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Abstract 
 
 
Sridhar Venkatapuram 
Health and social justice: The capability to be healthy 
 
 
This is an inter-disciplinary argument for a moral entitlement to a capability to be 
healthy.  Motivated by the goal to make a human right to health intelligible and 
justifiable, the thesis extends the capability approach, advocated by Amartya 
Sen and Martha Nussbaum, to the theory and practice of the human health 
sciences.  Moral claims related to human health are considered at the level of 
ethical theory, or a level of abstraction where principles of social justice that 
determine the purpose, form, and scope of basic social institutions are 
proposed, evaluated, and justified.  The argument includes 1) a conception of 
health as capability, 2) a theory of causation and distribution of health capability 
as well as 3) an argument for the moral entitlement to a sufficient and equitable 
capability to be healthy grounded in the respect for human dignity.  Moreover, 
the entitlement to the capability to be healthy is defended against alternative 
ethical approaches that focus on welfare or resources in evaluating and 
satisfying health claims. 
 
In specific, it is argued that human health is best understood as a capability to 
be healthy—a meta-capability to achieve a cluster of basic and inter-related 
capabilities and functionings.  Such a cluster of capabilities and functionings is 
in line with Martha Nussbaum’s central human capabilities.  A theory of 
causation and distribution of health capability is put forward that integrates the 
“classic” biomedical factors of disease (genetic endowment, exposure to 
hazardous materials, behaviour), social determinants of disease, and Drèze and 
Sen’s econometric analysis of the causation and distribution of acute and 
endemic malnutrition. 
 
Furthermore, the argument critiques Norman Daniels’s revised Rawlsian theory 
of health justice, and advocates for the capability approach to recognize group 
capabilities in light of “population health” phenomena.  Lastly, the thesis also 
argues that a coherent, capability conception of health as a species-wide 
conception will tend to make any theory of justice recognizing health claims a 
cosmopolitan theory of justice. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
1. The study of and concern over disparities in health achievements 
across social groups in industrialized countries, and the persistence of high 
prevalence of preventable mortality and impairments in poor countries have 
recently been conceptually brought together under the umbrella term ‘health 
equity’.  In order to motivate global-social action to address health disparities, 
it is argued that ethical values compel decreasing ‘health inequities’ across 
individuals and social groups.  Not all health constraints are necessarily 
morally troubling. Therefore, to identify which impairments qualify as 
inequities that require a response as a matter of social justice, three criteria 
in the form of a decision tree have been put forward.  A health constraint 
becomes a health inequity when it is deemed to be first, a) avoidable, then b) 
unnecessary, and then c) unjust or unfair.  Society is said be morally 
obligated to prevent and mitigate the health constraints that remain after 
applying the three-tier filter. (Whitehead, 1990; Whitehead, 1992; Evans et 
al., 2001)   
2. Though it has admirable intent, there are a number of weaknesses of 
this three-tier ‘health equity’ approach.  The most prominent weakness is the 
overarching vagueness about whether the moral concern is for the 
distribution patterns of health constraints—seen in terms of relative 
differences and inequities—or for other dimensions such as the absolute 
levels of health functionings, for the types of causes, for the consequences, 
or for all of these aspects.  Aside from this general ambiguity, there is a lack 
of clarity at each step of the decision tree.  At the first decision level of 
determining whether a health constraint is avoidable or not, there is no 
distinction made between whether a health constraint should be considered 
as being unavoidable because of the lack of resources or unavoidable 
because there is no extant epidemiological knowledge about aetiology, 
control, or treatment.  Both resource and informational limitations can make a 
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health constraint, including the ultimate constraint of death, unavoidable in a 
given location.  However, given ‘health equity’ advocates are greatly 
concerned with extreme global health disparities it would take the bite out of 
the approach if limits on local resources were allowed to determine what is 
avoidable or not.  Because limited resources and institutional capacities are 
obvious and significant reasons why health constraints persist in many poor 
countries, most of the health disparities would become unavoidable and thus, 
could not be identified as inequities.  At the same time, if limited local 
resources and institutional capacity cannot determine whether a health 
constraint is unavoidable, then it is unclear who is supposed to be compelled 
to act by the moral force of this framework.  If not local institutions, who is 
supposed to satisfy the local resource needs or stand in for the absent 
institutional capacities?  
3. A different set of implications follows when scientific knowledge 
determines whether a health constraint is avoidable or not.  Depending 
wholly on the expertise of epidemiology to determine which constraint is 
avoidable or not means taking as given existing disease categories and their 
underlying epidemiology.  This would absolve any social obligations to assist 
individuals with impairments and causes of mortality that are not currently 
recognized by ‘western medicine’ such as those listed in the ICD-10.1 (World 
Health Organization, 2007)  Second, because the criterion of ‘avoidable’ 
relies first and foremost on scientific knowledge of aetiology, control, and 
prevention, it expresses full confidence in the epistemology, coherence, and 
ethics of the practice of epidemiology.  Yet, the history of research scientists’ 
engagement with health concerns such as women’s reproductive health or 
HIV/AIDS should caution against such wholehearted confidence in 
epidemiology’s objective pursuit of scientific knowledge and practice. (Reid, 
1992; Epstein, 1996)  Third, because the criteria of ‘justice and fairness’ is 
the last step, the health constraints and their disparities that become 
classified as unavoidable or necessary by the first two steps are outside the 
scope of ethics.  That is, no justice claims can come from individuals who 
                                                 
1 The World Health Organization maintains a global reference database of all 
constraints on health referred to as the International Statistical Classification of 
Diseases and Related Health Problems, 10th Revision.      
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experience unavoidable or ‘necessary’ impairments and mortality.  Simply 
put, considering justice and fairness last means that the expertise of 
epidemiology is allowed to drive the scope and content of ethics rather than 
ethics driving the purpose and scope of the instrumental science of 
epidemiology. (Khushf, 1987; Weed, 1996; Weed et al., 1998; Weed et al., 
2001)   
4. Even accepting justice and fairness as the last consideration, the 
‘health equity’ approach expresses no clear commitment to a particular 
conception of justice or fairness.  There are references to human rights, and 
oblique references to Rawlsian social justice, and to Amartya Sen’s and 
Martha Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach. (Peter et al., 2001)  It is also 
important to note that despite the use of human rights rhetoric by ‘health 
equity’ advocates, the view is actually unsympathetic to rights.  The view 
expresses a particular form of utilitarianism—rule utilitarianism—where the 
underlying argument is that the state of the world would be much better 
overall (i.e. more health) if certain human rights, such as access to a 
minimum package of healthcare goods and services, were protected, 
provided, or promoted.  The protection of rights is invoked here as part of a 
purely consequentialist view.2  ‘Health equity’ advocates would likely have 
great difficulty navigating the conflict between rights and unlikely to side with 
rights in the classic conflict between individual rights and increasing overall 
social benefit.  Decreasing the magnitude of disparities is likely to have 
priority over individual rights.  As the current ‘health equity’ discussions are 
largely focused on aggregate health inequalities across social groups or 
populations, what rights or claims individuals have under a ‘health equity’ 
regime is unclear. 
5. This three-tiered approach to responding to health constraints is 
clearly an exercise in applied philosophy.  It seeks to apply ethical principles 
to existing institutions and practices, particularly to the clinical and public 
health sciences.  Ethicists are often fond of saying that ‘ought implies can’ 
                                                 
2 Rights can have a place in consequentialist analysis as has been argued by Sen.  
However, such an analysis is not made by ‘health equity’ advocates.  Instead, they 
advocate absolute rights for instrumental reasons.  For an analysis of rights and 
consequentialist reasoning see (Sen, 1981; Sen, 1984a; Sen, 1996) 
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and thus, it seems understandable to begin ‘health equity’ analysis with 
existing health institutions and their capacities, particularly that of 
epidemiological science.  But the shortcomings of this kind of applied 
philosophy are also clear in this situation.  Even after setting aside the 
uncertainty regarding who are the responsible agents and where the 
resources to build institutional capacities will come from, allowing 
epidemiological expertise to wholly determine the parameters of ethical 
reasoning that then determines the scope of social responses to human 
mortality and impairments is unjustified.  Science is a social endeavour and 
epidemiologists are fallible like all human beings.  Their fallibility, biases, and 
disciplinary limitations should preclude them from being the foremost or 
ultimate arbiters of the goals and breadth of the social response to health 
inequalities.  Of course, the same can be said about philosophers.   Neither 
profession can be the sole arbiter of what the social response should be to 
constraints on human health.   
6. Moreover, the social response to individuals who are vulnerable to or 
experience unavoidable impairments or mortality cannot just be silence.  
Within the ‘health equity’ framework they are literally pushed outside the 
margins of moral concern.  Respect for their equal moral worth has to be 
accounted for somewhere.  And, the notion that some mortality or 
impairments are necessary is profoundly problematic, requiring extra-
ordinary justification as a matter of justice, and cannot be presupposed to be 
acceptable as is done here. 
7. Though the ‘health equity’ movement and its decision tree are 
commendable for drawing on ethics to motivate greater social action 
addressing health inequalities, it is unfortunately an insufficient ethical 
framework.  Relying on the capacity of existing institutions, even if it is 
scientific expertise, precludes the comprehensive ethical evaluation of the 
causes, consequences, and distribution patterns of health constraints.  All 
three dimensions of human health have moral relevance.  The question of 
which impairment or mortality is unjust or unfair across individuals and 
groups—because of its causes, consequences, or distribution—must 
precede considering what our current social institutions are capable of 
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addressing.  If the right social institutions or capacities do not currently exist 
to address unjust or unfair health constraints, then our ethics should compel 
us to create such institutions and capacities.3  
8. Considering the epidemiology of an impairment prior to justice 
evidences a view that human health is foremost a phenomenon of nature, a 
‘natural good’, to which social institutions must respond.  Such a view is 
increasingly untenable given the growing recognition of the social production 
of determinants of impairments and mortality within and across societies as 
well as the extent of human/social domination over nature and individual 
agency. 4   A human being’s health is a product of iterative interactions 
between nature/biology, social institutions, and individual agency.  Thus, 
considerations of justice, or the principles that govern the actions of 
individuals and social institutions, cannot be secondary to the study of nature 
but must be integrated with it.  Proceeding in this vein, what follows is an 
argument for a moral entitlement to health at the level of ethical theory.  That 
is, claims related to human health are considered at a level of abstraction 
where principles of social justice that determine the purpose, form, and scope 
of basic social institutions are proposed, evaluated, and justified.  The 
argument includes 1) a conception of human health, 2) a theory of causation 
and distribution of health as well as 3) an argument for a moral entitlement to 
a capability to be healthy (CH).   
9. From the perspective of this three-part argument, every human being 
has a moral entitlement to the CH, and at a sufficient level that is 
commensurate with human dignity.  Showing respect for the equal moral 
worth and dignity of every human being entails the protecting, promoting, and 
restoring where possible her CH.  Such obligations map onto a diverse range 
of actors depending on how they are situated to the causes, consequences, 
and distribution patterns of health capability achievements and failures 
across individuals and social groups.  That is, different agents striving to 
                                                 
3 For an example of an argument for a moral claim to actions or goods that are not 
immediately available see Sen’s argument for a ‘meta-right’ or claim of citizens 
against their government that it must progressively realize economic and social 
goals.  (Sen, 1984a)   
4 This view is apparent in Thomas Pogge’s remark that the state of nature would not 
produce eight million poverty related deaths per year. (Pogge, 2005) 
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show respect for the equal dignity of human beings have different moral 
duties that can range from the duty not to constrain the CH (‘harm’), and 
alleviating consequences of past harm, to protecting, promoting, or restoring 
health capability.  Thus, the argument aims to illustrate that the health of 
human beings from the perspective of social justice requires continuous and 
iterative evaluation and social responses to the causes, consequences, and 
distribution patterns of a CH across individuals and social groups. 
10. The present argument for the entitlement to the CH—more 
specifically, to the social basis of a sufficient and equitable CH—extends the 
Capabilities Approach (CA) advocated by Sen and Nussbaum into the fields 
of health sciences including biology, epidemiology, clinical medicine, and 
public health.  The CA, at least the Senian version, has been described as a 
‘broad normative framework for the evaluation and assessment of individual 
well-being and social arrangements, the design of policies, and proposals 
about social change in society’. (Robeyns, 2005: p 94)  So far, the CA has 
had significant influence in numerous fields including welfare economics, 
political philosophy, and social development planning and policy.  In 
extending the CA to the health sciences and concern for human health in 
general, the three parts of the present argument bring together concepts and 
debates in the philosophy of biology and health, social determinants of health 
research as well as political philosophy to put forward a scientifically and 
ethically integrated argument.   
11. A ‘general’ theory of health and social justice needs to describe what 
health is, how it is created and distributed, and why it is valuable to human 
beings.  It should also be able to identify what to make of differences in 
health across individuals—what claims and obligations individuals have in 
regard to their health and the implications for the rights and duties of other 
agents.  For the sake of simplicity, the capacity to describe what health is and 
how it is created and distributed can be thought of as the descriptive 
capacities of such a theory.  Its capacity to guide an ethical social response 
to the differences in health across individuals and groups can be thought of 
as its ethical or normative capacities.  The argument for an entitlement to a 
CH presented below has many of these capacities, and much more.  But the 
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argument is not presented as a general theory because it is insufficient as a 
theory by itself.  It is unlikely that it could be a theory even if it relied even 
more heavily on the CA than it does already.  That is, fleshing out a health 
capability within a general theory of capabilities would be one way to produce 
a theory of health and justice.  But such an option is unavailable.  On the one 
hand, Sen rejects the need for ‘transcendental theories’ to do justice, 
implying that his conception of the CA is not intended to be one those 
comprehensive theories. (Sen, 2006)  On the other hand, Nussbaum asserts 
that her version of the CA is only a ‘partial’ theory of justice.  It is meant to be 
a minimal or sufficient conception of social justice. (Nussbaum, 2006: p 70-
71)  So in either case, extending the CA to health concerns will not deliver a 
full theory of health and social justice.5  For now, the present argument for 
the CH can be seen as articulating a framework and moral basis of a human 
entitlement to the capability to be healthy. 
12. The argument for a moral entitlement to a capability to be healthy or 
CH is divided into three parts.  In Part One, Chapters one and two present 
arguments for a theoretical conception of health and a unified theory of 
causation and distribution of health.  In Part Two, Chapters three and four 
review the CA and presents ethical arguments for a CH as an extension of 
the CA.  In Part Three, Chapters five thru eight present arguments for how 
conceiving of an entitlement to a CH is superior to ‘welfarist’ and ‘resourcist’ 
approaches to social justice.  Chapter six is largely focused on critiquing 
Norman Daniels’s recently revised Rawlsian approach to health and social 
justice.  Chapter seven and eight introduce the need to identify group 
capabilities in light of the ‘population health’ paradigm and research as well 
as the implications for global justice theory that result from implementing a 
concept of health as a species-wide capability.  The critique of Daniels and 
implicitly Rawls continues in Chapter 8 because of their difficulty in 
addressing health concerns across national borders.  The ‘descriptive’ or 
                                                 
5 This contrasts with the approach of Norman Daniels who extends Rawls’s theory of 
justice to health issues, and presents it as a full theory of health and social justice.  
Of course, this makes his argument entirely dependent on the coherence of Rawls’s 
theory.  To withstand criticisms against Rawls’s theory, Daniels has recently begun 
also drawing on Scanlon’s moral contractualism as well as trying to show similarities 
with the CA and opportunities for welfare approaches. (Daniels et al., 1999; Daniels, 
2007)    
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empirical science arguments of Part One are presented in conjunction with 
the normative argument for a moral entitlement to a CH in Parts Two and 
Three because they provide independent support.  They establish 
independently, rather than as an extension of CA, the coherence of 
understanding health as a capability and the robustness of an ‘entitlement’ 
theory of causation and distribution of a health capability.6   
13. The three parts of the argument are mutually reinforcing, and the 
entire argument is inter-disciplinary.  Applied philosophy necessarily has to 
be interdisciplinary as it applies philosophical scrutiny to a particular subject 
that has its own distinct assumptions, goals and methodology.  Such an 
endeavour is particularly complicated when philosophical scrutiny takes aim 
at the natural and biological sciences, as they are often perceived to be 
outside the scope of values.  The arguments presented here aim to create 
some common understanding across the natural and social sciences as well 
as ethics on a range of ideas including the concept of human health, how it is 
caused and distributed, and what the ethical social response should be to the 
absolute levels and relative differences in health capability across individuals 
and populations.  If need be, Part One may be understood as arguments in 
the sub-disciplines of philosophy of biology, medicine and epidemiology.  
Parts Two and Three are arguments in political philosophy that are situated 
against the background debates on whether the focal point of distributive 
justice should be on individual welfare, resources or capabilities.7     
14. Chapter 1 presents a theory of human health as a CH, or more 
specifically, an overarching ‘meta-capability’.  A person’s health should be 
understood to be an assessment of her capability to achieve, exercise or, 
express (‘achieve’) a cluster of basic and inter-related capabilities and 
functionings.  Chapter 2 presents a theory of causation and distribution of 
health that conceptually integrates its four causal factors which include 
individual biology, exposures to material particles, influence of social 
conditions, and individual agency (skills and choices).  Even though Chapter 
                                                 
6 This use of entitlement refers specifically to the ‘entitlement analysis’ used by Jean 
Drèze and Amartya Sen, which is understood as the precursor to the CA. 
7 Rights theories are not discussed separately as capabilities are seen as a species of 
rights.  The moral entitlement to social support for the CH is presented as being a 
‘cluster-right’ as identified by Judith Jarvis Thomson. 
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1 advocates a conception of health that is more expansive than a narrow 
focus on disease, Chapter 2 argues for a theoretical model of causation and 
distribution that is applicable to both a limited focus on disease as well as the 
broader focus on health capability, or achieving a cluster of capabilities and 
functionings.   
15. We arrive at the notion of health as a capability to achieve a cluster 
of basic and inter-related capabilities and functionings through first rejecting 
the incoherent though dominant view of health as the absence of disease.  
Disease, in this view, is defined as a biological part or process’s deviation 
from the statistically normal distribution of functioning.8  This now classic and 
purportedly scientific account initially advocated by Christopher Boorse in the 
1970s has numerous flaws which are reviewed.  Eschewing the ‘naturalistic’ 
or objective path to a definition of human health of Boorse and others, we 
instead review and adapt Lennart Nordenfelt’s holistic theory of health.  His 
theory, roughly stated, is that health is the ability to achieve vital goals.  
However, even though Nordenfelt provides a strong case for conceiving 
health as the ability to achieve vital goals, he includes the clause, ‘given 
standard circumstances’ to account for local cultural norms and practices 
determining the content of vital goals.  Though this seems descriptively 
accurate, local cultural norms or social practices are significant determinants 
of much avoidable mortality and morbidity around the world.  This is evident 
in the situation of girls and women in many developing countries.  Poor 
reproductive and sexual functionings in girls and women because of 
patriarchal cultural norms leads to millions of avoidable deaths and 
impairments every year. (MDG and Reproductive Health Team, 2004)  
Because cultural norms can undermine the achievement of vital goals of 
individuals, especially affecting those who are socially powerless, the 
meaning of health becomes empty if local cultural practices have absolute 
determining power over the content of vital goals, or who can achieve them 
and when.  So we replace Nordenfelt’s fully culturally relative, descriptive 
                                                 
8 For the sake of simplicity it will be assumed that statistically normal means the 
health measurement is a cardinal value and within two standard deviations of a 
standard normal curve.  A measurement is ‘normal’ when it falls within the central 
ninety-five percent of all the range of given measurements. 
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account of health as achieving vital goals with another account of a human-
species-wide minimum conception of vital goals.  This is done by replacing 
Nordenfelt’s empty set of culturally relative vital goals with Nussbaum’s 
account of basic human capabilities, or activities and opportunities that 
constitute a life with minimal human dignity.  Nussbaum also offers 
compelling reasoning to view these basic capabilities as pre-political moral 
entitlements, or claims to social support for exercising these basic 
capabilities, as being a source of basic political principles guiding social 
organization.        
16. Another significant contribution of reorienting our notion of health 
away from the absence of disease or statistically normal functioning to the 
framework of capabilities will be the surmounting of explanatory and 
informational limitations of current epidemiological models used to identify 
the determinants and distribution of impairments.  Conflating our general 
concern for health with the narrow and ambiguous concept of ‘disease’ has 
created much confusion for both our understanding of the variety of concerns 
we group under health as well as how and what we identify as the causes, 
consequences, and distribution patterns of health.  The field of epidemiology, 
which is the informational engine of public health programmes and clinical 
medicine, identifies the causes, distribution, and effective treatments of 
diseases and related health problems (‘impairments’) in individuals.  Yet, not 
withstanding the prodigious amounts of health research being published, a 
divisive debate is taking place amongst epidemiologists concerning whether 
the determinants of disease can only include individual-level ‘biomedical’ 
factors such as genetic endowment, exposures to material substances, and 
lifestyle behaviours or whether supra-individual factors such as social 
processes that have influence through distal factors and psycho-biological 
pathways can also be legitimate determinants.  At the heart of the debate is 
whether epidemiology should be seen as a natural science seeking to 
objectively identify natural phenomena or whether it is an instrumental and 
social science with a social mission. (Krieger, 1994; Susser et al., 1996a; 
Susser et al., 1996b; Rothman et al., 1998; Marmot, 2006) 
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17. Meanwhile, social epidemiologists continue to accumulate evidence 
about a range of social determinants that explain the causation and social 
distribution patterns of impairments and mortality due to chronic conditions. 
(Berkman et al., 2000)  Social determinants are causes behind the 
proximate, biomedical causes of impairments and mortality.  The fact that 
these determinants are social processes, and not the usual physical 
materials, and that they can often be one step removed from a proximate, 
individual level biomedical determinant raises complex theoretical and 
practical challenges for establishing the chain of causality.  The non-material 
nature also means that the observations of the causal phenomenon will be 
contaminated with social values.  Nevertheless, it is clear that the current 
linear cause and effect and exposure to disease/no disease ratio models 
dominant in epidemiology are inadequate.  Even with sophisticated multi-
factor statistical regression analysis, the existing biomedical categories of 
factors cannot sufficiently explain the causation and distribution patterns of 
chronic conditions. (Syme, 1996)  In contrast, social determinants research is 
proving to be far more robust.  Social determinants research is also 
questioning the model of discrete exposures by highlighting the broader 
interactive and iterative processes between the individual and the 
environment over the life course.  A new model of causation and distribution 
is needed that can capture both the biomedical causal factors as well as the 
social causes over the entire life course. (Susser, 1994a; Susser, 1994b; 
Susser et al., 1996a; Susser et al., 1996b; Marmot, 2005; Marmot, 2006)  
18. Chapter 2 presents such a candidate theory of causation and 
distribution of health that applies to epidemiology the ‘entitlement theory’ 
initially developed in the field of development economics.  Epidemiology is, at 
the core, driven by statistical analysis.  Thus, it has much in common with 
other social sciences such as economics that use statistics to model human 
behaviour.  To the extent that economic analysis can model the influence of 
the social environment, it behoves epidemiology to make use of those tools 
to model the influences of social environment on health.9  Jean Drèze and 
                                                 
9 Recent research on multi-level environmental analysis in social epidemiology has 
much in common with empirical analysis used in economics and sociology.  See 
Subramanian.  (Subramanian et al., 2004) 
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Amartya Sen constructed a general theory of famines or rather, malnutrition 
that explained its causes as well as asymmetric effects. (Drèze et al., 1989)  
That is, after showing how the scarcity of food explains only some 
occurrences, they were able to fully explain the causation and distribution of 
different levels of malnutrition across individuals.  They did this through 
building a model that accounted for the influence of an individual’s 
endowments (biological needs, labour capacity, productive land, and 
government transfers) and abilities to make adequate exchanges in the 
marketplace (social conditions) in meeting nutritional needs. (Drèze et al., 
1989)  The independent and interactive effects of the diversity in personal 
features/endowments, social environment/market prices, and abilities to 
convert personal endowments and social arrangements determine the 
different ‘bundles’ of food a person can acquire.  The amounts and diversity 
of bundles of goods that each person is able to acquire then reflects the 
asymmetry in nutrition levels across individuals.  Thus, the scarcity of food in 
the physical environment is ‘demoted’ to being only one type of causal factor 
or explanation.  In sum, Drèze and Sen were able to thoroughly model the 
interactions between nature/biology, society/market arrangements, and 
individual agency in an individual’s capability to achieve and actual 
achievement of adequate nutrition. 
19. Epidemiologists can learn valuable lessons from evaluating the 
significant differences between what would result from a traditional 
biomedical, epidemiological analysis of the causation and distribution of 
malnutrition, and the analysis produced by Drèze and Sen.  The biomedical 
focus on individual level exposure or non-exposure to physical quantities of 
micronutrients seems myopic in comparison to Drèze and Sen’s general 
theory of causation and distribution of acute and endemic malnutrition.  How 
is it that two economists can explain the causation and social distribution 
patterns of malnutrition anywhere in the world at any time period better than 
epidemiologists can?  What value does the biomedical model’s level of 
analysis have in the actual prevention and mitigation of malnutrition?  It 
seems the value of applying the entitlement theory from famine analysis to 
epidemiology is the dramatic expansion of explanatory variables beyond just 
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personal biological features, exposures to physical materials, and lifestyle 
choices. 
20. The entitlement analysis adds the causal component of social 
conditions which can have either direct or second-order impact.  This 
importantly allows entitlement analysis, which has evolved into the CA, the 
ability to integrate the classic biomedical model of disease causation with 
cutting edge research on the social determinants of health. (Marmot, 2006)  
In fact, the CA has much to offer social determinants research.  The 
capability model of causation and distribution can integrate the disparate 
strands of social determinants research including research on influence of 
material conditions over the life-course; the effects of income inequality, 
stress, and lack of autonomy on psycho-biological pathways; and, even 
research on social cohesion.  Moreover, applying the CA to social 
epidemiology highlights how even social determinants research actually 
focuses on the causation and distribution of disease, not health.  Through 
providing a coherent conception of health that is richer than concern for 
disease, and showing how modelling and statistical methodology from 
economics can be used to analyse health issues, the CH idea and causal 
model offers the potential to expand even the social epidemiologists’ toolkit.   
21. Based on the template of Drèze and Sen’s model of the general 
theory of malnutrition, an individual’s CH or bundles of health ‘beings and 
doings’ that can possibly be exercised by a person are created by the 
interaction between 1) an individual’s biological needs or features, 2) her 
physical and mental abilities to convert her own endowments and external, 
extant material goods and social conditions into health functionings, and the 
extant 3) material goods and 4) social conditions in the environment.10  In 
purely descriptive terms, the failure to achieve certain health ‘beings and 
doings’ such as living a normal length of life span or avoiding impairments 
can be explained in terms of having insufficient bundles of  ‘beings and 
doings’ due to the independent and interactive effects of the four causal 
                                                 
10 The analysis of luck as a causal factor is deferred in this dissertation.  Because 
luck works through all these four categories it is a cause of a different order.  For 
discussions on luck see Nagel, Nussbaum, and Williams. (Nagel, 1979; Williams, 
1981; Nussbaum, 2001)   
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factors.  A person’s health being ‘constrained’ means that their bundles of 
‘beings and doings’—their entitlement set of functionings—are either not 
comprehensive enough, being restricted, or both. 
22. However, because human beings do not live in a complete state of 
nature but in an environment that is largely socially constructed, responsibility 
for the failure of capabilities can be thought of being due to a large extent 
from the lack of sufficient supportive external material and social conditions 
(‘social basis’) or due to personal choices (‘agency’).  Nature (biology), 
individual choice, and society (material and social conditions) interact in the 
daily circumstances of life of every human being and produce complex 
patterns of benefits and disadvantage, most glaringly in the differences in life 
spans and morbidity. (Nagel, 1997)  That does not mean, however, that all 
three have equal causal weight.  The extent of the ability of modern human 
beings to influence or exert control over nature, other human beings, and 
material and social conditions means that causation must to a large extent or 
indeed, ultimately refer to human and social actions or inactions.  Despite a 
model of causation positing four types of causal factors in the achievements 
and failures of capabilities, the greatest responsibility lies with social 
institutions.11 
23. Part Two there is a shift to developing an argument for a moral 
entitlement to a CH in line with the CA developed by Sen and Nussbaum. 
(Sen, 1999a; Nussbaum, 2006)  It is argued that every human being has a 
moral entitlement to the social basis of a sufficient and equitable CH because 
of its intrinsic value in constituting human dignity as well as its instrumental 
value for conceiving, pursuing, and revising (‘pursuing’) one’s own life plans 
within contemporary global society.  It makes use of both the Senian 
capability ‘analytical device’ as well as Nussbaum’s normative argument for 
pre-political entitlements to basic capabilities that are said to arise out of 
human dignity and equal moral worth. (Nussbaum, 2000; Robeyns, 2005)  As 
                                                 
11 In response to Onora O’Neill’s argument that rights only exist where there are 
perfect obligations, Sen writes that rights sometimes produce obligations for 
whoever can help.  Such a notion that, even without an identifiable agent, whoever 
can help must do so exemplifies the thinking that social institutions or human 
societies are ultimately responsible for what does and does not happen in the world. 
(Sen, 2004c; Sen, 2005)   
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such, the CH argument presented here is a Sen-Nussbaum ‘hybrid’ 
argument.  As described in Chapter 1, it is also indebted to the work of 
Lennart Nordenfelt.  His trenchant critique of the biostatistical and other 
disparate theories of health, and his argument for health as an ability to 
achieve vital goals links capability theory to longstanding discussions in the 
philosophy of health, biology and medicine. 12  (Nordenfelt et al., 1984; 
Nordenfelt et al., 2001b)   
24. Drawing on Aristotle and Marx, Nussbaum claims that for a person to 
be able to live a life worthy of the dignity of the human being entails that she 
possesses certain capabilities that represent various kinds and amounts of 
activity and opportunity.  These ten central human capabilities (CHCs), each 
‘above’ a specified threshold, all-inclusively constitute a level of substantive 
freedom to pursue one’s own ends in such a way that is commensurate with 
the dignity of the human being. 13  (Nussbaum, 2006)  A liberal society, 
according to Nussbaum, should guarantee pre-political entitlements to this 
set of basic human capabilities to conceive and pursue one’s ends.  The 
breadth of capabilities account for the unique ‘neediness and sociability’ of 
human animals in addition to their reasoning powers.  The dignity of the 
human being reflects its ‘enmattered’ animality as well as it rationality.  A 
social guarantee to the social basis of these capabilities would show respect 
for the dignity of the human being and the equal moral worth of every human 
being.14     
                                                 
12 The CH argument is also influenced by the sociologist Bryan Turner’s recent work 
on human vulnerability.  He advocates placing the notion of human vulnerability at 
the centre of social and political philosophy and as serving as the foundation for a 
sociological theory of human rights. (Turner, 2006).  Turner’s theorizing is 
compelling for its starting point is the shared human vulnerability to suffering and 
loss of dignity that is an inherent aspect of being a physically embodied being.   
13 The idea of thresholds and levels reflect the notion that these capabilities can be 
measured in a particular way.  Measuring capabilities and functionings is a difficult 
project on its own, but will be assumed to be a plausible concept and 
uncontroversial at this point. 
14 Nussbaum’s notion of dignity highlights the difference between the human animal 
from other animals.  For example, the way a human eats in social surrounding is 
different from the way another animal might eat.  Rather than deny that humans are 
animals, these capabilities are aimed to prevent human animals from having to live 
like other herd animals which survive only by instinct and are pushed around by the 
forces of nature/environment and random events. 
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25. In the realm of political theory and social policy, proponents of the CA 
argue that human capabilities, such as the ten CHCs, should be the primary 
focus of social/distributive justice rather than an exclusive focus on the 
distribution of welfare, resources, opportunities, access to advantage, 
liberties, or some other similar conception.  Such a CA proponent should also 
be convinced that the CH should be a central if not the first consideration in 
conceptualizing social justice.  If capabilities are to be the focus of social 
justice, then the CH should be considered first among valuable capabilities.  
There should be a priority of the CH among capabilities and thus in social 
justice because on the one hand, if a person is no longer alive there is little 
point in discussing to which capabilities they are entitled or what justice owes 
them more generally.15   On the other hand, dismissing the concerns for 
physical and mental impairments of persons who are alive as being outside 
the purview of social justice is disrespectful to the majority of humanity who 
are differently constrained by impairments to pursue their own ends.16  By not 
addressing a real and burdensome aspect of the experience of daily living for 
most of humanity in the cotemporary world, theorizing about social justice 
that brackets health issues can be thought of as purely academic at best.  At 
its worst, such reasoning exhibits wilful ignorance.  The CH of individuals, 
rather than be taken for granted in theorizing about social justice, should be 
understood as fundamentally determining the real ‘worth’ of all capabilities to 
pursue and revise life plans.17  
26. As a coherent extension of the primary concern for the right to life of 
every citizen, the concern for the CH of citizens should be first priority of 
social institutions.  The CH includes the capability to live a normal length of 
life span and achieve a cluster of capabilities and functionings.  The respect 
                                                 
15 I do not assert that there is absolutely no point as I am still open to some of 
Kamm’s interesting arguments for how and what we might owe people that are no 
longer alive. Bryan Turner also cites the example of a right to a decent burial.  
(Kamm, 1993; Turner, 2006).   
16 Nusbbaum’s CHCs include all different kinds of capabilities so the argument here 
for the priority of CH is directed at other capabilities theorists and others not 
following Nussbaum. 
17 In a footnote in The Law of Peoples, Rawls largely defers to Sen and CA with 
respect to basic capabilities being prior in importance to primary goods, and the 
use of primary goods in order to get as close to ‘Sen’s effective freedoms’. In other 
discussions Rawls defers to Sen regarding the needs of individuals below a 
threshold of basic functioning.  See (Rawls, 1993; Rawls, 1999: p 13) 
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for the right to life of individuals is foremost on any society’s list of basic 
organizing principles.  But health concerns are thought to be in the realm of 
medicine and require the distribution of resources or subject to lifestyle 
choices.  And social obligations to prevent threats to life and threats to health 
are distinguished in an ambiguous way. (Venkatapuram, 2006b)  The CH 
argument conceptually ‘reunites’ or integrates the ability to stay alive and the 
ability to be healthy.  Death is seen as the ultimate constraint on dignity and 
health functionings, caused by biological, material, social, and volitional 
causes.  Thus, a conception of social justice which begins with human 
dignity, which includes the CH, makes the CH the first concern on the social 
and indeed, global justice agenda.  The argument for the CH and human 
dignity should serve to elevate the notion of health justice to the same level 
as the concern for political and economic justice.  Without health capability 
there is no equal human dignity nor can economic and social justice be 
pursued. 
27. It would be misguided to interpret the present CH argument as either 
advocating the forcing of individuals to be healthy, or as making scientifically 
ill-informed arguments for entitlements to impossible health achievements.  
The spectre of perfectionism or the impossibility critique directed against the 
CA can also be as easily and mistakenly posited against the argument for the 
CH.  The present argument is for the entitlement to the social basis of the CH 
and reflects a continual awareness of two dimensions.  On the one hand, it 
recognizes the normative importance of individual choice and responsibility in 
liberal theory.  But the respect for individual agency is set against the 
background of our most current sociological understandings of the links 
between agency and (global) social structures broadly.  It is also aware of the 
agency-structure debates in specific relation to health issues. (Turner, 2004)  
On the other hand, the argument reflects an awareness of the most current 
scientific developments in the health sciences while taking a critical view of 
the parameters, methodologies, and social practices of scientific research. 
(Trostle, 2004; Venkatapuram, 2006a)  Too often, philosophers defer to the 
expertise of natural scientists, and these scientists rarely question the 
epistemology or ethics of their expertise.  In fact, part of the driving force 
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behind the argument for the CH is that ethical reasoning has so far not kept 
current on the knowledge of the causes, consequences, and distribution 
patterns of human mortality and impairments.  Too much is deferred to the 
authority of scientific expertise, and extant information on impairments and 
mortality is too readily accepted.  And conversely, scientific practice in the 
health sciences, particularly in epidemiology and public health, has only just 
begun to incorporate philosophical reasoning.  (Weed, 1996; Weed, 1999; 
Roberts et al., 2002; Weed et al., 2003)   
28. Both Sen and Nussbaum have indeed referred to human health 
concerns in terms of capabilities.  Sen has suggested such a capability 
through various examples of health functionings.  And Nussbaum has 
explicitly identified a CH among the ten CHCs.  However, the writings of both 
create much uncertainty about the content of a CH in either of their versions.  
An example from each may elucidate such an assertion.  In the monograph 
Inequality Re-examined, Sen contrasts the subjective welfarist understanding 
of well-being with the ‘well-ness’ of a person understood as the achievement 
of a set of interrelated functionings that can include ‘being adequately 
nourished, being in good health, avoiding escapable morbidity and premature 
mortality, etc…’  (Sen, 1992 p.39)  Looking beyond his concern to distinguish 
between well-being and wellness, his listing of being healthy as a separate 
functioning from being adequately nourished and avoiding morbidity and 
premature mortality is confusing.  Lest this is seen as a one-off instance of 
ambiguity, Sen’s vehement refusal to identify any ‘core’ or ‘basic’ capabilities 
has meant that there has been a lack of comprehensive evaluation of any 
single capability aside from the use of examples to buttress the general 
arguments for the CA in various areas of social concern.18 (Sen, 1998a; Sen, 
                                                 
18 See (Sen, 1984a; Sen, 2002b) Moreover, it is unusual that the text of the keynote 
address, ‘Health from the perspective of freedom’ presented at a conference in 
2000 at the Harvard Medical School is still unavailable almost seven years later.  
While the basic form of the present argument for the CH being that individuals have 
a right to the equal capability to be healthy was affirmed at that conference, the lack 
of any comprehensive consideration of health capability has meant having to draw 
on a diverse range of modest length articles and speeches by Sen that discuss 
health and capabilities as well as those written by others on the subject that are 
often rife with conceptual errors.  See (Sen, 1984a; Sen, 1992; Sen, 1994a; Sen, 
1998b; Sen, 1998a; Sen, 1999c; Sen, 1999d; Sen, 1999b; Sen, 1999a; Sen, 2001b; 
Anand, 2002; Sen, 2002b; Sen, 2002a; Ruger, 2004a; Ruger, 2004b; Sen, 2004b; 
Anand, 2005; Ruger, 2006; Ruger et al., 2006)  
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1999a; Sen, 1999c; Sen, 2002a; Sen, 2002b; Sen, 2004b)  Important for the 
present for CH, Sen’s refusal to identify any basic capabilities also means 
that his version of the CA cannot provide a species-wide conception of 
health.  Like Nordenfelt, Sen offers only an empty set of capabilities.  Health 
capability will be whatever different societies choose to include as being 
basic through public deliberation. 
29. In contrast, Nussbaum provides the most thorough discussion so far 
of the capability to be healthy of persons in Women and Human 
Development.  (Nussbaum, 2000 pp. 70-96)  However, she too leaves a lot 
undone.  In that exposition, Nussbaum points out the need to determine 
which health functionings should be induced, rather than just ensuring the 
capability, as well as the need to determine what threshold levels of various 
functionings must be achieved in order to be considered adequate.  
Nevertheless, she defers the important discussion on which functionings  
must be induced and the minimum levels of health functionings to a future 
legislative stage and public deliberation. (Nussbaum, 2000: p 91)  There are 
still many aspects of the causes, consequences, distribution of health 
achievements and failures that need to be considered as a matter of first 
principles.  Furthermore, even if all ten capabilities are important for 
Nussbaum, it is hard not to notice that biological viability (‘life’) and physical 
integrity are still listed first and second on her list.  Such covert priority can be 
avoided or reduced if and when health is understood as a CH—an 
assessment of the entire cluster of basic capabilities—as it is done here.    
30. Nussbaum’s partial theory is commendable for making severe 
physical and mental impairments of human beings a central concern of the 
basic principles of justice.  She emphasizes that taking into account the 
interests of severely impaired individuals at the first stage of ethical 
reasoning on basic principles will result in substantive guidance for the basic 
structures of society rather than cursory accommodations.  But she does not 
go further and consider the implications for such first principles that would 
result from integrating the most current research, debates and theories of 
causation and distribution of health functionings.  The health capabilities and 
functionings she does outline within the ten CHCs should be understood as 
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implicitly referring only to the avoidance of disease.  She does not seem to 
have yet considered more fully the current debates on the determinants and 
distribution of human impairments and mortality, or the epistemology of the 
underlying individual biomedical model of disease causation.  Her 
discussions of health capabilities take the concepts of disease and health as 
given.  At the same time, even she recognizes that health institutions are 
equipped with necessary but often abused powers of coercion and 
paternalism.  In light of such coercive authority combined with the remarkable 
findings in research on the social determinants of health constraints/ 
inequalities means that providing only a rough outline of health capabilities, 
while asserting their centrality to human life and dignity leaves far too much 
work undone.  A capability to be healthy has to be centrally and explicitly 
identified and developed.     
31. One implication of giving more consideration to health capability, 
which is particularly relevant to Nussbaum’s approach, is that in light of the 
recent social determinants research and global experience with new and 
resurgent infectious disease epidemics, ensuring the social basis to even just 
a sufficient threshold level of health capability for every citizen will require a 
stringent and irrevocable commitment to certain basic social arrangements.  
Nussbaum conceives her list as being a source of political principles up to 
the individuals reaching certain thresholds of capabilities.  Social 
determinants research shows that even above a threshold level of material 
sufficiency, social inequalities in such things as control, stress, and respect in 
the workplace have influence through psychobiological pathways.  Thus, 
there will be a need to permanently regulate or prevent certain social 
inequalities in order to prevent or mitigate resulting inequalities in health 
capability.  That is, some kinds of social inequalities across individuals and 
groups should not be allowed even after every individual has the minimum 
level of central capabilities.  This leads to discarding the possible notion of a 
minimal conception of central capabilities as a preliminary standard that 
needs to be reached through provision of minimal material goods and social 
conditions.  Rather, whatever the level of material and social conditions, 
ensuring a minimum set of CHCs means that certain kinds of social 
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inequalities cannot be allowed for they will always threaten to undermine 
minimum thresholds of CHC or CH.  Such an understanding casts doubt on 
Nussbaum’s openness to the possibilities of other kinds of social justice 
theories, such as that of Rawls’s theory, after the ten CHC are realized for 
every citizen.19  Instead of certain levels being reached by individuals, it is 
more helpful to think of society as a system.  A more thorough appreciation of 
the causation and distribution of the ten CHCs in light of social determinants 
research will more than likely mean that some of the stringent requirements 
for or against certain social conditions under a central capabilities regime will 
have to be permanent.  The options for above the thresholds will not be as 
open as Nussbaum seems to imagine, thus making the ten CHCs a more 
permanent feature of social justice.     
32. Furthermore, though both Nussbaum and Sen advocate a significant 
role for public deliberation in determining the specific content and 
prioritization of capabilities socially guaranteed in a given society, it is far 
from clear how such public deliberation would occur.  What does public 
deliberation look like that would be in line with the CA?  The role public 
deliberation will have in relation to the CH is no exception to this general 
uncertainty.  In fact, research has shown that using public deliberations in 
health policy making tend be very complicated. (Hadorn, 1991)  
Nevertheless, there are at least three places in the CH where public 
deliberation must come in.  First, in the initial discussions on the concept of a 
list of basic or central capabilities that is part of achieving overlapping 
consensus.  Second, in identifying the sufficient and equitable thresholds of 
basic capabilities within and across societies.  Third, there must also be 
public deliberation on how to prioritize the social responses to the 
determinants, consequences, and distribution patterns of absolute levels and 
relative inequalities in health capability.  The upshot of this is that public 
                                                 
19 Nussbaum writes that her ten CHCs comprise a partial theory of justice because 
they do not identify all the requirements of what is necessary for a just society.  The 
ten CHCs only identify what will be guaranteed as a social minimum no matter what 
else is decided.  She also argues that putting forward a partial theory is acceptable 
because the world is so far from ensuring the every human being has these 
minimum capabilities that constructing a complete theory of justice can be 
deferred. P 75. (Nussbaum, 2006)  In contrast, Sen argues that a complete 
‘transcendental’ theory is not necessary to do justice in a particular situation.  (Sen, 
2006) 
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deliberation is central to the protection, promotion, and restoration of the CH 
of individuals but more reasoning needs to be done as to how such 
deliberations can occur in line with the CA. 
33. Thomas Pogge makes the point that though public deliberation is an 
important component of CA, the advocates of the CA should still put forward 
specific content and rankings.  They are, after all, respected members of the 
public. (Pogge, 2002a)  This comment was directed particularly at Sen who 
has hitherto been unwilling to specify any particular capability as being 
valuable.  However, Sen has recently been more willing to identify some 
capabilities which he believes would be valued by all societies.  Yet, he still 
insists against any assertion of ‘the one list’ of capabilities. (Sen, 2004a)  In 
any case, either in Sen’s off-the-record reflections on commonly valued 
capabilities or Nussbaum’s ten CHCs, the CH is present and prominent.  But 
it is too under-described by both writers.  Admittedly, it could be said that the 
CH is probably less ambiguous or less ignored in the CA literature than other 
capabilities that also could be considered basic such as education, or political 
participation.   The general schematic nature of capabilities in the literature 
may be understandable given Sen and Nussbaum are arguing for a general 
theory to social justice rather than one particular capability.  Nevertheless, it 
seems undeniable that the CH has to be a basic, if not the first capability of 
human beings.      
34. While it is possible to argue for a CH separate from any theory or 
approach to social justice, by extending the CA to some central and 
foundational issues in the health sciences, the aim is to add value to both the 
CA and the health disciplines.  In following the rigorous and radical critique 
initiated by the CA in the fields of economics and political philosophy, the 
argument for the CH aims to similarly reorient health sciences towards 
expanding human capabilities.  There is a pressing need to counteract the 
dominance of evidence based medicine, efficiency analysis, and aggregation 
of health achievements. (Khushf, 1987; Anand et al., 1997)  There is no 
dispute that social responses to human health issues have to be clinically 
and epidemiologically effective in addressing health concerns.  The most 
appropriate knowledge and technology must be identified and applied to the 
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health issue at hand.  And the social responses also have to be efficient in 
the allocation of social and material resources when it is clear that demand 
for resources outstrips supply.  However, considering the equitable 
distribution of resources after the scope of healthcare treatments is identified 
and efficiency calculations have been made is inadequate.20  Just as justice 
needs to be considered prior to epidemiology, justice has to be considered 
‘upstream’ prior to distributing healthcare through the continuous ethical 
evaluation of determinants, consequences, and distribution patterns of health 
constraints across individuals and social groups.   
35. Though the driving motivation behind formulating the argument for a 
moral entitlement to the CH is that the CA has something to offer our 
reasoning on health and justice, the argument in turn produces some 
suggestions for followers of both versions of the CA to consider.  The final 
chapter concludes the dissertation by presenting some of those points for CA 
advocates to consider in the further development of the CA.  Furthermore, 
the shortcomings of purely resourcist or welfarist conceptions of health 
claims which are presented in Parts Two and Three are identified as 
additional ammunition against these competing approaches.  And lastly, it 
should be noted that at the same time as putting forward an integrated 
argument for an entitlement to a health capability, the eight chapters herein 
present at least seven original arguments contributing to capability theory 
literature.  They include:   
35.1. A conception of health as a capability to achieve a cluster of 
basic capabilities and functionings.  This conception links the CA to 
the longstanding philosophy of health debates.   
35.2. A capability based theory of health causation and distribution is 
proposed that integrates the individual level biomedical model with 
social determinants research, and which goes beyond the focus on 
disease.  The conception of health as capability and theory of 
                                                 
20 This is not to say that there are no justice issues in the allocation of healthcare.  
Daniels identifies three unsolved rationing problems.  He identifies them as the 
aggregation problem, the most in need versus the most benefit problem, and the 
fair chance versus greatest benefit problem.  See Daniels’s ‘Equity and Population 
health.’ (Daniels, 2006) 
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causation and distribution of health capability both provide 
independent support for a CH outside of the CA.   
35.3. It is illustrated how the moral claim to CH, and indeed any 
capability, can be understood as a ‘cluster right’ as outlined by Judith 
Jarvis Thomson.   
35.4. An explicit analysis is presented of how a CH would fare 
against health claims from welfare or resource theories.   
35.5. Norman Daniels’s revised Rawlsian theory of health justice is 
reviewed and criticized from a capability perspective.   
35.6. Some basic ideas from social epidemiology and ‘population 
health’ are extended to the capabilities literature to argue that 
capability theory needs to recognize group capabilities.   
35.7. It is argued that a coherent conception of health as a species-
wide conception means that health claims in the ‘primary goods 
space’ of any distributive theory will tend to transform it into a 
cosmopolitan theory of justice. 
36. The scope and limitations of this argument. 
37. The present argument is severely constrained foremost by an 80,000 
word limit.  Indeed, each of the eight chapters could have been expanded to 
80,000 words and been a dissertation on its own.  But the guiding aim of the 
research project has been to illustrate how the idea of a right to health could 
be made coherent and justifiable through the CA.  Achieving that required 
examining some foundational concepts both in the health sciences and in 
ethics.  This also meant covering a lot of ground in a number of disciplines, 
asking ambitiously expansive questions, and becoming exposed to the 
benefits and pitfalls of inter-disciplinary research.  Indeed, the CA has been 
described as ‘post-disciplinary’ as it can potentially bring together a variety of 
disciplines cutting across empirical and normative analysis. (Robeyns, 2002)  
In any case, the value of putting forward the big picture on health and 
capabilities within the word limit has been taken to be worth the price of 
leaving out or giving less consideration of a range of issues, at least for now.   
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38. The argument avoids presenting interesting background material or 
reacting to disparate points and debates that cut across the topic of health 
inequalities and (global) social justice.  Importantly, the argument also does 
not settle every matter that it raises.  At this point in the evolution of the CA, 
and its even more nascent application to health issues, building a framework 
while highlighting some challenges is seen as a worthwhile endeavour. 
39. Aside from considering the coherence of the overall argument, a 
variety of factors determined what was included and excluded within the 
argument for the CH.  Some topics were substantively researched but 
excluded simply because of the lack of space.  They are thought not to affect 
the main components of the argument.  Things that were left out included a 
review of individual and population health measures as well as recent work 
on health and social capital.  Some discussions were left out because they 
were published or presented elsewhere. (Venkatapuram, 2006a; 
Venkatapuram, 2006b)  Discussions on bioethics and nascent ‘public health 
ethics’ were left out because they were largely negative critiques of their 
inadequate consideration of recent work in political philosophy.  Lastly, it will 
be clear that even though there is a nascent but growing interest among 
political philosophers on the topic of health inequalities, whether domestic or 
global, many of these disparate arguments are not responded to here.  This 
is a result of having thoroughly to consider and respond to one philosopher in 
particular.  Chapter 6 is entirely devoted to Daniels’s theory and implicitly 
John Rawls’s theory.  Daniels’s theory is the most direct ethical competitor to 
a capability perspective, and indeed, is put forward as a substantive or 
comprehensive theory.  The contributions made by others are particular 
points rather than whole theories.  Therefore, the limited space is devoted to 
reviewing Daniels which should inform responses to the arguments put 
forward by others. 
40. Lastly, some topics have been deferred for future research because 
they were too unwieldy within the time constraints of a PhD at Cambridge.  
These topics include considering a methodology for choosing capabilities and 
their thresholds as well as how to aggregate capabilities across individuals in 
order to make resource allocation decisions.  Other difficult topics that had to 
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be left aside include determining a capabilities view on luck or accident, the 
place of personal responsibility in regard to health capability, and the place of 
subjective and objective assessment of a person’s health capability.  It is 
hoped that readers will come to agree that deferring these various topics for 
future research does not fundamentally undermine or threaten any of the 
parts or the whole of the argument presented here. 
 28 
 
 
 
 
 
Part One
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Chapter 1:  Health as Capability   
 
 
 
41. This chapter criticises, and proposes an alternative to, the theory 
behind the prevailing notions in clinical medicine and in broader ‘health 
systems’ that health is the absence of disease.  It also seeks to undermine 
the related views that addressing health concerns means preventing or 
containing diseases, and that health ‘needs’ are largely requirements for 
healthcare goods and services.  The ‘scientific’ theory behind such views 
suggests that a person is healthy when they have no disease.  Disease in 
turn is defined as the abnormal functioning of a biological part or process.  
More specifically, a condition is classified as disease when the measurement 
value of a functioning of a biological part or process falls outside the normal 
distribution of measurements belonging to others in the same sex and age 
category as the individual.  Though the term ‘disease’ in common parlance 
connotes a great variety of conditions, disease in this ‘biostatistical theory’ 
(BST) refers only to atypical functioning of any biological part or process that 
contributes to survival and reproduction.  For example, a broken bone would 
be considered a disease because various biological parts and processes 
affected are functioning differently from ninety-five percent of similar parts 
and processes in individuals of the same age-sex reference group.  And a 
functioning bone can be identified as making a contribution to the human 
organism’s survival and reproduction.   
42. This BST theory of health initially put forward by Christopher Boorse 
exhibits a number of flaws, but they have not deterred its prevailing influence 
in the theory and practice of health sciences.  The two most important flaws 
of the BST are its inability to adequately account for the influences of the 
environment on individual functioning, and its focus on the biological goals of 
survival and reproduction.  The reasons for the BST’s continued 
perseverance seems to be that it is thought to be plausible most of the time, 
and better than any alternatives.  The theory of health proposed here rejects 
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both the pursuit of a purely objective, factual definition of health and one that 
is focused on the ambiguous concept of disease.  Instead, it builds on 
Lennart Nordenfelt’s ‘welfare theory of health’ as the ability to achieve vital 
goals.  Nordenfelt provides a valuable, trenchant critique of Boorsean type 
theories, and a compelling argument that incorporates the influence of the 
environment and for viewing health as the ability to achieve or exercise some 
basic functionings. 
43. However, Nordenfelt’s argument suffers from a significant weakness 
as it allows for a wholly culturally relative set of vital goals or basic 
functionings.  That is, while he may have achieved a descriptively coherent 
idea of health as achieving vital goals, Nordenfelt also implicitly affirms the 
cultural relativity of a concept of health.  The theory proposed here replaces 
Nordenfelt’s empty set of vital goals with a species-wide conception of basic 
vital goals, or central human functionings.  As a result, the theory of health 
put forward here is that the health of an individual should be understood to 
reflect the assessment of her ability to achieve or exercise a cluster of basic 
capabilities and functionings.  Such a ‘meta-capability’ to achieve or exercise 
basic capabilities bridges the gap between the biomedical usage of the term 
‘health’ to evaluate the presence of disease and its social and ethical usage 
to assess an individual’s well-being and abilities to function in the world.   
44. Broadening and reconfiguring the concept of health away from the 
focus on atypical or abnormal functioning of internal biological parts and 
processes to one which evaluates a person’s capability to exercise some 
basic functionings in the world obviously has a cascade of implications.  In 
the first instance, reconfiguring our conception of health will affect the 
framework and methodology we currently use to study the causation and 
distribution of what we currently define as health.  That is the subject of 
Chapter 2.  Thereafter, a new conception of health will affect how we respond 
to the differences in health, their causes, and their consequences.  More 
immediately, the current chapter examines Boorse’s and Nordenfelt’s 
theories of health and introduces the idea of health as a capability to achieve 
or exercise a cluster of basic capabilities and functionings.   
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45. Section 1: The bio-statistically normal theory of health. 
46. Starting in the late 1960s contentious debates ensued in the United 
States and the United Kingdom over the scientific objectivity of the concept of 
disease and related concepts such as health, illness, malady, and disability.  
In response to some of the extreme positions asserting that disease is simply 
a socially constructed category reflecting disvalued conditions, Christopher 
Boorse published a series of four articles in the late 1970s with the aim to 
establish a scientific and value-free definition of health and illness.  His self-
stated, ambitious aim was to create a theory of health which would also be a 
theory of medicine since the aim of medical practice is to address the health 
needs of human beings.  He seemed to assume, like so many others still do, 
that medicine and health are mutually encompassing ideas.  If the concept of 
health is defined then the scope of medicine becomes defined; if the scope of 
medicine is defined then health becomes defined.  The supposedly complete 
or perfect mutuality between health and medicine is what allowed Boorse to 
claim that his theory of health would also bring coherence to the everyday 
use of health concepts in medical practice.   
47. Boorse asserts that his theoretical definition of health expressly 
separates out the value-laden aspects from the objective aspects, and is 
modelled on the empirical outlooks of scientists such as biologists and 
pathologists who, as he argues, have value-free and factual understanding of 
their subjects of study.  During the three decades since its publication, 
Boorse’s theory has become standard in medical teaching even though it has 
provoked tremendous criticism and summarily dismissed in the literature.  In 
1997, Boorse attempted a formidable rebuttal to a compilation of over two 
decades of criticisms.  His theory of health, presented in its 1997 form, 
contains the following four components: (Boorse, 1997) 
 
1. The reference class is a natural class of organisms of 
uniform functional design; specifically, an age group of a 
sex of a species. 
2. A normal function of a part or process within members of 
the reference class is a statistically typical contribution by it 
to their individual survival and reproduction. 
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3. A disease is a type of internal state which is either an 
impairment of normal functional ability, i.e. a reduction of 
one or more functional abilities below typical efficiency, or a 
limitation on the functional ability caused by environmental 
agents. 
4. Health is the absence of disease. 
 
48. To recapitulate the four points in reverse, a living thing is healthy if it 
is not diseased.  To be diseased means that somewhere in the inter-related 
and organized physiological structure, a biological part or process is 
functioning outside the normal distribution of values typical for the reference 
class of the species.  Normal functioning refers only to the contributions parts 
and processes makes to the survival and reproduction of the individual.  
Given that physiological parts and processes change over the life-course, 
and some are different in males and females, an individual’s normal function 
is compared to those of other individuals of the same sex and age reference 
class.    
49. The basic underlying idea is that human biological functioning is 
geared towards or ‘designed for’ survival and reproduction.  Biological parts 
and processes exist in order to contribute to a causal chain of processes of 
survival and reproduction.  Biological functionings of parts or processes that 
are not causally related to reproduction or survival are excluded from the 
domain of health.  This is why a physical deformity, even though it is atypical, 
because it does not directly affect survival or reproduction is not a disease 
and thus, not related to health.  Moreover, instead of one set of ideal values 
or average values, the statistically normal distribution model presents a range 
of values that occur most frequently across a group of human beings.  This is 
important because not only does it imply variation among the human species, 
it is also unable to say if someone is less or more healthy within the range.  
One of the more provocative components of Boorse’s theory is that he claims 
that mental disease can also be defined similarly through the tabulation of the 
normal distribution of mental functionings across human beings.  What is 
most common becomes the standard for what is healthy. 
50. Accompanying the theoretical definition, Boorse also put forward a 
theory of illness to capture the value aspects of health.  The concept of an 
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illness serves to make clear and plausible the making of a distinction 
between the value-free factual and value-laden practical use of scientific 
concepts.  Boorse argued that the term illness is and should be used in 
medical practice to identify the sub-class of diseases which a society 
attaches normative judgements.  That is, in the clinical, social, or legal usage, 
the term illness should identify the subset of diseases which are judged to 
have negative value.  A concept of illness is necessary, according to Boorse, 
because not all diseases are valued negatively.  For example, a blockage in 
the fallopian tubes would theoretically be a disease but it could be valued by 
a woman who does not want to bear children.  Therefore, the obstruction 
may not necessarily be deemed an illness.  Disease is said to be cogent as a 
theoretical concept, but illness is needed as a practical concept.  Boorse 
offered the following four criteria for defining a sub-class of diseases as 
illnesses.  A disease is an illness only if: 
(i)    it is serious enough to be incapacitating; and is 
(ii)   undesirable for its bearer; and  
(iii)  a title to special treatment; and  
(iv) a valid excuse for normally criticisable behaviour. 
 
51. Of the disparate range of criticisms levelled against his theory which 
outlines concepts of disease, health, and illness, Boorse himself 
acknowledges and has tried to reply to four types of criticisms.  The first 
category criticises his concept of statistically normal functioning in relation to 
environmental change.  The second category criticises his notion of 
diseases.  The third type refers to species variation, while the fourth type 
relates to age and biological purpose.  Referring back to his theory, Boorse 
argues that a disease is either an internal, abnormal functioning or a 
limitation of functioning caused by environmental factors.  The first type of 
limitation refers to a comparison between an individual and the group.  The 
second limitation refers to the decrease in the functionings of an entire 
population.  He recently added the second clause in order to accommodate 
environmental catastrophes where the entire population is affected.  Without 
such a clause, reduced health functionings would be considered healthy 
because the majority of the population also has reduced functionings.  Of 
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course, the comparison in the second scenario is between the group and a 
theoretical or counter-factual alternative.   
52.   Despite this accommodation, Boorse’s definition is still open to the 
criticism that it conceives of humans as functioning at one constant level.  For 
the theory to make sense, one has to imagine a human body working like a 
machine that functions at a constant rate.  Numerous critics have pointed out 
that humans carry out various activities in different environments, and that 
biological functionings are dynamic making possible short term adaptations 
to changing conditions in the environment.  As the temperature becomes 
hotter, colder, or as the altitude increases, the body’s physiological 
processes adapt in order to reach some level of homeostasis.  The BST does 
not really account for the body’s ability to alter functionings in order to adapt 
to changes in the environment.  Some of these adaptive processes can be 
short-term such as perspiration, and others can be long-term such as 
metabolism.  By not taking into account the ability of the body to adapt, the 
BST will misclassify individuals as being diseased when they are actually 
adapting to their immediate environment in order to survive.  
53. A slightly different adaptation criticism is that the BST ignores what 
the individual is actually doing and thus, will misclassify individuals as 
diseased when they are undertaking different kinds of activities that alter their 
biological functionings.  Unlike in the previous examples where the body 
adapts to changes in the environment, here, a person pursuing an activity 
such as running a marathon would be identified as exhibiting abnormal 
functionings compared to the rest of her age-sex reference class.  Assuming 
that her entire reference class is also not running a marathon, during the 
period when the body is fully exerting itself, the BST would classify her as 
diseased because her measurements would likely fall outside the normal 
distribution range of her reference-class. 
54. The changes in functionings because of having to adapt to changing 
environments or in undertaking various activities reveal a necessity to take 
into account the interaction between the individual and the environment.  The 
BST holds constant both the activity and the environment.  Alternatively, it 
would have to consider all adaptations in all environments and all 
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functionings during all activities as being within the normal range.  But this 
would mean the BST would lose significant analytical power in being able to 
differentiate between normal and abnormal.  One would not be able to 
differentiate between a person who is running a marathon from a person who 
is just short of experiencing hypothermia or indeed, a person who is sleeping.  
The normal distribution of values would simply become too broad to offer any 
meaningful distinctions.   
55. Boorse’s reply is that he had initially thought of these two types of 
environmental challenges but assumed that averaging across a large 
reference class would take care of these variations.  That is, if the 
measurements of a large enough group is used, then the measurements of a 
person when she is resting, when she is in a cold environment, or when she 
is running marathon would all fall under the normal distribution.  However, if 
these environmental adaptation issues do indeed persist, then according to 
Boorse, the theory only requires adding the stipulation in a ‘statistically 
normal environment’ in the definition.   
56. Putting in the stipulation of a standard environment means the range 
of normal values of a functioning is linked to a particular standard 
environment; as the standard environmental conditions change, the range of 
normal functioning values also moves with it.  Thus, a person living at high 
altitudes would be compared against others living at high altitudes in contrast 
to before where there was no consideration of changes in the environment.  
This would also presumably apply to all the different types of activities 
individuals could carry out in an environment.   
57. However, standardizing the environment has significant additional 
implications that Boorse either is unaware of or ignores.  When the biological 
functioning of a reference class is standardized to a particular environment, it 
means that it is localized to a particular geographical location.  The 
consequence is that the definitions of disease and health are no longer a 
species-wide conception but one that is geographically relative or specific to 
a sub-group of human species. 1   This would be a plausible definition if 
                                                 
1 This is important as the reference class is no longer coextensive with all of the 
human species, but groups of humans in similar environments.  This makes it even 
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human beings were animals that were only reactive agents living in nature.  
But because human beings have and are able to transform their surrounding 
environments, the normal distributions of their functionings in a given 
environment cannot be thought of as scientific or objective.  It is conceptually 
flawed to make a range of human functionings standard to a particular 
geographical environment when the environmental conditions surrounding 
any group of human beings have been shaped by human beings.  
Categorizing adaptations in biological functionings as normal even though 
they were induced by some level of human influences on the physical and 
social environment introduces values into the definition of health.  Human 
beings can shape their own environment thus they shape their own biological 
functionings to a significant extent.  This counters the notion that human 
biological functions are objectively designed for survival and reproduction, 
and their adaptations are part of reaching those goals.  Moreover, as the 
human influenced environment begins shifting the entire distribution range of 
functioning in the direction of either lesser or more effective functioning the 
belief in the ‘naturalness’ or ‘objectivity’ of the range will likely be replaced by 
a comparison with a theoretical ‘ideal’ standard.  Lastly, the ‘statistically 
normal environment’ stipulation really produces the biggest problem where 
the concepts of ‘statistically normal environments’ and political borders are 
thought to overlap.  That would mean that whatever the prevalent levels of 
health functionings in a country or continent, that range of functionings would 
be considered healthy. 
58. A second conceptual flaw of the BST is that it categorizes as healthy 
any processes the body initiates to ward off disease.  It does this because 
biological processes to fight disease are features common to the majority of 
human beings.  For example, when an infectious organism enters the body, 
the immune system marshals a variety of processes geared towards fighting 
off the infection.  We would normally call the infection a disease and the 
process of fighting it a period of illness.  Yet, from the perspective of the BST, 
                                                                                                                                          
more likely that Boorse would have to group populations according to geographic 
and political boundaries.  While Daniels may (problematically) be able to take 
political boundaries as morally relevant, Boorse loses much of his value-neutral 
pretensions.   
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all of these functionings occur in a statistically normal way and contribute to 
the goal of survival and reproduction of the organism.  Thus, the BST cannot 
recognize the infection and the body’s response to an infection as a disease.  
Boorse responds that indeed, such immune responses are normal.  
However, he argues, the disease lies in the injury at the point of entry of the 
infection, and any consequent death of cells.  The death or decrease in 
functioning of cells consequent to infection defines disease.   
59. Critics respond that if the death of a single cell can mean disease, 
then every human being is theoretically diseased.  Boorse concurs that 
indeed, according to his theory every human being is likely to have a 
disease.  Yet, for Boorse, this is not a theoretical deficiency.  Every body can 
be theoretically diseased, but only some diseases are considered illnesses 
requiring a response through clinical medicine.  Nevertheless, if we are to 
follow his original theory, a person with a few dead cells may not be ill, but 
because they have a disease, they cannot be thought of as healthy either.   
60. A third critique of the BST concerns how it deals with the intersection 
between the age reference class and the supposed biological goals of 
survival and reproduction.  The reason Boorse includes the age reference 
group is because human beings obviously begin a process of physiological 
development starting from conception and go on to experience the 
degenerative aspects of aging.  At the same time, Boorse also identifies 
individual survival and reproduction as the goals of normal biological 
functionings.  Functionings which do not contribute to the goals of survival or 
reproduction do not have any place in the theoretical definition of disease 
and health.  For example, structural deformities which have no impact on 
survival and reproduction cannot be considered diseases even if they are 
extreme deviations from normal distribution.  This supposedly provides a 
clear criterion to divide medical care addressing health needs from other 
services such as cosmetic surgery.   
61. Critics have questioned the choice of survival and reproduction as 
the two primary biological goals as well as the possibility of conflict between 
them.  One critic asks what the point of health or biological functioning is in a 
woman who has already reproduced and is in the stage post-menopause?  
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From a theoretical species evolution perspective, survival of post-
menopausal women becomes irrelevant because they have already achieved 
their goal or served their purpose.  Boorse replies that irrespective of the 
goal-directed aspect of the BST definition of health, from a purely descriptive 
perspective, there is a normal range of biological functionings which occur in 
the reference class of menopausal women.  Thus, one is still able to identify 
whether the functionings in a particular post-menopausal woman is normal or 
healthy.  For example, the statement ‘a heart is there because it pumps 
blood,’ offers no explanation of the goals of the function but is purely 
descriptive and factual.  Such an account of functions could then describe the 
normal range of biological functionings of post-menopausal women.  What 
Boorse aims to do is simply rely on the idea of health as a functioning that is 
similar to most others.  But of course, if in considering the case of post-
menopausal women, if non goal-orientated functioning can be judged to be 
normal and abnormal, or healthy and diseased, then it is not clear why goal-
orientated functionings have to hold for any other categories of individuals.  Is 
Boorse saying that up to menopause functioning is goal oriented but after it is 
simply descriptive?  If it is, on what basis can he justify such a two tiered 
system, especially one that seems to rely on a theory of species survival? 
62. What then of those other situations where human beings face a 
choice between reproduction or survival?  For human beings, survival and 
reproduction can sometimes be mutually exclusive goals; one does not allow 
the other.  Boorse responds by stating that because of the ubiquity of 
‘parental sacrifice in reproduction,’ he expects the BST to prefer reproduction 
over survival.  By which Boorse means that normal biological functioning is 
designed for reproduction and then survival.  For Boorse, the processes of a 
women’s pregnancy and of giving birth, could never be considered disease 
even though it could be directly undermining the survival of the woman.  
Normal functioning and dying prematurely from childbirth are seen as 
compatible notions.   
63. In spite of these criticisms and a range of many others, Boorse 
continues to maintain that the BST still does the best job of providing a 
scientific and value-free conception of disease and health.  He writes that the 
 39 
 
critics of the concept of disease he has put forward are really more 
concerned with how to conceive of health as being more than just the 
absence of disease rather than his analysis of the disease concept itself.  
One potentially productive move towards filling the gap between his disease 
concept and the desire for an alternative normative conception of health, 
according to Boorse, is presented by Jerome Wakefield.  He puts forward a 
theory of health/disease, where a conception of disease is a harmful 
dysfunction.  Wakefield requires that at the foundation of the concept there is 
an ‘objective’ biological dysfunction on which stands a normative concept of 
harm.  Without such a primary biological dysfunction one would presumably 
have only normative judgements or culturally relative conceptions about any 
biological functionings that can be perverse or eccentric.  For example, 
having green eyes can be thought as an illness just because of cultural 
beliefs rather than because of any immediate harm.  Relying on Wakefield as 
an example, Boorse reasons that his statistically normal functioning definition 
of disease can be the value-free concept on which can be built various 
normative constructs such as harmful disease, treatable disease, disabling 
disease or insurable disease, et cetera.  Such efforts can be thought of as 
‘disease-plus’ concepts of disease.  At the least, what Boorse seems to have 
concluded is that he has a justifiable concept of disease while being open to 
how it is integrated into other theories.  However, he seems to have backed 
away from emphasizing that his theory is supposed to be of health, not just 
disease.  
64. Section II: Nordenfelt’s Welfare theory of health  
65. One notable aspect of the debates occurring over three decades 
following Boorse’s publication of his theory is that most of his critics and 
supporters stayed entirely within the framework or terms of debate that he 
established.  They have either sought to appraise whether his conception of 
disease is as value-free as he maintains, or whether it adequately takes into 
account the practical clinical use of disease concepts, or have put forth 
modified disease concepts.  But the majority have kept the central focus on 
Boorse’s concept of disease.  And very few writers have attempted to 
articulate an alternative conceptualization of health.  Among the handful of 
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authors who have put forward alternative theories of health, only one goes 
any meaningful distance beyond focusing on the presence or absence of 
disease.   
66. Lennart Nordenfelt, a Swedish philosopher, published his complete 
theory in 1987 under the title, On the Nature of Health. (Nordenfelt, 1987)  In 
2001, he published another book that reviewed Boorse’s 1997 rebuttal as 
well as the leading alternative theories of Lawrie Reznek, K.W.M. Fulford, 
and his own. (Reznek, 1987; Fulford, 1989; Reznek, 1995; Reznek, 1998; 
Nordenfelt et al., 2001a)  While Reznek’s theory is a supplement or derivative 
of Boorse’s theory because it holds on to the disease concept, Nordenfelt’s 
and Fulford’s theories are significantly different and referred to as ‘reverse 
theories’ of health.  That is, the framework that Boorse established is to begin 
with a theoretical definition of disease, and then derive a values-laden, 
practical category called illness.  In his later writings Boorse refers to 
illnesses as diagnostic and therapeutic abnormalities.  In any case, the 
presence of illness is the absence of health.  For Nordenfelt and Fulford, the 
epistemological starting point is the person’s holistic/embodied functioning in 
the world and the presence of any impairments or constraints.  They move 
from assessing a person’s holistic functioning in the world to inside the body 
to identify the causes of constraints on biological parts and processes.  This 
is seen as going in the ‘reverse direction’ to the prevailing method of going 
from internal disease to illness and then, health.  The importance of this 
‘reverse’ distinction lies in the contrasting epistemological starting points.  
Boorse claims an objective starting point with the focus on the normal 
functioning of a biological part or process, while Nordenfelt begins with a 
holistic position by focusing on an evaluation of the things a person is able to 
be and do, or ability to achieve a set of vital goals.  Nordenfelt would 
probably argue that his theory is also objective and descriptive but that it 
simply starts at a different place. 
67. Not surprisingly, Boorse views these ‘reverse’ theories as profoundly 
mistaken by pointing to the fact that a number of human experiences can 
cause symptoms of suffering or disability— such as being lovesick or feeling 
disappointed—but have no ‘pathological’ causes.  One assumes that what he 
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means is that lovesickness cannot be a disease because it is not caused by 
a genetic material, organism, or harmful particle.  On the other hand, 
individuals can present themselves at medical clinics with biological 
conditions such as myopia or athlete’s foot which are not categorized as 
illnesses but nevertheless, are causally explained by genetics, organisms or 
materials.  Furthermore, Boorse argues, a theory that starts with normatively 
evaluating certain states as illness and then moves on to disease is 
incoherent because many people do carry diseases—experience abnormal 
functioning of parts or processes—without the individual knowing, and even 
before it is recognized by a clinical physician.  A disease exists in the person 
even when it is not recognized as an illness by the person or others.  To label 
someone as healthy because of outward signs could be categorically wrong 
many times and indeed, unhelpful to the person.  Starting with disease would 
not face the problem of mistaking a person with a disease.  Yet, in 
challenging the starting point of visible symptoms, what Boorse has achieved 
is to point out the problems with both the concepts of disease and illness.  He 
does not however, undermine the possibility of conceptualizing health 
separately from those two concepts. 
68. Nordenfelt refers to his theory of health as a ‘welfare’ theory because 
his conception of health aims to reflect the quality of a person’s abilities to 
achieve her vital goals.  He writes, ‘To characterize a human being in terms 
of health or illness is to describe one aspect of the ‘status’ of this human 
being, what we often call his ‘state of well-being’. (Nordenfelt, 1987)  He 
clearly aims to go beyond conceiving health as the absence of disease and 
towards defining positive content for the concept.  It is logical, he believes, to 
begin theorizing with a person’s experience of health, rather than a concept 
of disease, because health and its cognates are embedded in ordinary (non 
professional) thinking.  And in eschewing a purely objective or scientific 
approach, he argues that ordinary usage of health concepts can be as 
accurate as other ordinary language concepts related to morality, emotions, 
or excellence.   
69. Nordenfelt reaches the idea of health as the ability to achieve vital 
goals by beginning with semantic analysis to consider the terms ‘health’ and 
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‘disease’; the two concepts central to the subject.  He reasons that whether a 
theory of health is negative (absence of) or positive (with content) 
fundamentally turns on which of these terms is used as the starting point.  
Starting with disease, he argues, moves people to look inward into the parts 
of the individual and their biological organizational make-up.  Health, on the 
other hand, is a term that reflects a more holistic perspective about the 
person.  To examine how starting with the concept of disease drives the 
analysis inward into the body, Nordenfelt reviews Boorse’s theory.  He 
eventually rejects Boorse theory, and thus, the more general approach of 
starting with disease. 
70. Nordenfelt finds the Boorsean theory fundamentally inadequate as a 
way of conceiving the practical use of the concept of health, and even 
inadequate as a scientific view of disease.  The notion of health as being a 
dysfunction of a biological-part is perhaps necessary, Nordenfelt argues, but 
it is not a complete theory of health.  More importantly, he asserts that a 
Boorsean conception of health does not adequately address the influence of 
the environment.  No human action, even a biological function, happens 
without an environment.  When raising an arm, the arm experiences 
resistance from the air around it, but could also face more substantial 
resistance such as an object, and the more complex resistance of social 
forces.  Every human action/biological functioning happens in an 
environment and thus, a concept of health must reflect the interaction 
between the human being and the (physical and social) environment.   
71. Moreover, Nordenfelt does not believe that Boorse adequately 
addresses external influences by stipulating the idea of a standard 
environment through averaging the conditions of large swathes of the globe.  
It is not feasible to work with such a notion of standard environment because 
large swathes of the planet are unfavourable environments for human 
beings.  Pollution makes the entire planet increasingly unfavourable to 
human beings and the majority of people in the world live in extremely harsh 
physical and material circumstances.  Averaging these harsh and 
unfavourable circumstances into statistically normal environments simply 
makes all of these conditions normal.  While Boorse’s eventual recognition of 
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the influence of the environment is important, Nordenfelt concludes that it is 
unjustifiable to develop a statistically normal environment like the notion of 
statistically normal biological functionings of human beings. 
72. The starting point that Nordenfelt begins with is the commonplace 
idea that we think of health when it is not there.  When there is instead, 
disability and pain.  He chooses ‘disability’ as the primary concept and 
starting point of thinking about health rather than pain.  He does this because 
even though pain can be due to disability, and pain can cause one to be 
disabled, all causes of pain are not necessarily due to disease.  Pain can be 
caused by heartache, for example.  But, as being disabled has to mean being 
unhealthy, in all instances that it is used, disability becomes the primary 
concept to begin with.  From there, he makes a semantic move by turning the 
focus from disability, or the lack of health, into a positive notion of health as 
constituting ‘ability plus the opportunity for action’.  The Aristotelian 
combination of ability and a supportive environment, Nordenfelt argues, 
creates the ‘real practical possibility of action’.  He derives this concept of 
practical possibility of action from the philosophy of action-theory; a field 
which assesses ideas such as human action, causality, intent, basic action, 
and action-chain.  Here then, lies one of the biggest differences between 
Boorse and Nordenfelt, as the latter aims to give an explicit and important 
role to the influence of the environment on the health of the individual.  
Health is not just a phenomenon internal to the body, within the biological 
structure, but also reflects the direct influence of the environment whether 
through physical or social forces.  When a person is unable to complete a 
certain action because something or someone constrains their capacity of 
action, then the person’s practical possibility for action is limited.  If the ability 
or ‘practical possibility of action’ related to an important set of vital goals is 
constrained, then the person is unhealthy.   
73. Nordenfelt defines constraint not only as the inability to complete a 
certain action but importantly, also includes the second-order inability to learn 
how to complete that action.  If the second order ability is not there, then the 
person is genuinely unable to complete the action, and can then be 
considered as genuinely disabled and unhealthy.  So for example, a person 
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who breaks a leg playing football would be temporarily considered to be 
disabled.  However, after a period of therapy, when a person recovers their 
ability to use their leg, they are no longer disabled and unhealthy.  However, 
if the injury to their leg is irreversible, they are genuinely disabled and not 
healthy.  The ability to recognize a difference between temporarily and 
permanently disabled is important.  Moreover, if they do not recover the use 
of their leg because of inadequate facilities, then they are not truly disabled 
as adequate facilities have not been available for this person.  Their health is 
being constrained.  Consider the alternative in Boorse’s case where the 
individual would be theoretically diseased, and also considered ill.  But in 
Nordenfelt’s schema, they are temporarily disabled or unhealthy because of 
the lack of sufficient facilities.  And if they choose to give up in their therapy 
prematurely, they cannot be considered truly disabled or unhealthy because 
they stopped short of recovering their ability.  In general, Nordenfelt is 
arguing that a person should be understood to be ill or ‘not in health’ when 
their abilities to act are constrained, and when within standard/adequate 
circumstances, they also lack the ability to learn to overcome that constraint.  
One is in non-health temporarily during the period of learning to overcome 
the constraint, and permanently or genuinely ill or disabled if there is no 
possibility to learn the ability to overcome that constraint.  
74. Conceiving health as an assessment of our abilities or practical 
possibilities of acting, Nordenfelt then asks which abilities are necessarily 
related to health.  Reflecting on the idea that human beings are thought of as 
living organisms that have goals, of which survival is one among many, he 
focuses on the idea of vital goals.  Health, he argues, is an assessment of 
abilities to achieve vital goals.  Though ambiguous, Nordenfelt seems to be 
simply arguing that human beings are goal directed, and these goals can 
vary, but there is a theoretical core set of goals which are vital or basic to all 
human beings.  And, in trying to identify vital goals from a ‘basic needs’ 
perspective versus a subjectively-defined goals perspective, Nordenfelt 
concludes that both are lacking in coherence.  Instead, he argues that vital 
goals of a human being are goals whose fulfilment is necessary and sufficient 
for their welfare, or minimal happiness of the bearer.  As a result, because 
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his conception of health reflects the ability of a person to achieve vital goals, 
which in turn achieves minimal happiness, he considers his theory, ‘a welfare 
theory of health’.  In formal terms, Nordenfelt’s theory of health is as follows:2  
A is in health if, and only if, A has the ability, given 
standard circumstances, to realize his vital goals, i.e. the 
set of goals which are necessary and together sufficient 
for his minimal happiness. (Nordenfelt, 1987) 
 
75. The constraints on the ability define someone as being unhealthy or 
ill.  The idea of ‘ability’ includes both the first-order ability, and a second-order 
ability to learn.  The lack of the first order ability is necessary but not 
sufficient to be considered ill or unhealthy.  The second order ability must 
also be constrained and is defined as:   
A has a second-order ability with regard to an action F, if 
and only if, A has the first-order ability to pursue a training-
program after the completion of which A will have the first-
order ability to do F. (Nordenfelt, 1987) 
 
76. And reflecting the reverse nature of his theory, Nordenfelt defines 
disease last as: 
D is a disease-type in environment E if, and only if, D is a 
type of physical or mental process which, when instanced 
in a person P in E, would with high probability cause 
illness in P. (Nordenfelt, 1987) 
 
77. While laying out a formal concept of health as the ability of a person 
to pursue their vital goals, Nordenfelt makes explicit the normative aspects of 
the concept.  First, the standard circumstances in which individuals form their 
abilities to pursue vital goals are normatively defined.  While we may be able 
to conceive of a person being able pursue any action given extraordinary 
circumstances, what we understand health to be is the possibilities of actions 
given particular environments.  What conditions are adequate, such as the 
                                                 
2
 To account for the health of human beings that do not have recognizable 
intentionality when they are infants, he offers a modified theory for humans without 
recognizable intentions.  ‘Infant I is in health if, and only if, the internal constitution 
and development of I is such that, given standard adult support, the necessary and 
jointly sufficient conditions for I’s minimal happiness are realized.’  Presumably, 
such a definition would also apply to individuals without full rationality or mental 
capacities.   (Nordenfelt, 1987) 
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levels of available medical facilities or appropriate material goods in order to 
achieve vital goals are socially determined.  There cannot be one definitive 
environment which is necessary and sufficient for achieving vital goals.  
Factually, these levels have changed over time and occur in differing degrees 
throughout the world.  What this means in practice is that a person who does 
not recover their ability to pursue vital goals within the socially determined 
level of adequate circumstances can be understood to be unhealthy.   
78. Second, the choice of vital goals which are necessary for minimal 
happiness is also normative.  What defines minimal happiness has to 
account for an external objective assessments of what is required as well as 
internal subjective components.  While arguing that a subjective 
determination of vital goals is more likely to be correct as the subject has 
presumably more access to information about their welfare than the external 
observer, Nordenfelt nevertheless leaves open the possibility of the conflict 
between subjective and objective determination of the goals required for 
minimal happiness.  He suggests that defining criteria for minimal happiness 
through inter-subjectively verifiable terms is one way to overcome the stand 
off between subjective-objective approaches.   Yet, he does not go further to 
identify what such a balanced approach might entail. 
79. Even though Nordenfelt attempts to systematically consider and 
address a wide range of objections throughout the process of constructing 
his theory of health, in the final analysis, the conception is fairly simple.  A 
person’s health reflects the person’s ability to achieve minimal happiness in a 
particular environment.  Nordenfelt does not discuss what vital goals would 
look like in different societies.  He does not even consider whether individual 
survival is a shared goal across human societies.  This is curious because if 
sheer survival is at least one shared goal across the human species, should 
it not be specified in the theory?  Nor does Nordenfelt consider whether there 
are any other goals that can be considered necessary for minimal welfare or 
happiness across the human species.  Moreover, the environmental 
conditions considered necessary and sufficient to achieve these vital goals 
are said to be relative too.  But surely we can specify some minimal content 
of environment which human species must be surrounded by in order to 
 47 
 
survive.  It is empirically true that human beings must be surrounded by 
oxygen, have access to potable water, and be protected from fatal injuries in 
order to keep functioning.  Should not those aspects at least be specified as 
absolutely necessary constituents of the physical environment?  Nordenfelt’s 
architecture of the argument is useful, but he stops short of filling in the 
architecture of the concept with any content, even uncontroversial content. 
80. Despite its simple construction, the value of Nordenfelt’s theory lies 
in many aspects.  His welfare theory of health expands the frame of 
discussions of the philosophy of health away from focusing only on disease 
and onto human actions and the environment.  He achieves this largely 
through making use of linguistic and action-theory philosophy.  Semantics 
and linguistic philosophy is arguably necessary in reasoning about health 
because theories of health are projects of reconstruction of health related 
concepts.  That is, Nordenfelt and others who seek to develop concepts or 
theories of health must reckon with the every day use of health concepts, and 
importantly, with the large body of existing medical knowledge.  A theory of 
health must be able to reorganize and bring coherence to existing scientific 
knowledge on biological functioning and dysfunctions.  Indeed, Nordenfelt 
has gone some ways towards establishing a conceptual vehicle for a health 
concept that does bring coherence to the health sciences.  However, he 
stops short of doing any social philosophy.  Questions such as what goals 
constitute minimal happiness and what is an adequate environment for 
achieving these goals are left completely open.   
81. Referring back to Boorse, the main strength of his theory is that 
health as normal functioning seems plausible if we take as given that 
biological functioning in every human being is directed towards survival and 
reproduction.  In Nordenfelt’s theory, we understand biological functioning as 
necessary for health and are directed to look towards the abilities to achieve 
important goals in different environments for a sufficient conception of health.  
This may be considered to be an inadequate conception by some who 
believe that the most important reason for a theory of health is not for 
individuals to use a subjective concept of health, but for its use in social 
decisions.  A concept of health has to be much more explicit about what 
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these vital goals for minimal happiness are, and how to prioritize resources, 
or in Nordenfelt’s terms, determine the standard environment.  We want a 
conception of health to help us determine an adequate environment rather 
than let the social and physical environment determine what constitutes 
health.   
82. Because of the complete ‘descriptive’ capitulation to the local social 
environments in the determination of the content of vital goals for minimal 
happiness, Nordenfelt’s exact formulation accepts too much social and moral 
relativism.  For example, one of the clearest examples of where social 
practices and individual vital goals are not always aligned can been seen in 
the high levels of endemic and acute mortality of girls and women in 
developing countries.  Aside from biological vulnerability, the social and 
economic practices that are locally determined, undermine the health of girls 
and women around the world.  Poor reproductive and sexual health in girls 
and women because of patriarchal cultural norms leads to millions of 
avoidable deaths and impairments every year.  Because cultural norms can 
conflict with the achievement of vital goals of individuals, especially of those 
who are socially powerless, local cultural practices should not have absolute 
determining power over the content of vital goals, and who can achieve them, 
and when.   
83. A socially relative definition of vital goals has to be replaced with an 
ethical species-wide definition of vital goals.  In searching for such a species-
wide conception, the overlap between Nordenfelt’s vital goals or components 
of minimal happiness and the idea of basic or central human capabilities, 
advocated by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum is quite remarkable.  
Nordenfelt quite literally connects the debates on the philosophy of health 
and the capability theory through his idea of health as the ability to achieve 
vital goals, or practical possibility of action.  The overlap should not be very 
surprising however, as both Nordenfelt and the CA are informed by 
Aristotelian reasoning on action, influence of the environment, and human 
flourishing.  Nussbaum’s CHCs, the CA, and the objections to both are 
discussed more thoroughly in Parts Two and Three.  Here, Nussbaum’s 
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central human capabilities are discussed in relation to Nordenfelt’s vital goals 
understood as a capability to achieve a cluster of basic capabilities. 
84. Section III: Integrating Nordenfelt and Nussbaum 
85. Though Nordenfelt produces a framework or conceptual device for 
thinking about health, he leaves the content open.  Health, he avers, is the 
ability to achieve necessary and sufficient vital goals for minimal happiness.   
Nordenfelt is not clear whether vital goals are states of being or actions.  Nor 
does he make clear whether they are instrumental to or by themselves 
constitute minimal happiness.  Nevertheless, he recognizes that there must 
be both objective and subjective determination of the content of vital goals in 
different societies.  Similar to Nordenfelt, Nussbaum in developing her 
reasoning for the CA also criticises the ‘basic needs’ approach and the 
subjective preferences approach to determining what should be the focus of 
basic entitlements in every society.  Though Nordenfelt was thinking centrally 
about health in relation to human flourishing and achieving vital goals, 
Nussbaum is concerned with a minimal conception of a life with dignity, and 
conceives it as consisting of some central capabilities.  From the perspective 
of social justice, she argues that every society should ensure that each 
citizen achieves a threshold of ten central capabilities.  In brief, the ten 
central human capabilities include 1) living a normal length of lifespan; 2) 
having good health; 3) maintain bodily integrity; 4) being able to use senses, 
imagination, and think; 5) having emotions and emotional attachments; 6) 
possess practical reason to form a conception of the good; 7) have social 
affiliations that are meaningful and respectful; 8) express concern for other 
species; 9) able to play; and 10) have control over one’s material and political 
environment.   
86. Nussbaum conceives the social goal to be ensuring that individuals 
have the capabilities—the practical possibility of achieving—and not the end 
achievement (functionings) unless dignity and respect of the individual are at 
stake.  In contrast, for children, the social goal should be ensuring that they 
indeed achieve the functionings.  Capabilities, not functionings are the focus 
for adults because of the necessity to respect the choices of citizens to 
determine their own lives, and in order to achieve overlapping consensus on 
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the capabilities.  Nevertheless, she still allows for the possibility that some 
functionings may be thought of as so valuable that they will not be allowed to 
be neglected or fail, thus overriding individual choice.  A minimum set of 
CHCs ensures that no matter how individuals proceed with their lives, they 
will always have the capabilities to revise their conceptions of plans or have 
an exit option from their current chosen way of life. 
87. The idea of a capability reflects the Aristotelian theory of human 
flourishing through the simple notion that human flourishing requires a 
supportive environment.  A person’s actions are contingent on the 
environment.  Take the simple example of a person raising their right arm.  
For a person to carry out such an outward movement of raising an arm 
requires that she has the internal/personal capacity to raise the arm, and that 
the environment is supportive of that act which means that at the least, there 
is no insurmountable barrier.  Normally, our use of the word capability refers 
to possession of the internal/personal ability to carry out such an act.  In the 
CA, capability refers to a person’s possession of the real and effective 
opportunity to carry out an act.  This effective opportunity or freedom is 
realized through varied combinations of the person’s internal capacity and 
the nature of external conditions.  We would be comfortable with the notion 
that a person who does not have a right arm does not have the capability to 
raise their right arm.  However, it is also true that if someone or something is 
holding the person’s right arm down, she does not have the capability to raise 
her right arm in this situation either.  It is also possible that someone else 
raises the arm for her because she pays the person, a third party pays them 
or forces them do so, or for so many other reasons.  Simply focusing on 
whether an arm is raised possibly excludes significant other information.   
88. Nordenfelt relies on concepts such as actor/agent, action, supportive 
environment, and ability which reflect his grounding in action-theory.  
Interestingly, one of the novel concepts that advocates of CA have 
introduced in thinking about human actions, that has implications for action-
theory and the related idea of freedom more generally, is that people differ in 
the needs for and conversion skills in order to carry out an action, or a 
functioning.  This point recognizes that the diversity in how human beings are 
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‘constructed and situated’ can affect if and how well they are able to carry out 
any particular act.  The surrounding conditions for an act cannot be taken for 
granted as having uniform effects on a person, or conversely, it cannot be 
assumed that any act requires the same external conditions for every person.  
So Nordenfelt goes far in highlighting and accounting for the influence of the 
environment on human action.  But the capabilities analysis further elucidates 
the need to account for the individual diversity in needs as well as in their 
skills to convert their own endowments and their environment into intended 
actions.  Action theory, in contrast, thinks of human beings as being uniform 
and analyzes their actions like billiard balls creating a chain of events.  
89. The achievement or exercising of any single act or functioning 
usually requires a chain of actions that are a mix of well-being and agency 
functionings.  Contrary to the general ethos of the CA literature, a person is 
not simply a container of capabilities or a producer of unidirectional 
functioning achievements.  A person’s beings and doings are inter-related 
and inter-active.  Achieving one functioning can make the achievement of 
others possible or impossible.  Failure to achieve one functioning can result 
in the failure of another functioning, or even the failure of all functionings.  
And any given capability can entail multiple functionings.  For example, the 
capability to achieve sufficient nutrition entails a whole range of functionings 
including metabolic processes, physical functionings involved in ingesting 
and chewing, having physical access to foodstuffs, and so forth. 
90. A second point to keep in mind is the difficulty in separating cause 
from effect when considering capabilities, especially being unable to 
distinguish between the causes of health and health itself.  The concepts of 
capabilities and functionings are distinguished as being potential versus 
actual achievements.  The potential or capability exists when all the causal 
factors for achieving the functioning are in place.  A person is healthy when 
they are capable of achieving their vital goals.  Nevertheless, the distinction 
between cause and effect gets profoundly complicated quickly when it is 
recognized that capabilities can lead to functionings and further capabilities.  
A capability to be healthy is really a cluster of interdependent, iterative, and 
dynamic capabilities and functionings achievements.  Trying to separate out 
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a finite set of capabilities and functionings as part of the causes versus the 
effects of health is difficult to do.  This should not mean however, that health 
itself should be defined only in terms of achievements because they are 
easier to identify.  Such a notion of a capability to be healthy implicitly being a 
cluster of inter-dependent capabilities and functionings motivates the 
integration of Nussbaum’s cluster of capabilities with Nordenfelt’s health as 
abilities to achieve vital goals.  The affinity to Nussbaum’s conception of 
CHCs is due not only to just the structure, but also the content and 
justification.   
91. Following the CA, the CH in the present argument, erases the sharp 
distinction between the individual and social environment because of its 
focus on the diversity of needs of individuals and the differing abilities to 
convert resources and surrounding environment.  Moreover, the focus on 
capability reflects the recognition of how the environment can profoundly 
shape a person’s self-perceptions of their own needs or functionings.  A 
person who is expected by social norms not to pursue knowledge about 
reproduction or sexuality may also believe impaired reproductive and sexual 
functioning is an acceptable and expected condition.  A normative conception 
of health must include an assessment of the surrounding conditions to 
counter such subjective assessments.  The concern for capability also places 
great emphasis on real opportunity.  A person may be able and willing to 
learn about reproductive and sexual health but if there are no sources of 
information available then she does not have a full CH.  Sooner or later her 
internal biological functionings will be impaired from the restricted social 
conditions.  For a person to be healthy, to have a full CH, there must be real 
opportunities to achieve health related functionings.  Realizing a full CH 
means that internal needs, abilities to converts external resources match with 
external material and social conditions.   
92. But the idea of ensuring a supportive environment or social 
conditions for capabilities should not be taken lightly.  While at a certain level, 
it is understandable that access to food, water and shelter is necessary for 
the CH.  It may also be easily accepted that certain liberties such as freedom 
of association and access to information is necessary for having a real CH.  
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The idea of capability becomes a lot more demanding however, when we 
come to recognize that the prevalence of morbidity and premature mortality 
among individuals is caused by social dynamics such as income inequality, 
job stress, discrimination, absence of social support, et cetera.  Then, any 
efforts at ensuring the real CH must directly address fundamental aspects of 
social organization.  In fact, within epidemiology, the individual-level 
biomedical model is being criticised for its inadequate accounting of social 
determinants of disease.  Alternative models are being put forward that 
exhibit a systems approach where the inter-related dynamics of systems from 
the molecular to the body, to the family and community, to the nation and 
region, and to the global system, all affect the prevalence and distribution of 
impairments and mortality among human beings.   
93. The CH then, may require the supportive social conditions to be 
much more expansive than anyone has so far considered.  It may be quite 
possible that the CH of individuals in a particular location in the world is 
constrained more significantly by a national or trans-national phenomenon 
than by individual level factors.  Rural to urban migration patterns due to 
changing economic policies may improve or destroy health capabilities more 
than access to healthcare.  The full force of the capability perspective then is 
the ethical requirement to identify any and all factors that affect capabilities, 
and then address any constraints because of the paramount importance of 
ensuring that individuals can pursue their diverse plans of life.  What is yet to 
begin are attempts to identify and measure health functionings, aside from 
prevalence of disease, and how to identify the necessary and sufficient 
balance of internal capabilities, social conditions, and agency to achieve the 
health functionings.   
94. The CH as a meta-capability of achieving a cluster of capabilities 
reinforces the inter-dependence of almost all of the capabilities that 
Nussbaum identifies: life, bodily integrity, senses, emotions, practical reason, 
affiliation, other species, play, and control over environment.  The CH also 
underlies Sen’s references to basic capabilities including nutrition, 
movement, clothing and shelter, participation, education, et cetera.  The 
inter-related nature of the CH is not surprising as physiological viability and 
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bodily functioning is necessary for the pursuit of any activity.  But the current 
division of labour between clinical medicine, public health, and other public 
agencies, does not correlate with the inter-related nature of capabilities.  
Particularly in regard to CH, poor reproductive health functionings may be 
only partially addressed by healthcare as they may also require education on 
biology, hygiene, and sexual health, as well as access to income.  
Reproductive healthcare providers may be reluctant to take on all these other 
needs, and indeed would be justified in stating those activities are outside 
their mandate and expertise.  The CA argues that the respect for the equal 
moral worth of a person requires the ethical social response to coordinate 
activities across these sectors in realizing the effective freedom to achieve 
reproductive health functionings.   
95. Such an example highlights that the clinical care focus on disease 
has been inadequate in addressing the health needs of people.  The 
responsibility of ensuring the effective CH of individuals may not always be 
with healthcare professionals.  Public health professionals are better 
equipped to look across the natural and social sciences to evaluate the 
extent of the CH of individuals.  The traditional focus on sanitation, 
vaccinations, et cetera is too restrictive an understanding of their mandate ‘to 
ensure social conditions so people can lead healthier lives’. (Kass, 2001)  
Indeed, public health professionals working in areas where health capabilities 
fail the most address social conditions rather than provide public goods.   
96. The CH is valuable to an individual as an intrinsic part of and 
instrumental to pursuing their life plans.  But, as Nussbaum argues, the ability 
of individuals to have basic capabilities partially constitutes and is 
instrumental to achieving social justice.  The failure to provide the social 
basis of the promotion and protection of health functionings violates the equal 
concern and respect for every human being.  Health viewed in terms of a CH 
reorients viewing it as a personal advantage derived from luck, function of 
preference, or lastly, a matter for beneficence to making it one of the central 
considerations of social justice. 
97. Interestingly, what all the theories of Boorse, Nordenfelt, and 
Nussbaum and Sen have in common, and which should be seen as 
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incompleteness in regard to all their conceptions of health, is that they 
confine their scope to the individual, whether at the level of biological parts or 
at the whole individual.  These theories do not address the dynamics and 
health status of a population aside from it being made up of an aggregation 
of health of individuals.  Boorse’s theory would conceive as normal and 
healthy any biological state which happens across the majority of the 
population.  It literally sums the health of individuals and produces an 
average value.  Nordenfelt’s theory evaluates an individual’s ability to 
achieve valued goals based on a standard set by the local society.  And 
Nussbaum and Sen focus on the individual’s capability to stay alive for a 
normal length of life, and be free from (clinical) disease.  However, the health 
of an entire population can be determined by phenomena occurring beyond 
the scope of an individual.  
98. This chapter has reviewed the biostatistical theory of health, 
Nordenfelt’s welfare theory of health, and lastly, argued that Nordenfelt’s 
conception of health can be made more defensible by replacing the vital 
goals with central human capabilities, such as those put forward by 
Nussbaum.  Bringing together Nordenfelt’s analysis with that of the CA has 
benefits for both.  For Nordenfelt, his definition can become defensible by 
incorporating an idea of basic human capabilities and justifiable through 
freestanding ethical reasoning used to identify them.  For the CA, Nordenfelt 
provides a link to the philosophy of health debates.  Also, the problem with 
ranking the basic capabilities as well as the impossibility of separating out a 
capability to live a long lifespan from a CH gets solved.  The problem of the 
inseparability of health from well-being also is solved.  Nordenfelt provides 
the framework to argue that a CH is the ability to achieve all of the basic 
human functionings.  That is, health is not just instrumental to other 
functionings; it is an evaluation of the ability to exercise a set of basic 
functionings.  Rather than separate out a core set of physiological 
functionings as being health functionings, Nordenfelt helps to define health 
as the a set of basic capabilities that span the neediness, sociability and 
reasoning capacity of the embodied human animal. 
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99. The main points to take away from this chapter are that the health as 
a concept becomes coherent when conceived as a capability.  And that 
capability is a capability to exercise or achieve a cluster of further capabilities 
and functionings.  The process of rejecting Boorse’s ‘objective’ and 
‘naturalistic’ theory of health shows not only the ambiguity of the notion of 
disease that points to abandoning that concept, but also that disease and 
health are not mutually encompassing concepts.  Furthermore, integrating 
the arguments of Nordenfelt and Nussbaum provides us with both a structure 
and content of a capability to healthy.  Nordenfelt provides the structure of a 
health as the ability to achieve vital goals for minimal happiness that includes 
both subjective and objective content of vital goals.  While Nussbaum 
provides the content of the vital goals in the form of ten central human 
capabilities.  The breadth and extent of these capabilities reflect a conception 
of human dignity that encompasses the neediness, sociability and ability to 
reason in pursuing a life plan. 
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Chapter 2:  Theory of Causation and Distribution 
 
 
 
100. As stated in the Introduction, a theory of health should at least have a 
coherent conception of health, and the capacity to explain how it is created 
and distributed among individuals and groups.  Chapter 1 put forward a 
conception of health as the capability to achieve a cluster of capabilities and 
functionings.  Such a conception is more coherent than the BST of disease 
as well as other theories that are derived from it.  However, rejecting the BST 
of disease has implications for its counterpart theory of causation and 
distribution of disease.  The ‘biomedical model’ of disease causation and 
distribution that evolved from the classic, late 19th century ‘germ theory’ of 
infectious disease recognizes three types of causal factors.  These include 
individual biological traits, exposures to external particles, and behaviour.  
The tools developed in the late 19th century to observe and isolate micro-
organisms revolutionised the methods to contain communicable diseases in 
individuals and populations.  However, the increasing recognition of non-
infectious causes of chronic and degenerative conditions required 
transforming the very productive agent-host-disease causation model.  
101. A new model was developed to account for the independent and 
interactive influences of genetic endowment, exposures to materials, and 
behaviours in the production of disease—in the BST sense of the term.  
Common metaphors for such a multi-factoral model of causation include the 
‘web of causation,’ or the ‘multi-factoral causal pie’.  However, despite the 
need to expand the number and diversity of causal factors for any given 
chronic and degenerative conditions, the focus remained on individual level, 
proximate, and objectively ascribable factors.    
102. Rejecting the BST of disease that is prevalent in the health sciences 
does not automatically require also rejecting its counter-part biomedical 
theory of disease aetiology and distribution.  That is, disagreements about 
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the ontology of disease and health do not necessarily carry over to 
disagreements about how disease and health are created and distributed.  
Take, for example, the ongoing debates in health economics about the merits 
of various health measurements.  Health economists have largely 
circumvented the debates in philosophy of biology and medicine while 
developing an array of measurements of health.  Largely skipping over the 
meaning of disease, most of the health metrics conceive of health as time 
spent alive without constraints on physical functioning.  Yet, while the 
debates on methodology and content of each proposed measurement are 
wide ranging, there is little scrutiny of the prevailing explanatory frameworks 
for the causation and distribution of health functionings and their constraints 
(i.e. death and disease).   
103. Conversely, as the following discussion will show, disagreements 
over the sufficiency of the individual-level, biomedical model of causation and 
distribution of disease do not evidence any disagreements over the concept 
of disease.  For instance, the often contentious debates about the scientific 
objectivity of recognizing social determinants of disease do not reveal any 
questioning of the BST concept of disease.  Even the most strident advocate 
of social epidemiology still largely accepts a central focus on disease.   Given 
that in normal clinical practice, the overwhelming concern is with identifying 
and mitigating the effects of disease combined with a widely recognized 
global catalogue of identifiable diseases, taking time out to question the logic 
behind such a list or the notions of disease and health may seem 
unwarranted or wasteful.   
104. However, along with the BST of health, the biomedical model of 
causation and distribution of disease must be rejected, or at least demoted, 
because it is inadequate as a general theory.  It is significantly constrained in 
explaining the causation and distribution of chronic and degenerative 
conditions.  In addition to being unable to fully explain the causes of 
constraints, the biomedical model is even more limited in identifying the 
causation and distribution of health, even when seen as the statistically 
normal functioning of biological parts and processes.  The possibility of it 
accounting for or underwriting the idea of a CH seems even less likely.   
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105. Three specific limitations afflict the individual-level, biomedical model 
of disease causation.  The first is the questionable model of ‘scientific’ 
causality that is used which excludes the recognition of social processes and 
distal factors as part of the causal chain in production of disease.  The 
second limitation is the model’s capacity to recognize only  limited types of 
distribution patterns of disease/health across human beings.  Lastly, an 
explanatory model with restricted power and with limited capacity to 
recognize distribution patterns will produce only partially informed and not 
fully effective social responses to disease/health concerns. 
106. A counterpart causation theory to the conception of health as a 
capability does indeed require demoting the narrow, biomedical model of 
disease because of its inherent limitations.  It must be replaced with a theory 
that is more robust in explaining the causation and distribution of health 
capability.  The one presented here is able to account for most recent work in 
epidemiology which identifies a breadth of social determinants and borrows 
the analytical framework used to model the causes and distribution of 
endemic and acute malnutrition.   
107. To preview, a theory of health causation and distribution should be 
able defensibly to allocate responsibility between human biology, external 
social and material environment, and individual behaviour.  These three 
factors are all encompassing determinants of the length and quality of life.  
While social epidemiology has expanded the scope of environmental 
determinants to include social processes, the ‘entitlement analysis’ of 
famines provides a conceptual framework to fully analyse causality and 
distribution of the CH.  A CH and its constraints can be identified by the 
combined result of interactions between individual biological endowments, 
external material and social conditions, the person’s abilities to convert their 
own endowments, material goods and social conditions into functionings.   
108. Seen against this comprehensive analytical framework, the 
biomedical model’s reliance solely on healthcare goods and services comes 
into clear relief.  Healthcare is intended to meet biological needs, but it 
constitutes only one component in a ‘multi-causal pie’ producing an 
individual’s health capability.  Healthcare may satisfy urgent needs to induce 
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or protect biological functioning but the individual may still not be able to 
achieve the cluster of capabilities and functioning if the other causal 
components are not conducive.  Unless the term healthcare is stretched to 
encompass all material and social conditions, what is normally known as 
healthcare are just some necessary but not sufficient material good for an 
individual to achieve a cluster of capabilities and functionings.  In contrast, 
ensuring an individual has sufficient and equitable health capability entails 
possibly intervening in their biological functioning, the material and social 
environment, and/or their conversion skills.  The biomedical model’s focus on 
healthcare, and ensuring that biological parts and processes fall within a 
statistically normal range, is really thus only a partial theory of health 
causation that is applicable only some of the time.     
109. The following two sections review the evolution and content of extant 
theories of disease causation and distribution.  An argument is then put 
forward for an entitlement theory of health causation and distribution that is 
able to account for all the disparate theories, in addition to the prevailing 
biomedical model. 
110. Section I:  Causation and distribution theories. 
111. Towards the end of 1968, the highest ranking government health 
official in the United States, the Surgeon General, stated that it was ‘time to 
close the book on infectious diseases’.  Articulating the mood of the times, he 
argued that all infectious diseases and effective methods to contain them had 
been identified.  The spread of infectious diseases in developing countries 
was thought to be due to abject poverty similar to the situation of pre-
industrialized Europe and America.  The focus of health sciences in the 
second half of the 20th century was to be on non-infectious diseases such as 
heart attacks, cancers, and strokes as these were now the largest cause of 
premature mortality and impairments.  In moving away from infectious 
diseases to a growing concern over chronic diseases, epidemiologists 
developed a variety of methods to identify the aetiology of disease such as 
case-control methods, cohort studies, and more recently, using computers to 
carry out complex statistical calculations.  The model that has been the basic 
paradigm since the first text books on epidemiology were published in the 
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mid 20th century is that of ‘multiple causation’.  Evolving from a model of 
single causative agent and host model based on the germ-theory, the 
multiple causation model hypothesizes a chain of different factors including 
exposure to a single or multiple hazardous materials, genetic predispositions, 
and behaviours. (MacMahon, 1960; Krieger, 1994) 
112. The first epidemiology textbook published in the United States in 
1960 proposed understanding the multiple factor aetiology of disease in the 
following way.  A linear, causal chain of multiple factors does not take into 
account the complex precursors to each component of the chain, and that the 
precursors and chain components might have overlap or interactions creating 
a variety of direct and indirect effects on the progression to disease.  The 
authors advised eschewing the old notion of a single agent or a serial chain 
of events causing disease.  They advocated a more sophisticated 
understanding of causality of disease, termed the ‘web of causation’.  The 
web model, argued the authors, also benefited from not having to prioritize 
different causal factors, and focused instead on identifying the determinants 
that are both necessary for disease and most amenable to intervention.  The 
epidemiologist’s objective is to identify the most proximate link in the web to 
the disease in order to cut the links. (MacMahon, 1960)   
113. Nancy Krieger argues that this web of causation is the most 
fundamental operating metaphor in the epistemology of epidemiology.  And 
importantly for Krieger, the metaphor and the consequent methodology 
ignore the primary sources of the causal factors.  In an influential essay she 
asks, ‘Where is the spider?’  The web of causation model carries with it a 
theoretical framework that subscribes to biomedical individualism, referred to 
as the biomedical model.  Such a model emphasizes proximate biological 
determinants of disease amenable to intervention through the health care 
system; considers social determinants to be second order factors and 
possibly, irrelevant; and lastly, sees the population distribution of diseases as 
simply a sum of individual cases.  ‘In this view, disease in populations is 
reduced to a question of disease in individuals, which in turn is reduced to a 
question of biological malfunctioning,’ say Krieger. (Krieger, 1994: p892)  The 
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biomedical view of population health then is simply the aggregate picture of 
biological malfunctioning.  
114. This model of biological individualism is fundamentally shaped by the 
scope of and evolution of the practice of epidemiology in the United States 
throughout the later half of the 20th century.  Meanwhile, in the United 
Kingdom, where epidemiology first began and many infectious agents were 
first identified, the concern over the cause of the distribution patterns of 
mortality and impairments had as much, or greater, prominence than the 
aetiology.  By the mid 20th century, the dramatic improvement in life span and 
morbidity that was markedly visible at the turn of the century was expected to 
continue.  The progress was measured most directly in the decennial 
censuses using basic demographic statistics.  The continued higher mortality 
rates among the poorer sections were attributed to a time lag in the effects of 
better conditions.  Unlike the United States, the government of the United 
Kingdom officially recognized and began analysing health progress by socio-
economic classes as a social category starting in 1913.  It has been argued 
that class was not similarly recognized in the United States because of the 
political ideology calling for a classless society.  Moreover, the overwhelming 
disparity between whites and blacks produced the dominant social categories 
of social analysis.  In the United Kingdom, social position or class was 
defined by groupings of occupations which were said to reflect not only 
income, but also similar culture and social status.1   
115. Like in most other industrialized countries, the leading causes of 
mortality and impairments in post World War II Britain were degenerative 
conditions of old age and chronic conditions such as heart disease, cancers 
and strokes.  By the 1960s, what is often referred to as the mortality or 
epidemiological transition, the transition from high mortality rates due to 
infectious diseases, to lower mortality rates due to chronic conditions, had 
become well established.  The profound transformation in the levels and 
causes of mortality and impairments began in the mid-19th century through 
Edwin Chadwick’s initiatives including the containment of infectious diseases 
                                                 
1 Simon Szreter has reviewed the coherence of the occupational grade class 
identification system and the influence of the eugenics movement in the 
classification system. (Szreter, 1996) 
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through covered sewers, waste collection, and provision of potable water.  
Such programmes worked in conjunction with an overall reduction in 
malnourishment, improvement in working conditions, and more efficacious 
control of food handling. (Caldwell, 2001)  Countering the view that these 
dramatic changes were inevitable due to industrialization, recent historical 
research presents evidence that social movements played an integral role in 
the expansion of scope and geographical coverage of government health 
institutions and policies. (Szreter, 1996; Szreter, 1997)  In any case, by the 
mid-20th century, in addition to the dramatic decrease in overall population 
mortality rates, the causes of mortality and morbidity due to infectious and 
communicable diseases were now replaced by age-related degenerative 
conditions and chronic conditions with largely unknown causes.  That is, the 
constraints on biological functioning were recognizable but their full aetiology 
was not.  Despite the lack of full knowledge of causes, rhetoric about 
individual responsibility and making sound choices for one’s own health 
became more prevalent, particularly through the UK Labour government’s 
health policy papers in the 1970s.   
116. By the 1970s, however, the persistence of higher rates of premature 
mortality and preventable impairments among the lowest socio-economic 
classes as evidenced by the mortality statistics of the decennial censuses 
could no longer be explained away as simply due to a time lag.  Even after 
decades of government welfare programs and the creation of a National 
Health Service, the persistence of higher premature mortality rates (and 
disease precursors) in the lower social classes moved the British government 
to establish a Working Group on Health Inequalities in 1977.  The remit of the 
working group was to review the aggregate differences in health 
achievements between classes, evaluate possible causes, the implications 
for government policy, and identify areas and questions requiring further 
research.  The final report of that committee released in 1980, known as the 
Black Report, has proven to be a watershed event for initiating public debate 
as well as a new area of health research on the causation of the (unequal) 
distribution patterns of life-spans and impairments across social groups.  
(Black et al., 1992; Macintyre, 1997; Whitehead, 1998)  That is, the Black 
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Report emphasized the causation of the distribution patterns of premature 
mortality which was informed by the aetiology of proximate causes of 
mortality.  
117. Despite the rhetoric of ‘health,’ in order to avoid the difficulties with 
the complexity of the concept, the working group focused only on mortality 
rates.  They simply took viability or ability to stay alive as constituting what 
Sen has separately described as the ‘irreducible absolutist core’ of the idea 
of health. (Sen, 1984b)  Thus, in actuality, the working group evaluated the 
unequal distribution of mortality across groups stratified by age, sex and 
socio-economic class.  Inequalities in health meant inequalities in length of 
life spans.  Another notable feature of the reasoning of the working group is 
that as a result of the central concern for the causes of the distribution 
patterns, the distinction between the causes of distribution and the aetiology 
of the condition causing mortality was not always clear.  But the blame for 
such confusion between causation and distribution does not wholly lie with 
the working group.  The epistemology of causation and distribution in 
epidemiology is notoriously difficult.   
118. Theoretically, a non-random distribution of mortality occurs in a 
pattern linked to a feature relevant to the causation of mortality.  For 
example, the higher mortality among older age groups can be explained by 
the causal factors linked to older age.  However, when there is no prior 
knowledge of the possible causal factors, any pattern can be a potential non-
random pattern of distribution.  For example, an uneven distribution of 
mortality across individuals with different astrological signs would seemingly 
raise the possibility of a causal factor linked to astrological signs.  If there 
were no link, in a large enough population the disease would be evenly 
distributed across all signs.  While astrological signs may be easy to dismiss, 
it is much harder to dismiss other causal phenomena that may sound more 
plausible.  The biomedical model constrains the possible causal factors to 
genetic traits, exposures to harmful particles and behaviour.  And thus, it can 
only recognize patterns of distribution along biological features, exposures, 
and behaviours.  Even then, many variations of experimental and 
observational studies are carried out to test hypotheses regarding these 
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factors.  The biomedical model’s inability to explain the obviously patterned 
distribution across socio-economic classes, however, compelled the search 
for alternative causal explanations.  The working group thus focused on 
causes of distribution patterns that were also previously linked to aetiological 
theories of mortality and impairments. 
119. The Black Report is a seminal publication in the history of 
epidemiology for establishing the legitimacy of recognizing causes that are 
both one-step removed from proximate biological causes of mortality/disease 
and which also determine the social distribution patterns.  The causes of the 
proximate causes could explain both causation and distribution of mortality 
and impairments.  The contemporary controversies over scientific objectivity 
of social determinants and social epidemiology arise from this first and 
second-order distinction in the causal chain of disease.  Social determinants 
are environmental factors one or more steps removed from the proximate, 
individual-level causes of abnormal functioning of biological parts and 
processes.  The debate is over whether there exists a defensible causal 
structure between social determinants and proximate determinants, and 
whether the scope of epidemiology and health sciences should extend 
beyond the proximate causes including individual biology, exposures, and 
behaviour.  The two fold fear is first, that it is bad science to go beyond first-
order causal factors, and second, that going beyond proximate factors means 
that epidemiologists and health scientists/providers will have to become 
‘social engineers’.  (Rothman et al., 1998) 
120. Section II : The Black Report and Whitehall studies 
121. The working group reviewed four categories of explanations for the 
persistence of higher mortality/ill health among the lower classes.  The 
explanatory categories encompassed the full range of extant aetiological 
theories ranging from the biological, behavioural, and environmental.  The 
categories of explanations examined by the working group also showed that 
the core debates on the aetiology and distribution of ill health in the late 20th 
century were remarkably similar to those in the late 19th century.  In the 
previous century, supported by various nascent forms of empirical analysis, 
higher rates of premature mortality and impairments among the lower social 
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classes were attributed to a range of factors including  inherent biological 
characteristics of individuals (genetic quality), their volitional behaviours 
(culture of poverty), or factors in the environment shaped by social and 
economic structures.  Aetiological theories which concentrated on intra-
individual biological pathways such as the miasma theory—which was the 
motivation for Chadwick’s public sanitation programs—or germ theory, both 
competed with these other explanations.  The spectacular success of germ 
theory in reducing mortality at the turn of the 20th century fully undermined 
miasma theory, and muted advocacy for the alternative theories.  However, 
the persistence of premature morality in later 20th century reinvigorated the 
theories posited in the previous century even if they reappeared in slightly 
different guises.  And, the issue at stake in the debates seemed to be almost 
identical to the one prior to the control of infectious diseases.  The question 
remained why do more members of the lower socio-economic classes die 
younger and experience more disease?   
122. The working group organized causal explanations into four general 
categories: 
122.1. Artefact explanations.  These explanations asserted that there 
was no relation between social class and health, but that they were 
simply measurement errors due to the changing population 
structures. 
122.2. Theories of natural or social selection.  In this conception, the 
inability of the poor to stay alive or free from disease indicated their 
weaker status as human organisms, and thus determined their lower 
social class position.  A less stringent hereditary/eugenics position 
was that people who are ill or disabled invariably end up in 
occupations associated with the lower classes.  
122.3. Materialist or structural explanations.  These theories posited 
that economic and associated socio-structural factors determined 
physical susceptibility as well as exposure to hazards in the housing 
and work environment.  Poverty in terms of material deprivation 
directly resulted in premature mortality and morbidity.   
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122.4. Cultural/behavioural explanations.  The last category asserted 
that the unthinking reckless and irresponsible behaviour of individuals 
such as alcoholism, and poor morals were predominant in the lower 
classes, and associated with high mortality and morbidity. 
123. After three years of deliberation, the working group concluded in the 
Black Report that the reason for the social gradient in mortality was largely 
due to the ‘material and structural’ explanations.  The recommendations for 
addressing the social gradient emphasized the role of health services sector, 
and also recommended a broad anti-poverty strategy.  Sarah Macintyre 
writes that the debates ensuing after the Black Report suggest that though 
the material and structural explanation was identified as the main cause, it 
was without sufficient justification or explication of the causal pathways.  She 
further argues that this category was selected mainly because it was the only 
category of explanation left after dismissing the three other alternatives.  
Nevertheless, Macintyre maintains that the Report’s recommendations for 
improving education, addressing health damaging behaviours, and helping 
disabled individuals reflected the committee affirming a ‘soft’ version of each 
of the other explanations as well. (Macintyre, 1997)   
124. However nuanced the recommendations of the working group may 
have been, the general conclusion that significant public resources were 
needed to address the needs of the poor was not well received by the new 
Conservative government. The government attempted to suppress the Black 
report in a variety of ways.  The report’s conclusions, nevertheless, were 
picked up by the media, the academic community and the shadow 
government.  As a result, the report’s profound impact on the scope and 
nature of public debate, health research and poverty alleviation continues to 
the present.2   
125. The recommendation for more publicly funded anti-poverty 
programmes as the most effective response to the persistence of high 
mortality and underlying impairments among the lower classes initiated 
                                                 
2 Margaret Whitehead’s ten-year follow up report was also downplayed by the 
Conservative government, but this report too managed to receive significant public 
attention. (Whitehead, 1998) 
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acrimonious public and academic debate.  Any critique of the 
material/structural explanation was received as voicing support for eugenics, 
moralism, or atomistic libertarianism that lurked beneath the other 
abandoned explanations.  Nevertheless, the actual pathways by which 
poverty, understood as material deprivation, leads to disease in individuals 
and classes were never explicitly specified.  Identifying the precise role of 
poverty as a pathway to mortality instigated still further debate about the 
meaning of material deprivation and its causal relationship to mortality and 
impairments.  One could either follow the line that absolute material 
deprivation causes ill health or alternatively, that relative material deprivation 
causes ill health.   
126. Absolute-level causation entails examining factors such as 
malnutrition, reduced biological and mental resistance, lack of healthcare 
goods, and poor housing.  Relative-level causation is pursued by examining 
the effects of having insufficient resources needed to be able to carry out 
one’s life commensurate to a particular societal environment.  An absolute-
level view is correct in identifying minimum requirements according to some 
objective standard.  Among absolute level adherents, the debate is often over 
the level of the threshold.  However, the absolute-minimum level approach 
does not fully take into account the context in which the individual is living.  
(Vagero et al., 1995)  The relative-level view of addressing mortality levels 
suggests that different amounts of resources are needed to stay alive and 
avoid morbidity depending on the varying requirements of particular 
environments.  These debates over the absolute versus relative levels of 
material resources as the causes of the unequal social distribution pattern of 
mortality transmuted into more general debates about the framework and 
purposes of poverty alleviation. (Sen, 1984b)    In any case, while absolute 
needs for material goods cannot be denied, recent research by Richard 
Wilkinson shows that relative income inequality within and across rich 
countries is also correlated with lower overall health achievements as well as 
all major social problems. (Wilkinson et al., 2006)  However, the exact 
pathways between income inequality and the constraints on biological 
functionings are still not yet clear. 
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127. The Black report’s conclusion that absolute material deprivation is 
the dominant cause of unequal social distribution of mortality and 
impairments was significantly challenged by the growing influence of findings 
from a 1978 study of the health of British civil servants, known as the 
Whitehall Study.  What started out as a conventional study of the risk factors 
for heart disease among a large, defined, and accessible population of 
research subjects produced startling results.  Michael Marmot and colleagues 
showed that, despite the fact that civil service employees across all grade 
levels were all above the threshold of poverty, there was a clear step-wise 
gradient in health measurements linked to the rank of employment.  Starting 
from the bottom grade, each rank of employees had better health profiles 
than the rank below.  Initially this pattern was thought to be only associated 
with the risk factors for and prevalence of heart attacks.  But the distribution 
pattern was confirmed across all diseases including gastrointestinal disease, 
renal disease, strokes, accidental mortality, violent mortality, and cancers 
that were and were not related to smoking. (Kreisler, 2002)  Subsequent 
follow up studies, ten and twenty-five years later, which also included 
women, showed that the step-wise pattern remained. (Marmot et al., 1997; 
Marmot et al., 1998)  This identification of step-wise gradient in health 
measurements according to social position, here considered to reflect civil 
service grade of employment, consequently motivated a tremendous amount 
of research.  That research overwhelmingly shows a socio-economic gradient 
in health measurements across the entire population in every industrialized 
society. (Macintyre, 1997) 
128. The Whitehall studies clearly established that relative social position 
affects health outcomes.  There would not otherwise be a clear and 
consistent social gradient across the wide spectrum of constraints on health.  
The studies also proved the more general point that second order, causes of 
proximate biological causes of mortality could be identified and measured.  
Furthermore, the research suggests that the social gradient in mortality 
reflects an individual-level, psycho-social mechanism mediating between 
social conditions and the production of impairments in an individual.  
However, it was uncertain from the initial study whether the social gradient is 
 70 
 
created by one monotonic social process affecting the entire population or 
through different processes occurring at different grades in the social 
hierarchy.  The studies, however, unequivocally showed that aside from the 
uncontested causal role of absolute material deprivation on mortality, health 
achievements were not distributed according to the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-
nots,’ but distributed in a continuous social gradient.  Furthermore, 
subsequent studies which took into account individual behaviours such as 
smoking and diet were also able to show that volitional behaviours could not 
explain the distribution.  In sum, the Whitehall studies were able to establish 
clearly that the classic biomedical model’s causal factors of biological 
endowment, individual behaviours, and exposures to harmful materials could 
not explain the step-wise gradient, nor could the gradient be dismissed as a 
random pattern. (Marmot, 2004; Marmot, 2006) 
129. Marmot contends that psycho-social processes, such as the 
workplace environment studied in the subsequent Whitehall studies, produce 
the continuous social gradient in mortality rates and impairments.  Various 
concepts pertaining to an individual’s ‘control,’ ‘agency,’ and ‘dignity’ have 
been suggested as aspects of the workplace which differ according to 
employment grade, and that may be correlated to the gradient in health 
measurements.  Research is ongoing to define such concepts.  Whether 
such workplace features can be extrapolated to outside the workplace such 
as the home and community is still being considered.  Such research is 
limited at present because there is no epidemiological framework that can 
sufficiently integrate both the biological factors and these proposed, psycho-
social processes.  Concepts such as dignity or agency are not easily 
amenable to being translated into causal categories similar to exposures, 
behaviours or genetic endowments.  A new theoretical framework is needed 
which can account for both proximate and distal factors as well as biology, 
exposures to material and social conditions, and individual behaviours.  And 
such a theory must also be able to explain the distribution of health and its 
constraints. 
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130. Section III: Causation theories and social epidemiology 
131. The step-wise social gradient in health achievements has been taken 
up with great interest by American epidemiologists.  They come from a 
tradition of understanding poverty in terms of absolute deprivation, and the 
dominance of inequality between whites and blacks in the American context 
precluded the thorough study of health differences across the entire socio-
economic hierarchy.  Furthermore, American epidemiologists were and 
continue to be driven to understand the step-wise social gradient through an 
individual’s psycho-social, biological, or neuro-endocrine-immunological 
processes.  That is, the focus on social determinants as causal mechanisms 
of mortality and impairments has priority over examining their role in the 
causation of unequal social distribution of health achievements.  (Macintyre, 
1997)  The field of social epidemiology in the United States thus, has largely 
been framed as a quest for understanding social determinants of disease, 
with it being somewhat implicit that social distribution patterns are a 
secondary consequence of those social determinants.  Inequalities across 
social groups are of epidemiological concern only if the stratifying social 
feature is related to a causal pathway.  Without a link to a causal mechanism, 
unequal distribution of mortality and impairments fall outside of the scientific 
practice of epidemiology.  That is, the unequal distribution of a disease 
across men and women would be considered outside the scope of 
epidemiology if the causal factor of the disease had nothing to do with gender 
or sex.  
132. In pursuing the identification of causal pathways between social 
determinants and inequalities in health constraints across individuals and 
social groups, the classic, biomedical model of disease causation has been 
overlain or expanded to include social determinants.  The social environment 
is seen as the missing ‘spider’ in the web of causation.  Social determinants 
influence genetic endowments, other social processes that work through 
psycho-biological pathways, and determine the exposures to material goods 
as well as shape individual behaviours.  In essence, all epidemiology is now 
considered to be social epidemiology.   While this may be true, the diverse 
range of social determinants theories have been divided into various 
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categories.  They are segmented into psycho-social theories, political-
economy theories, income inequality theories, social capital theories, and life-
course theories.  Before presenting an argument for how the capability 
device and the entitlement analysis can integrate all these various types of 
social determinants, the next section briefly reviews various types of social 
determinants theories.   
133. Psycho-social Theories 
134. The social gradient in health among British civil servants established 
that the influence of the environment was no longer a question simply about 
material conditions.  Environmental influences also had to include other 
social factors such as features of the work environment, social circumstances 
outside work, and social context of health affecting behaviours.  Marmot 
suggested that features in work environment that impacted health included 
such things as how much control individuals had at work, how fairly they 
were treated at work, and how interesting they found their work. (Kreisler, 
2002)  Prior to the Whitehall study, Marmot and Leonard Syme, one of the 
pioneers of social epidemiology and his professor at Berkeley, had examined 
the possible influence of social factors on health by comparing the health 
status of Japanese male immigrants to the United States and similar men 
residing in Japan.  The research finding showed that Japanese immigrants 
took on the disease profile of the surrounding American population.  More 
specifically, those immigrants that were more assimilated experienced more 
of the health constraints affecting the majority population, proving that health 
profiles were not purely determined by genetics, or individual behaviours. 
(Marmot et al., 1976)  
135. Prior to the Whitehall study, two other significant research 
conclusions on the effects of social factors had been established in the 
United States.  In what is regarded an important milestone in social 
epidemiology, John Cassel presented a lecture to the American Public Health 
Association in 1976 on the need to address the psychosocial factors that 
decrease biological resistance through better identification and categorization 
of factors at the social level rather than at the individual. (Cassel, 1976)  
Cassel stated that two important findings regarding the body’s responses to 
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stressors needed to be recognized.  First, biological processes that 
determine susceptibility to disease were weakened when an actor does not 
perceive evidence that her actions are resulting in the intended 
consequences.  The second finding was that the biological responses to 
stress inducing situations were ameliorated by the strength of the social 
support provided by other people considered most important by the 
individual.  Following Cassel’s lecture, the ensuing debates continue to 
consider a range of issues including whether animal research from which 
these psychosocial effects were identified were applicable to human beings; 
if it is possible to carry out ethical experiments on humans to test these 
ideas; to what extent the biological mechanisms had been sufficiently 
specified; and whether stress creates a general susceptibility or if particular 
biological responses to stress lead to susceptibility to specific diseases.  In 
any case, Cassel’s lecture, as well as the work of Marmot and colleagues, 
point to various psycho-social determinants such as agency, control, stress, 
and social support that need to be further conceptualized and researched.  
136. Ecological Theories ( income inequality/ political economy)  
137. In separate research carried out in the 1980s which later influenced 
and complemented studies of psycho-social mechanisms, significant 
evidence was marshalled to show income inequality was correlated to higher 
levels of social inequalities in health.  Above a certain threshold level of 
national wealth or Gross National Product (GNP), wider average-income 
differences between classes are associated with a steeper gradient in health 
differences and higher, overall mortality for the entire population. (Wilkinson, 
1997; Kawachi et al., 1999; Wilkinson, 2000)  Below this threshold national 
threshold there was no correlation.  This would indicate that below a certain 
threshold absolute material deprivation has more significant influence on 
mortality and morbidity.3   
                                                 
3 While absolute deprivation as being a cause of poor health outcomes is 
uncontested, there is some research that even underneath such a GNP threshold, 
the amount of social spending on poverty alleviation and public health goods and 
services improves health outcomes sometimes better than in rich countries.  This 
would temper the conclusion that inequality at the bottom has no effects.  See (Sen, 
1999c) 
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138. Across a number of industrialized countries, and within regions of 
countries, research has confirmed that the steepness of the health gradient is 
associated with level of income inequality.  Richard Wilkinson argues that the 
effect of income inequality lies first in the psycho-social effects of being of 
lower social status, experiencing subordination, or denied respect.  Static as 
well as increasing income inequality affects social standing and in turn, leads 
to biological processes in the individual such as chronic anxiety, permanent 
increases in stress hormones such as cortisol, more atherosclerosis, and 
poorer immunity.  The total result of these processes that occur through 
psycho-biological pathways is said to be analogous to rapid aging. (Kawachi 
et al., 1999) (p493).   
139. Wilkinson concludes that the second effect that the research shows 
is that income inequality dissipates social cohesion.  Increasing inequalities 
in income change the nature of social relations through decreasing levels of 
trust, increasing hostility and violence, dissipating social networks, and 
increasing domestic conflict among other things.  The consequent ‘culture of 
inequality’ is starkly compared to the income egalitarian and cohesive 
community identified by Robert Putnam in his influential research on civic 
society in regions of Italy.  Bringing together Putnam’s sociological analysis 
on social capital and Wilkinson’s income inequality thesis, a number of 
researchers examining the association of the levels of trust, levels of hostility, 
and rates of homicide and violent crime have found a strong relationship to 
income inequality. (Kawachi et al., 1999) 
140. Political economy 
141. Aside from methodological critiques, a number of alternative 
explanations have been posited for the effects of income inequality on the 
causation and distribution of premature mortality and impairments.  First, it is 
averred that a larger force such as broader social ideologies and cultural 
behaviours determine structures that result in both income and health 
inequalities.  David Coburn, for example, argues that it is not simply income-
inequality in a vacuum but the dominant ideology of neo-liberalism that is 
causing both the income inequality and health inequalities. (Coburn, 2004) 
Vincent Navarro maintains that politics is directly implicated in the increasing 
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health inequalities through identifying the fluctuations in health inequalities 
according to the political regimes in power.  Looking specifically at infant 
mortality rates from 1945 to 1980 in developed, capitalist countries, Navarro 
concludes that governments representative of labour movements and social 
democratic parties committed to redistributive policies showed better rates 
than other more libertarian governments such as the United States and 
United Kingdom.  (Navarro, 1993; Navarro et al., 2001)  
142. Leonard Syme offers more theoretical alternatives to Coburn and 
Navarro’s empirical explanations for the income inequality and health 
inequality association. (Syme, 1998)  He hypothesizes that the well off may 
be simply doing much better than the worse off given that it is much harder 
for those at the bottom of a steep social hierarchy to achieve as much, if at 
all, compared to those at the top.  Simply put, improved opportunities for 
health achievements accrue to those who are able to best take advantage of 
them.  They have more agency.  A second possible explanation is that the 
richer can simply acquire many more material goods that help them achieve 
better health.  And a third explanation, based on animal studies, suggests 
relative deprivation is rooted in evolutionary biology.  It posits that individuals 
in whatever environment will see themselves as having less and achieving 
less that those with more of whatever is the valued asset, whether it is 
income or bananas.  Hierarchy will always be present and therefore, so too 
will the consequent social gradient in health constraints.  Syme’s final 
hypothesis is that individuals don’t mind being worse off if everyone is 
considered to be in the same situation, but are troubled when they believe 
that others are better off through unfair social arrangements. Steep income 
inequalities cause biological responses because they are seen as unfair 
social conditions.  
143. Social capital and support. 
144. The overlap between Wilkinson’s thesis on income inequality and 
social cohesion and Robert Putnam’s recent work on the benefits of ‘social 
capital’ has led some researchers to examine more specifically the 
association between social cohesion and health outcomes.  Income 
inequality is replaced by social cohesion as the primary causal factor in 
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health inequalities.  Putnam refers to social capital as the connections among 
individuals in the form of social networks and the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from them.  From analyzing the historical and social 
changes in regions of Italy over a twenty year period, and subsequently in 
America, Putnam argues that ‘generalized reciprocity’ within a small social 
group, community or an entire society can generate great social and 
economic benefits. (Putnam et al., 1993; Putnam, 2000)   Within social 
capital, Putnam identifies two different types of relationships.  ‘Bonding 
capital’ refers to relationships among social groups made of individuals of 
similar background, and thus trust and reciprocity occurs without hesitation.  
‘Bridging capital’ is relationships among individuals who may not share any 
common background characteristics but come together to undertake 
cooperative activity.  In reviewing Putnam’s theory, particularly in relation to 
health inequalities, Szreter argues for a greater inclusion of the role of the 
state and also identifies the importance of what he terms ‘linking capital,’ or 
the relationships between significantly unequal individuals and civic 
organizations on the one hand, and government institutions, on the other. 
(Szreter, 2002) 
145. Social capital analysis as a model for community development has 
become widely prevalent across many disciplines and institutions.  Despite 
the rapid dispersion of the idea and the application of the concept to health 
inequalities in particular, Macinko and Starfield conclude that there does not 
seem to be a consensus on the nature of social capital, its appropriate level 
of analysis, or the appropriate means to measure it. (Macinko et al., 2001)  
Wilkinson’s thesis offers a pathway between income inequality, social 
cohesion, and the impact on psycho-biological processes.  But when starting 
at the community level with empirical measurements of social cohesion, and 
without any further evidence of how social cohesion is increased or 
decreased, it has proven less useful in explaining the aetiology or distribution 
of disease.  Interestingly, what social capital and health research has 
established is the idea that a particular community has health effects that can 
be observed at the same level of analysis as that of an environmental 
exposure to a particular type of pollutant.  Various studies have shown how 
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cities and neighbourhoods have identifiable effects on the health constraints 
of individuals. (Subramanian et al., 2004) 
146. Life Course approach: 
147. Though social capital theorists have focused on various aspects such 
as trust and reciprocity among individuals and networks, Wilkinson contends 
that the effect of low social status or acute subordination resulting from 
income inequality and the existence of egalitarian relationships, in the form of 
ideal friendships, can have a profound effect early on in the life course.  The 
transference of low status of parents to the development experience of the 
child, and the ability of the child to establish friendships during the early years 
of life, greatly modulates the psychosocial effects of income inequality later in 
life.   
148. In a similar vein, more biological and epidemiological evidence has 
been forthcoming that the health constraints experienced by adults may be 
significantly pre-programmed in infancy as well as in-utero.  Barker and 
colleagues aver that a biological imprint on the human body occurs in the 
foetal and infant period impacted by the mother’s health, which is particularly 
vulnerable in contexts of material deprivation.  Low birth-weight and 
retardation of the foetus is linked to higher risk of adult onset of respiratory 
disease, diabetes, heart disease, stroke, and certain cancers. (Vagero et al., 
1995)  Barker writes that the geographical and social inequalities in mortality 
rates and impairments across the United Kingdom could be explained 
through the experience of poverty by mothers.  Other researchers have 
subsequently studied non-biological pathways that result in adult health 
constraints. (Vagero et al., 1995)  For example, social disadvantage early in 
life results in a series of denied opportunities—such as schooling, 
employment and marriage—and other negative experiences that 
cumulatively combine to produce disease starting in middle age.  In a similar 
vein, Davey-Smith has argued that income inequality does not produce 
significant and immediate health conditions but instead, a life-time of 
experience of low social status leading to an accumulation of biological 
effects that eventually lead to premature mortality and visible constraints in 
adulthood. (Krieger et al., 2004) 
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149. Barker’s studies on early biological programming have opened an 
area of research on the life-course perspective on health.  However, his work 
has also been widely criticised by Marmot and others. (Vagero et al., 1995)  
Marmot argues that examining the mortality rates of the former Austro-
Hungarian countries after World War II shows remarkable differences.  If 
indeed, there is biological programming in-utero, there would be a cohort 
effect across the now independent countries.  But there is not.  Instead there 
is a significant divergence in the health of populations in Austria, which is 
considered part of Western Europe, and Hungary and Czechoslovakia which 
is considered Eastern Europe.  The mortality rates in Austria are much lower 
than in the other two countries.  Marmot writes that the differing social and 
economic factors post independence, rather than biological programming, 
caused the significant differences and similarities in the three countries.  
Furthermore, he argues that the same sort of divergence which happened 
between the eastern and western Europe divide is probably what is causing 
the differences within different regions of countries such as the United 
Kingdom.(Marmot et al., 1998) 
150. ‘Ecosocial’ epidemiology: 
151. While epidemiologists are familiar with the term ‘ecological’ as 
referring to group level analysis, the ‘eco-social’ theory of health and illness is 
conceptualized as simultaneous processes occurring at multiple levels 
starting from DNA to protein to organ to individual to community and beyond.  
The model of one level nested into another has lead to the metaphor of the 
‘Chinese box,’ as the new paradigm of epidemiology.  The Chinese box 
metaphor is to show the inter-related and nested nature of biological 
processes.  The Chinese box, it is argued, is a significant shift from the 
current ‘black box’ methodology where multiple, individual level factors are 
analysed for strength of association without an explication of the exact 
relationship.  (Susser et al., 1996b)   
152. Though the eco-social model has only recently begun to be explored 
in epidemiology, Levins and Lowentin had been asserting in the 1970s and 
80s the need to replace unidirectional cause and effect theories with more 
complex understandings of the dialectical relationships between humans, 
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other organisms, and the environment. (Levins et al., 1985)  Their eco-social 
theory of health is said to be informed by a variety of sources most notably 
biology, agriculture, epidemiology, philosophy, and systems theory. (Levins 
et al., 1999)  Underscored by a Marxian analysis, Richard Levins argues that 
current methodology of epidemiology has focused too narrowly on specific 
problems such as a single disease.  Though the focus on a single disease 
can help identify therapy for that particular disease, it ignores the much wider 
and larger issues of health disparities.  In fact, the solution can have negative 
consequences on other processes that affect human mortality and morbidity.   
153. Levins further criticizes the multiple factor epidemiological model 
which attempts to give relative weights to various factors in the causation of 
disease as being a victim of Cartesian reductivism.  Large problems are 
broken down to individual parts, without recognizing the additional properties 
at the system level.  Instead, Levins argues that rather than either/or 
distinctions such as genetics/volition, individual/environment, and mind/body, 
a theory of health should incorporate all factors in a complex system of 
analysis that is more than unidirectional pathways, and includes feedback 
loops, time lags, and other interactive relationships.  The importance of 
systems analysis, first developed by biologists in early 20th century, is now 
beginning to be taken up in epidemiology in the form of non-linear models, 
such as the ‘Chinese box’ theory of disease causation. (Krieger, 1994; 
Susser et al., 1996a; Susser et al., 1996b; Krieger, 2001)  Indeed, the causal 
model of CH advocated presently imagines a dynamic system made up of 
personal features, conversion skills, material goods and social conditions. 
154. Section IV :  Need for unified theory of health 
155. It should be well evident that in reviewing the diverse social 
determinant theories of disease causation and distribution, all were largely 
developed in reference to industrialized countries.  This is largely because 
the dominant mode of understanding the determinants of disease in non-
industrialized countries is to attribute it to material deprivation.  While the 
biological proximate causes of diseases in developing countries are not 
denied their causal role, it is more easily accepted that material conditions 
determine the proximate biological causes.  Wilkinson’s research presents a 
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particularly strong position on this by asserting that mortality rates are 
correlated with GNP across societies.  Above the threshold of $5,000 -20,000 
GNP, mortality rates of societies are correlated with income inequality within 
societies.  This threshold, he writes, ‘represents a transition from the primacy 
of material constraints to social constraints as the limiting condition on the 
quality of human life’. (Kawachi et al., 1999: p 27)  However, it is far from 
certain that determinants of premature mortality and morbidity under this 
threshold are wholly or uniformly due to material constraints.  Poor 
reproductive health of girls and women, or the spread of HIV/AIDS can be 
attributed to social and cultural practices as much as if not even more than, 
material deprivations. 
156. It would be even more misleading to conclude from Wilkinson’s 
research that achievement of a certain GNP threshold will automatically bring 
with it dramatic improvements in life expectancy and lower prevalence of 
impairments.  This widely held view that economic growth inevitably leads to 
dramatic improvement in life expectancy, to a decrease in burden of 
impairments, and to improved social prosperity has been longstanding since 
the mid-20th Century.  It was posited as a theoretical model by Omran in 
1971. (Omran, 1971)  He argued, based largely on the analysis of the 
trajectory of the United Kingdom, that as a result of economic growth, 
premature mortality and morbidity dramatically falls, followed by a fall in 
fertility levels, leading to a demographic transition.  However, Simon Szreter 
argues that there is no automatic link with economic growth and improvement 
of health or welfare of individuals.  In fact, he argues that industrialization 
released disruptive forces in British society that were managed by the politics 
of public health advocates and institutions. (Szreter, 1997)  That is, social 
action had an influential role in managing the process and consequences of 
industrialization.   
157. Sen and Nussbaum have also argued against focusing narrowly on 
increasing GNP.  It is not considered to be a defensible approach to 
development given that there is no guarantee that quality of life of individuals 
will improve and that equity and justice focusing on the inequalities across 
individuals rather than just population-level indicators. (Nussbaum et al., 
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1993)  The arguments of Szreter, Sen and Nussbaum help support the point 
that despite absolute material deprivation being an uncontested determinant 
of the health and quality of life of individuals, social factors also have 
influence on individuals across the entire GNP gradient.  The emphasis on 
absolute deprivation over relative inequality obfuscates the differing, relative 
importance of material and social conditions in all contexts.  Across societies 
and in the lives of specific individuals, the relative influences of material 
goods and social conditions on biological functioning or achieving a cluster of 
capabilities vary.  The hard won acceptance of social determinants of health 
inequalities in industrialized countries should not come at cost of denying 
their influence in poor countries as well.   
158. In light of the wide ranging theories put forward by social 
epidemiologists to supplement the biomedical model, and the possible 
misinterpretation of the absolute versus relative inequality research, there is 
a need for a ‘unified theory’ of health causation and distribution.  Such a 
theory should encompass material and social conditions in addition to 
biological needs.  And it should encompass both rich and poor countries.  A 
unified theory which is applicable across the entire human species must be 
able to defensibly allocate responsibility for health causation and distribution 
among the four elements consisting of nature/biology, social and material 
conditions, individual agency, and luck.  Such a theory can indeed be 
identified by looking towards the ‘entitlement analysis’ used to explain the 
causes and distribution of acute and endemic malnutrition.  
159. Drèze and Sen showed how the received view that famines are 
caused by the lack of food is only a specific explanation, and put forward a 
general theory of famines that included other components.  Sen and Drèze 
were able to demonstrate how famines occur and their ‘asymmetrical’ effects 
on individuals by modelling the interactions between an individual’s 
endowments (biological functioning/needs, labour capacity, productive land, 
and government transfers) and abilities to make adequate exchanges in the 
marketplace in order to meet nutritional needs. (Drèze et al., 1989)  As mass 
starvation and endemic malnutrition occurs even where there is food 
available in a particular location, Drèze and Sen eschewed the narrow focus 
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on the availability of food.  In effect, they were able to fully model the 
interactions between nature/biology, society/environment, and individual 
agency in the causation and differing distribution of acute and endemic 
malnutrition.   
160. Though the analysis of famines could be reframed in terms of 
modern capability theory, it is worthwhile to examine the ‘entitlement theory’ 
on its own terms.  The entitlement analysis consists of three parts: individual 
endowments, exchange mapping, and the entitlement set.  The term 
entitlement here does not refer to ethical or legal notions of rights or claims, 
but to descriptive aspects of economic exchanges.  Entitlements refer to ‘the 
bundles of goods over which they can establish ownership through 
production and trade, using their own means’.  In the model, individuals begin 
with differing amounts and types of endowments including different physical 
and mental powers, land, wealth, products of labour, and so forth.  
Individuals go to the market to exchange these endowments directly for food 
or more likely, income through labour.  They then again make an exchange 
or convert income for food.  Aside from the direct, or two-step exchange, the 
third and fourth possible ways to obtain food are either through individuals 
keeping some of the food they produce, or individuals receiving direct 
government transfers of food or income which they then exchange for food. 
161.   A person’s entitlement set contains all possible bundles of goods 
one could legally acquire through existing endowments, direct transfers, or 
through the one or two-step exchange processes.   Analysing various 
famines, Drèze and Sen showed that famines occur where individuals are 
unable successfully to exchange or convert their endowments for sufficient 
amounts of food.  Their endowments fall, or the exchange mechanisms fail 
such as through falling wages for labour or prices for food increasing, and so 
forth.  Endemic hunger occurs for different reasons than famine, but it can 
still be explained through the same theoretical framework.  By focusing on 
the personal endowments and exchange mechanisms rather than only on the 
physical availability of food in the surrounding environment, Drèze and Sen 
showed that famines occur due to a plurality of causes as well as have 
asymmetrical impact on individuals.  The differing types and amounts of 
 83 
 
endowments and different skills to negotiate the exchange mechanisms 
resulted in different types of entitlements sets.  They further went on to argue 
that ensuring a minimum-threshold level of income or a standard nutritional 
level across individuals would still result in certain individuals being 
malnourished.  This is because individuals have different 
endowments/biological needs and different abilities to convert their 
surroundings into entitlement sets.  A number of individuals may still be in 
need or unable to convert what is offered by the threshold.  Indeed, the 
individual can still experience hunger if she chooses not to exchange or 
make exchanges for bundles of goods other than food.  The idea of the 
entitlement set represents all the possible bundles acquirable from the 
exchanges, of which food is only one bundle.  While this simple model may 
seem to involve only the individual and the market, Sen and Drèze are 
emphatic that both the public and the government can play significant roles in 
ensuring that the entitlement sets of individuals contain sufficient food during 
famines, and in addressing endemic hunger.   
162. The move from the entitlement theory to capability theory, and then 
to health capability should not be very hard to understand.  The entitlement 
analysis identifies the causation and differing distribution of malnutrition 
across individuals by looking at the interactions between an individual’s 
endowments and exchange mechanisms.  The entitlement set represents all 
the potential bundles of goods one could acquire, and one assesses if these 
bundles could be sufficient to meet nutritional needs.    A person’s capability 
to achieve nutrition or entitlement set is then not just determined by the 
availability of food, but also by the nature of exchange mechanisms and 
personal features or endowments.  Capability theory posits that personal 
features plus social conditions and material goods result in a capability set.  
Diversity in personal features, diversity in ability to convert social conditions 
and material goods, and the actual social and material conditions determines 
the content of the capability set.  It looks as if, in the CA, the breadth of 
personal endowments in famine analysis is transformed into purely personal 
biological features, and the market exchanges component is transformed into 
material and social conditions.  To be even more explicit, the CA can be 
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easily summarized as individual needs and skills (endowments) plus social 
conditions (two-step market exchange dynamics) and material goods 
(economic goods) produce capabilities.  The capability theory is broader than 
the entitlement theory as the capability set contains bundles of ‘beings and 
doings’ rather than just bundles of economic goods including food. 
163. The analysis of famines or malnutrition is amenable to being 
transposed onto a theory of health causation and distribution, not least 
because the framework successfully explains malnutrition, an obvious health 
concern.  Drawing on Drèze and Sen’s analysis, an individual’s ‘health 
entitlements’ or ‘CH entitlement set’ would contain the potential beings and 
doings produced from  the interactions of: 1) individual biological needs; 2) 
abilities to convert material and social conditions into health functionings; 3) 
the extant material goods and social conditions in the surrounding 
environment; and 4) luck.  Failure to achieve such functionings as living a 
normal length of life span or avoiding impairments can be explained either by 
the lack of sufficient material and social support in the environment or due to 
the individual’s choices.  That is, the social conditions or ‘society’ did not 
provide the material goods or social conditions that satisfy individual 
biological needs; the individual was unable to improve skills to convert 
existing material conditions or social conditions into functionings; or the 
individual wilfully choose to pursue actions that resulted in death or 
impairments. 
164. The descriptive model of entitlement sets or capabilities allows for 
the integration of biomedical model of disease causation as well as the 
diverse range of social determinant theories of causation and distribution.  At 
bottom, both epidemiology and economics rely on statistical analysis to infer 
causation from correlation.  The capability model, which comes out of 
economics, has no difficulty in being able to analyze objective features such 
as biological functionings and material goods or qualitative phenomena such 
as conversion skills and social conditions.  Thus, individual-level biomedical 
causes such as genetic endowments, exposures to harmful substances, and 
behaviours can be integrated with the analysis of social determinant causes 
such as workplace conditions, social support, political and economic policies, 
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and so forth.  Indeed, the capabilities framework can integrate all of the 
various social determinants models. It is clear that across individuals and 
groups, the influence of different personal endowments, conversion skills, 
and exposures to material goods and social conditions cause different and 
asymmetric health constraints.  Importantly, the capability model provides the 
significant conceptual advantage of viewing health as a possible set of 
functionings rather than as the absence of disease.  Using the concept of 
health as capability to achieve or exercise a set of capabilities and 
functionings would allow this explanatory model to be applicable across the 
human species, and across rich and poor countries. 
165. The further advantage of the capability model is that it is conducive to 
undertaking an ethical analysis of what the social response should be to the 
causation and distribution of health constraints.  The biomedical model and 
the social determinants models are constrained from providing valuable 
ethical information.  For example, social determinants research has been 
motivated by and in turn, expanded social concern for the unequal social 
distribution of health constraints.  However, the scope of social 
epidemiologists’ concern is still only limited to social distributions that are 
causally linked to social determinants.  For example, skewed mortality rates 
across social classes may be attributed to various psychological stressors 
due to class position.  But cutting across social classes, there may also be 
unequal mortality across ethnic groups.  Though members of the ethnic 
group may belong to classes with mortality rates, there still may be a 
compelling reason to address absolute and unequal mortality within the 
ethnic group in addition to addressing unequal mortality rates across classes.  
The consequences may be greater for members of the ethnic group, or there 
may be a social commitment to especially protect the group from premature 
mortality.  Even if there is no social cause to the distribution, there may still 
be good reason to identify patterns of distributions according to social 
markers.  The biomedical model and even the social determinants model can 
only legitimately examine distribution patterns according to causal factors. 
166. The capability framework can identify distribution patterns of 
capability sets across multiple dimensions of individuals and groups.  This 
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can provide valuable information in determining the response to the causes, 
distributions and consequences of health capability and its constraints.  
Health, understood as the ability to achieve vital goals or a cluster of 
capabilities and functionings, provides the standard against which to 
compare a particular individual’s health capability set.  The capability 
causation framework provides the information on different possible causes 
for constraints on the achievement of the cluster of capabilities that make up 
health.  However, social responses to the health capability sets of a single 
individual or group when they fall below the standard, requires looking at 
differences in causes (endowments, skills, material and social conditions, 
choices) as well as asymmetric distributions, and consequences.  In the 
simple case where the cause is the same, looking at a variety of distribution 
patterns across social groupings or according to consequences may be 
necessary to prioritize social responses.  In contrast to such analysis being 
on the margins of classic or social epidemiology, the unified capability theory 
of health causation and distribution can provide robust descriptive information 
on causation and distribution that can inform an effective and ethical social 
response. 
167. In summarizing Part One, the argument illustrated how coherence 
could be brought to the concept of health in the theory and practice of the 
health sciences through a concept of health as the capability to achieve a 
vital or basic cluster of capabilities and functionings.  It also put forward a 
theory of causation and distribution of health that is able to account for 
individual-level, proximate causes as well as social determinants.  Such a 
theory unifies a broad range of dichotomous frameworks such those used to 
evaluate infectious versus chronic diseases, biomedical versus social 
determinants, rich versus poor country health profiles, proximate versus 
distal causative agents, natural versus social science, and so forth.  
Moreover, the framework also provides rich information for identifying an 
ethical social response to the inequalities in health functionings by not only 
looking at the inequalities in health capabilities, but also at the diversity of 
causal components, social distribution patterns, and consequences. 
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168. As was discussed in the introduction, addressing health concerns 
requires inter-disciplinary reasoning, most obviously across the health 
sciences and ethics.  But as has been shown, reflecting on the ethical 
response to inequalities in health achievements cannot begin with taking the 
extant scope and practices of health institutions as given.  Against the claims 
and assumptions that portray the study of disease causation and distribution 
as the pursuit of scientific truth, the operation of health institutions including 
research must be viewed as instrumental activity in the service of human 
beings.  Thus, values and ethics must be considered prior to the scope and 
extent of these activities.  Parts Two and Three thus present an argument for 
a theory of health at the level of ethical theory, or where social justice 
principles determining the form and scope of basic social institutions are 
discussed and justified.  With the starting point that the CA is the best 
approach to social justice, the CH is explicated and then, contrasted with the 
alternative welfare and resource approaches.  Chapter 6 examines in depth 
the resource approach of Norman Daniels as it has been presented as a full 
theory of health and justice.  Part Three then discusses how health 
phenomena at the population level mean that group capabilities are an 
unavoidable concept despite the normative individualism of the CA.  The last 
chapter discusses how a species-wide conception of health capability and 
the pre-political moral claim to such a capability has profound implications for 
debates on cosmopolitanism and global justice. 
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Chapter 3:  The Capabilities Approach (CA) 
 
 
 
169. The aim of this chapter is briefly to review the CA as background to 
situate the argument for the CH in Chapter 4.  It presents a summary of the 
CA including its major motivations, some conceptual features, and some 
criticisms.  Importantly, it also highlights the main differences between the 
versions advocated by Sen versus that of Nussbaum.  Indeed, the CH 
argument pursued in Chapter 4 is a hybrid argument which integrates Sen’s 
analytical structure of capability with Nussbaum’s central human capabilities 
as the content.  The CH is presented as a meta-capability to achieve or 
exercise a cluster of central human capabilities at a level that is 
commensurate with dignity worthy of the human being in the contemporary 
world.  The following review of the CA aims to provide the background to 
developing such a hybrid argument.         
170. The CA has its foundations in the critique of the prevailing thinking in 
welfare economics and political philosophy in 1970s and 80s.  Since then, 
the CA has been having profound influence on these fields as well as in the 
theory and practice across a wide range of spheres including domestic and 
international economic policy making, measurement, and evaluation; 
population and reproductive health policy making; social exclusion evaluation 
and policy making; and education policy making.  And the present argument 
for the CH extends the CA into the health sciences and policy making.  The 
two creators and others have written numerous books and analyses on the 
approach.  The Human Development and Capability Association maintains a 
comprehensive bibliography online.  (Human Development and Capability 
Association, 2007)  Given the breadth of the material, all that can be done 
here is to present a summary outlining key issues and problems with an eye 
to those especially relevant to the CH.  Importantly, it should be noted that 
the summary here does not present a justification for the CA, and because 
the CH is an extension of it, not the CH either.  For justification of the CA, 
 90 
 
one must look first-hand at most recent writings of Sen and Nussbaum. 
(Nussbaum, 2006; Sen, 2006)   The present argument for the CH largely 
assumes the justification of the CA. 
171. The CA is presented as an ethical framework that asserts that a 
liberal conception of social justice should focus on supporting—protecting, 
providing, expanding, restoring, and so forth—the capabilities of individuals 
to conceive, pursue, and revise their life plans. (Sen, 1999a; Alkire, 2002b; 
Alkire, 2005b; Robeyns, 2005; Nussbaum, 2006; Vizard, 2006)  The focus on 
human capabilities is motivated by the initial recognition that economic goods 
such as income and wealth only have value because of what individuals can 
be and do through using such goods.  Thus, instead of focusing exclusively 
on distributing goods because of their instrumental value, CA advocates 
contend that social justice criterion should more directly focus on what we 
really care about.  Namely, the focal points should be what individuals are 
able to be and do— ‘functionings’—that result from making use of economic 
goods, commodities, or any other ‘things’.  CA advocates do not deny that 
economic or other material goods can be crucially important for individuals 
but rather, that an exclusive or primary focus on goods rather than what 
people can be and do is off-target.     
172. A second, foundational and motivating impetus behind the CA is the 
concern for inequalities in the standard or quality of life across individuals.  
National or aggregate group statistics such as Gross National Product or life 
expectancy and other population health statistics often obfuscate inter-
individual inequalities in basic human functionings as well as in broader 
opportunities and abilities to pursue life plans.  The prevalent focus on 
aggregate measurements of achievements of social groups or the nation-
state likely reflects societal goals seeking to maximize the average or total 
group levels of wealth or welfare.  The CA militates against both a ‘fetishistic’ 
focus on material goods as well as on maximizing aggregate indicators while 
disregarding inter-individual inequalities in what individuals are actually able 
to be and do.  Instead, the CA champions supporting individual capabilities 
understood as effective opportunity to achieve beings and doings.  
Advocates of the CA have divergent views on if and when the goal of social 
 91 
 
action is to ensure the sufficiency, equity, or equality of capabilities.  Not 
surprisingly, given the entrenched focus on economic and material goods in 
both ethical theory and public policy making, some detractors of the CA insist 
that the focus of social justice should continue to be on distributing economic 
and other resources.1    
173. Aside from economic or material goods being off-target if the real 
concern is for what individuals are able to be and do in pursuing their lives, 
the methods used in distributing such goods can actually create or 
exacerbate inequalities in the choices and abilities of individuals.  The types 
of resources and the amounts to be distributed are often based on a 
‘standard’ conception of individuals/citizens or their ‘needs’ in both theorizing 
and policy making.  Entitlements are often based on an idealized moral 
agent, or average citizen, adult, or child.  However, at any single point in 
time, and over the life course, every human being differs in her biological and 
psychological needs for the types and quantities of material and social 
resources in order to achieve even the same functioning as another human 
being.  For example, the daily requirements for protein are different for a 
growing child than an older individual.  Or a pregnant woman needs more 
iron and nutrition than another individual in order to undertake the same level 
of physical activity.  Distributing one standard package of goods, such as a 
minimum income or food rations based on a fixed conception of needs can 
result in individuals being unequally able to achieve the same functionings as 
well as pursue their diverse plans of life. 2   
174. Every individual also differs in her abilities to convert her surrounding 
social conditions and extant material goods into beings and doings.  Physical 
and psychological features such as mobility and literacy can profoundly 
determine one’s ability to make use of available material goods and social 
                                                 
1 For a brief review of debates on whether social justice should focus on resources, 
welfare or capabilities see Daniels. (Daniels, 1996a)  Moreover, it is an open 
question as to whether there is a necessary trade-off between achieving equitable 
capabilities versus higher aggregate capabilities.  While Nussbaum and Sen have 
different approaches to this ‘aggregation’ problem, Peter Singer sees the potential 
of equalizing down as a major fault of Nussbaum’s CA. (Singer, 2002)   
2 Thomas Pogge argues that a ‘sophisticated resource theory’ would be able to 
account for most differences in needs of individuals except those of severely 
impaired.  But he acknowledges that no current resource theory can be considered 
as being such a sophisticated resource theory.  (Pogge, 2002a) 
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conditions.  The efficacy of conversion abilities can also be significantly 
influenced by external constraints.  For example, racism, gender and caste 
discrimination, or disabling architecture can be significant barriers for an 
individual in converting extant goods and social conditions into beings and 
doings.3  Furthermore, individuals can be differently able to convert their own 
endowments—their own physical features, reasoning capacity, or even 
property—because of the lack of information, training, and indeed, various 
types of cultural beliefs.  Girls and women may believe that certain kinds of 
reproductive tract impairments are a normal part of being female; that 
females cannot physically exert themselves as much as males; or, that 
female reasoning skills are ill-equipped for business or scientific professions.  
Theorists and policy makers using a standard template of conversion skills or 
simply ignoring differences in conversion skills all together can produce or 
exacerbate inequalities in quality of life across individuals.  Personal diversity 
in needs and conversion skills will produce unequal capabilities if every 
person is provided a standard type or amounts of goods and social 
conditions. 4   Such resultant inequalities can become obviously apparent 
when individuals with severe physical and mental impairments are said to be 
treated equally by given entitlements to the same set of resources as 
individuals without impairments.  Thus, CA advocates maintain that the 
narrow focus on commodities, aggregate statistics, exclusively following 
maximization policies, or using a standardized conception of persons can 
often be blind to, wilfully tolerate, or directly produce unequal opportunities 
and abilities among individuals to pursue their life plans. 
175. Given the CA’s central worries over the right target of ethical concern 
and inequalities in the life prospects of individuals, the CA also strongly 
repudiates the prevalent focus on welfare—whether it be utility, happiness, 
                                                 
3 For example, in 2004 the United States Supreme Court heard arguments in 
Tennessee v. Lane where physically disabled plaintiffs argued they were denied 
access to public services because they could not physically access courtrooms.  
George Lane had to crawl up the courthouse steps, while security guards watched 
and laughed, in order to appear and defend himself in court.  He was later arrested 
for failure to appear in court when he refused to crawl or be carried up the stairs at 
a subsequent hearing. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) 
4 This is one of the criticisms of the ‘basic needs’ approach to development policy 
which promotes entitlements to minimal amounts of various goods to every citizen. 
(Sen, 1983; Sen, 1992)   
 93 
 
preferences, satisfaction, et cetera—in economics and consequently, in 
national and international development policies.  The pervasive focus in 
economics on welfare or well-being, understood to reflect the subjective 
mental state of a person, is due to the influence of utilitarianism.  Paralleling 
utilitarian philosophy which asserts that the only correct social goal is to 
maximize human happiness and minimize pain across individuals, welfare 
economics aims to maximize the social welfare function that aggregates 
preferences.  However, as has been repeatedly argued, the preferences of 
human beings are malleable. (Sen et al., 1982; Nussbaum, 2000)  Some 
human beings adapt to great deprivation and express little or no 
dissatisfaction.  Meanwhile, other individuals can express great 
dissatisfaction with what objectively seems a minor annoyance in 
comparison.  Moreover, under a pure utilitarian regime, the goal of 
maximizing aggregate welfare means that it is reasonable for any individual 
human being to be used as a means to achieve higher aggregate social 
welfare.  The goal of achieving maximum amount of welfare trumps all other 
considerations.  Furthermore, contrary to the primacy given to the pursuit of 
happiness by utilitarianism, certain actions may be important to pursue even 
though they are known to result in unhappiness.  Fighting in a just revolution, 
for example, can be a valuable activity even though it will not likely be 
pleasurable for the individual.  Though this cursory description of welfarism 
and utilitarianism may be objected to as being an unfair rough sketch, for the 
types of reasons highlighted here and more, critics of welfarism/utilitarianism 
have argued that economics and social justice and equity concerns must 
consist of much more than just maximizing subjective pleasure or 
satisfaction.5     
176. In order to avoid the range of profound flaws of both ‘resourcist’ and 
‘welfarist’ approaches highlighted here in both theory and practice, advocates 
of the CA aver that the equal respect and moral concern for every human 
being compels ensuring sufficient or equitable capabilities of individuals to 
conceive and pursue their life plans.  There is importance given to 
                                                 
5 Admittedly this is a very rough sketch of welfarism and utilitarianism.  For an 
excellent and more even handed review of utilitarian philosophy and its different 
branches see Kymlicka. (Kymlicka, 2002) 
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recognizing ‘capability’ rather than just the actual achievement of beings and 
doings because of the intrinsic value in having choice or opportunity to 
achieve various beings and doings as well as in the actual achievements.  
Advocating for the capability rather than actual achievement is also 
necessary in the context of a liberal society.  Citizens must be allowed to 
determine their own life plans as far as possible.  Furthermore, there is also 
the important distinction between ‘substantive’ opportunity and just formal 
opportunity.  Substantive freedom or opportunity exists when there is real or 
effective practical possibility to exercise a capability.  That is, for each 
capability, a person’s internal features/needs and conversion skills and 
external material and social conditions all must sufficiently match to create 
the practical possibility to achieve the being or doing.  CA advocates also 
emphasize the value of having a meaningful breadth of capabilities.6  That is, 
the intent of the CA can be undermined if the idea of a capability is applied to 
superfluous or disvalued beings and doings, or a person is presented with a 
very limited choice of capabilities, even if they are valuable.  The over-
arching goal of the CA, then, can be understood as ensuring individuals have 
substantive and meaningful freedom to conceive, realize, and revise his or 
her own ends.       
177. The significant implications of CA’s arguments for shifting the focus 
from goods and welfare to capabilities, and the philosophical justification for 
such a move have been explored in a range of disciplines.  Not surprisingly, 
the CA has had the most influence in the two disciplines of welfare 
economics and political philosophy. (Robeyns, 2005; Robeyns, 2006)  There 
is considerable overlap between the CA and these two disciplines as welfare 
economics is concerned with how best to measure and achieve economic 
and social progress, traditionally seen as maximizing the social welfare 
function.  And there is overlap with political philosophy as one of its central 
concerns is conceptualizing a just society.  As a result, the CA has evolved 
                                                 
6 There is argued to be value in both having options as well as in having meaningful 
options.  This discussion is deferred at this stage because it largely pertains to 
Sen’s conception of the CA.  Nussbaum advocates for a particular set of central 
human capabilities thus sufficient choice and meaningful breadth is delineated to 
some extent.  She argues that life worthy of the dignity of the human being will 
have sufficient levels of ten specific capabilities.  Sen speaks more abstractly about 
the value of having choices, and for these choices being valuable or meaningful. 
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over the past two decades in critical opposition to competing perspectives in 
either discipline.  It has also evolved through trying to proactively illustrate the 
empirical and normative aspects of simultaneously pursuing economic and 
social goals while realizing a coherent conception of social justice. (Alkire, 
2002b) 
178. The CA is currently viewed as being most directly relevant to the 
theory and practice of economic and social development policies of 
developing countries.7  Given that alleviating poverty and human deprivation 
is the main concern of such policy arenas, and that previous policies focused 
largely on increasing aggregate wealth or distributing basic goods, the CA is 
viewed as offering the most state-of-the-art policy guidance that can 
overcome the drawbacks of previous policies while also providing ethical 
justification.  Nevertheless, the social concern over poverty, inequality, and 
other deprivations in poor or industrialized countries means that the CA has 
potential for global application.8   
179. Interestingly, though the CA has hitherto had significant influence on 
the normative aspects of welfare economics, the sub-field of health 
economics has also begun to explore potential applications. (Evans et al., 
2001; Anand, 2005; Anand et al., 2005)  Health economists develop 
measurements, guidelines, and recommend policies both in the public and 
private sectors on how to allocate resources in the ‘health sector’.  Their 
actions in effect determine on a massive scale who will live and who will die, 
and whose impairments will be mitigated, and whose will not. (Anderson, 
2007)  Health economists are faced with making some of the starkest 
decisions regarding the distribution of benefits and burdens across citizens.  
However, here too, the dominant mode of ethical reasoning so far has been 
to focus on goods and pursue welfare maximization.  That is, the distribution 
of healthcare resources is marshalled to where aggregate, population health 
measures will be maximized. (Anand, 2005)    
                                                 
7 See online bibliography on the CA at http://www.capabilityapproach.com/.  
8 The Cabinet Office of the United Kingdom recently incorporated the Capabilities 
Approach in evaluating how to chart a course for the Equalities Review Commission.  
The Equalities Review Commission will now combine all different government 
organizations that are meant to ensure equal treatment of citizens. (The Equalities 
Review, 2007)   
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180. In seeking to justify what a particular health measure is capturing and 
the maximization methodology, health economists like any other agents 
seeking justification look towards ethical reasoning.   And contemporary 
ethical reasoning in the domain of public or social policy has largely been 
focused on articulating and justifying a conception of social justice that is 
egalitarian.   Much of modern day egalitarianism has its roots in the 
nineteenth century when utilitarianism presented a radically alternative 
ethical framework to counteract longstanding social inequalities arising from 
such aspects as the class and family one was born into or religious beliefs.  
Utilitarians advocated the moral importance of taking equal account of the 
welfare of every individual in social planning.  It found wide acceptance due 
to its simple method of consequentialist reasoning to achieve welfare 
maximization, and its justification being that welfare or happiness is the most 
important good in human life.  The principle of ‘the greatest good for the 
greatest number’ arising out of that period in time still dominates public policy 
making in countries world wide. 
181. Section I: Rawls, Sen, and Nussbaum 
182. After dominating liberal political and social philosophy for over a 
century, utilitarianism was seriously challenged in the late twentieth century 
by the publication in 1971 of a Theory of Justice by John Rawls. (Rawls, 
1971)  Resurrecting the social contract tradition, Rawls argued that in a 
hypothetical decision making process, a representative group of human 
beings, placed behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ that shields them from knowledge 
of their prospective social positions, would impartially identify a set of basic 
social institutions and rules for social cooperation that would establish a just 
or well-ordered society.  This conception of social justice is argued to exhibit 
a ‘fair procedure’ approach to justice as it identifies a mutually agreed, fair 
process for decision making so that the outcomes, whatever they might turn 
out to be, will be considered just. (Nussbaum, 2006: p10)  This is in contrast 
to alternative approaches including utilitarianism or rights theories which seek 
to ensure certain outcomes, and then proceed to identify appropriate 
procedures. (Nussbaum, 2006: pp 81-84) 
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183. According to Rawls, the respect for equal moral worth of persons, or 
egalitarianism, is expressed in his theory in a variety of ways—in the 
hypothetical procedure, and most particularly, in the social guarantee of a set 
of ‘primary goods’.9  That is, respect for the equal moral worth of individuals 
is partly realized through ensuring that every individual has access to certain 
goods which each would find to be instrumentally valuable in pursuing their 
individually unique ends.  The primary goods are ‘all purpose means’ that 
include material goods such as income and wealth as well as social 
conditions such as liberties, equality of opportunity to achieve jobs and 
offices, and social basis for self-respect.  Rawls further maintained that 
against the background of a set of basic institutions which would guarantee 
the primary goods of highest equal basic liberties and equality of opportunity, 
certain inequalities in income and wealth should be allowed.  Rawls reasoned 
that because economic incentives are necessary for the economy to function 
and grow, inequalities in income and wealth were unavoidable, but that they 
could be regulated or harnessed.  Thus, Rawls stipulated that keeping in 
mind the requirement for the equal distribution of certain other primary goods 
(such as liberty, or social bases of self-respect), any increase in inequality in 
income and wealth across individuals could be allowed if it is also 
concomitant with an increase in the shares of the least well-off.   
184. The significance of Rawls’s contributions is hard to overstate.  He is 
credited with re-establishing political philosophy as a living discipline, and for 
widening the conceptions of social justice beyond utilitarianism.  Other 
philosophers have followed Rawls in offering alternative conceptions of social 
justice, and given his influence in the field, have had to articulate the 
similarities and differences to his theory.  After surveying the field of political 
philosophy including and after Rawls, Sen makes the observation that all the 
proposed theories of social justice are egalitarian, but the central and divisive 
question is equality of what? (Sen, 1992)  In order for a conception of social 
justice to be plausible in the modern world every individual has to be treated 
                                                 
9 These include i) basic rights and liberties…ii) freedom of movement and free 
choice of occupations against a background of diverse opportunities…iii) powers 
and prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility…iv) income and 
wealth…v) the social bases of self-respect..’ (Rawls, 1971: p 62; Rawls, 1980: p 526; 
Rawls, 1993: p 181)  
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equally, but in what respect should individuals be treated equally?  Rawls 
conceives the moral equality of persons as requiring a particular distribution 
of particular goods.  Contemporary utilitarians still maintain that equality 
requires taking into account each person’s preferences in the maximization of 
welfare.  Other philosophers have argued that equal treatment requires equal 
distribution of certain resources, opportunities, rights, and indeed, 
capabilities.  Roughly, all the various propositions for equal treatment can be 
characterized as falling into one of the three categories of welfare (utility, 
happiness, well-being), resources (primary goods, insurance, basic income, 
opportunities, rights), or capabilities (minimum threshold, basic). (Daniels, 
1996a)   
185. Despite standing alongside various conceptions or theories of social 
justice, the reason the CA is referred to as an ‘approach’ rather than a theory 
of justice is because it does not have the full components of a general theory 
of justice.  People do indeed disagree about what is necessary for a theory to 
be considered a complete theory of justice.  However, using the work of 
Rawls as a standard, a theory of justice should comprise a political account 
of the person, a political theory of the good or rights and obligations, a 
political psychology, and an account of justification that includes the 
identification of the epistemology and methods used in constructing the 
theory.  (Nussbaum, 2006)  These components should address the concerns 
over the coherence of theory construction, the fairness of the proposed 
conception, and the stability of the theory when being realized in the world.  A 
critique of a theory is often the evaluation of these aspects.  Despite having 
many of these components, the CA is not considered to be a full theory.  One 
reason is that the CA thought to not have any ‘public criterion of social 
justice’. (Pogge, 2002a)  That is, according to Thomas Pogge, the CA 
provides a useful language to assess the justness of other theories of justice 
and real world situations, but by itself, the CA offers no criterion for what 
justice should substantively entail.  Pogge is essentially asking, if equal 
treatment is meant to apply to capabilities then, capabilities to what?  Without 
any content of capabilities, it is only an analytical framework, not a 
substantive theory.  While there are answers available to Pogge’s questions, 
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such answers, however, still will not transform the CA into a full theory for 
some of the reasons discussed below.  
186. Pursuing an answer to Pogge’s question presents one of the 
distinctive aspects of the CA among the range of contemporary conceptions 
of social justice.  Uniquely, the CA has two prominent advocates—Amartya 
Sen and Martha Nussbaum—who developed the approach together for a 
period of time but now have quite divergent views.  The answer to Pogge’s 
question, and whether the CA is classified as an approach or theory will 
depend on which of the two versions one pursues.  Sen’s initial critique of the 
focus of welfare economics on preferences and Rawls’s standardized set of 
primary goods formed the foundation of the CA.  He has recently written that 
there is no need for an all encompassing ‘transcendental’ theory in order to 
evaluate and do justice in particular situations. (Sen, 2006)  This seems to 
imply that his version of the CA does not need to be a comprehensive theory 
of justice, whatever that may entail, in order to do justice.  Moreover, aside 
from describing the analytical concept of a capability and how it may be 
applied to a particular quality of life issue, he has steadfastly refused to 
identify any capabilities that every human being should possess in a 
conception of a just society.  This seems to preclude his version from 
providing any ‘public criterion of justice’ that Pogge claims is needed.   
187. One reason Sen provides for refusing to identify ‘the list’ is that the 
commitment to self-determination and democratic processes in liberal 
philosophy militates against any specification of the right or the good.  He 
argues that specifying capabilities would be limiting what people may or may 
not be and do.  Nevertheless, Sen has previously identified what he believes 
would be some ‘basic capabilities’ that would likely be common to any 
community when deliberating on the content and priorities of capabilities.  
These basic capabilities would include the capability for mobility, to satisfy 
nutritional requirements, to be clothed and sheltered; to participate in the 
social life of community, and others. (Sen et al., 2003)  Importantly, Sen 
argues that a full list of capabilities should not and cannot be identified across 
human beings because of the plurality and incommensurability of moral 
goods.  There is no acceptable way to achieve a full and thorough ranking of 
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moral goods, here, capabilities or functioning-achievements, in a liberal 
society. (Sen, 1994c; Sunstein, 1995; Sen, 2000)  Even where democratic 
processes and public reasoning attempts to identify a list of capabilities, it 
may be untenable to expect an agreement on a complete and ordered list.  
All of this may be true, Pogge replies, but as a prominent member of the 
public participating in public deliberation, Sen could still identify what he 
thinks should be in the set of capabilities that every person should possess. 
(Pogge, 2002a)     
188. In contrast, Nussbaum has clearly pursued constructing a capabilities 
based theory of justice, which she explicitly identifies as being a ‘partial’ 
theory of justice.  Nussbaum writes that she shares Sen’s belief that the 
‘capability space’ is the right place to compare and evaluate inequalities in 
quality of life across individuals.  However, she pursues providing an account 
of ‘core human entitlements’ that should be ‘respected and implemented by 
governments of all nations, as a bare minimum of what respect for human 
dignity requires’. (Nussbaum, 2000: p 12; Nussbaum, 2006: p 70)  Thus, 
Nussbaum has combined the evaluative space with substantive content 
which then produce basic political principles for social organization.  In 
following Rawls’s standard of theory construction, she also identifies a 
necessary moral psychology that consists of greater beneficence and 
compassion than what is required by dominant social contract theories based 
on mutual advantage; an epistemology and method of using wide reflective 
equilibrium which she uses to move from an intuitive conception of the 
human being and dignity to the consequent capability entitlements that 
attach; and she follows Rawls in seeing her theory as being limited to political 
liberalism, and making the ten central capabilities the object of overlapping 
consensus which is argued to provide stability.   
189. What distinguishes Nussbaum’s approach from Sen’s most clearly is 
that she has identified ten ‘central human capabilities’ (CHCs).  These 
capabilities are to be guaranteed by every society to each citizen and indeed, 
to every living member of the human species.  Nussbaum’s conception is 
presented as only a partial theory of justice because she is concerned ‘only’ 
with sufficiency, or ensuring minimal thresholds of central capabilities.  
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Indeed, she argues for some capabilities to be sufficient they will have to be 
equal.  And, ensuring sufficient capabilities is seen as one but not the only 
central purposes of social cooperation. (Nussbaum, 2006: pp 71, 75, 274)  
Because she does not consider establishing all political principles, or the 
inequalities in capabilities above the sufficiency thresholds, Nussbaum 
suggests her partial theory is compatible with other theories of justice being 
implemented when everyone is above the minimum thresholds levels.  
(Nussbaum, 2000: p 12; Nussbaum, 2006: p 75)  Among these other 
theories, a theory striving for the full equality of capabilities, which is 
sometimes attributed to Sen, could still be a possibility. 
190. One of the drawbacks of the CA is that there is much confusion in the 
capabilities literature about basic concepts, including the idea of a capability 
for a variety of reasons.  Some of this confusion is due to the differences 
between Sen and Nussbaum.  Putting aside outright misunderstandings of 
the idea of capability, choosing to privilege Sen’s or Nussbaum’s conception 
over the other, or instead, attempting to bring together both versions as I 
think one should, requires a thorough understanding of the sources, distinct 
forms of both versions, and what they have in common.  Even this, however, 
is not an easy task.  The simplest distinction between Sen and Nussbaum’s 
approaches is to consider the Senian version as a descriptive framework 
while viewing Nussbaum’s conception as a normative framework.  Sen’s 
approach has been described as providing an analytical device in contrast to 
Nussbaum’s account of substantive entitlements. (Alkire, 2005b; Robeyns, 
2005; Robeyns, 2006)  This distinction is too weak to hold, however, as 
Sen’s argument also has normative intentions.  He argues that for any theory 
of social justice to be plausible, it has to have some component of treating 
every person equally in some respect.  He further argues that the most 
defensible conception of equal treatment from the perspective of social 
justice or equity is to ensure equal or equitable capabilities. (Sen, 1992; Sen, 
1999a)  Thus, like Nussbaum, Sen also intends his version of the CA to be a 
normative theory that should stand along side other liberal theories of justice.       
191. To truly appreciate the breadth and nature of differences between 
their two approaches which only seem to be increasing, it is quite useful to 
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see the origins of the CA in Sen’s entitlement theory of hunger/famines and 
its coming together with the Aristotelian conception of human flourishing, 
where Nussbaum begins.  Sen’s entitlement theory of famines has already 
been discussed in Chapter 2.  To quickly recapitulate, the entitlement 
analysis models the causation and asymmetrical distribution of acute and 
endemic malnutrition among individuals by capturing the interactions 
between an individual’s endowments (personal and material) and market 
exchange mechanisms.  A person’s theoretical entitlement set holds all the 
potential bundles of goods she could acquire through iteratively converting 
her endowments in the marketplace.  The sufficiency and asymmetry of 
nutritional achievements can be best evaluated by examined a person’s 
entitlement set, and not only by the extent of available food in the immediate 
vicinity.  That is, a person’s nutritional level is determined by the interactive 
sum-effects of 1) the diversity in individual needs for types and amount of 
nutrition, 2) extant endowments, 3) availability of food, and 4) state of market 
exchange mechanisms.  Acute and endemic hunger occurs when there are 
insufficient bundles in the entitlement set from the interaction of needs, 
endowments, available food, and market exchange mechanisms. 
192. Section II: Sen’s analytical device, quadrants, vectors 
193. The concepts of a capability and functionings have been described in 
a variety ways. (Sen, 1983; Nussbaum, 2000; Alkire, 2005b; Robeyns, 2005; 
Robeyns, 2006; Vizard, 2006)  As an aid to making sense of the variety of 
descriptions, it may be helpful to identify a number of conceptual dyadic 
distinctions.  After reviewing the writings of Sen, Nussbaum and others on 
the CA, one may initially conceptualize the idea of a capability as an 
equation, imagining an archetype of a capability on one side and the 
personal features and external, material and social conditions of a person on 
the other side.  For example, an ideal conception of a capability to be well 
nourished would be on one side of the equal sign and the personal features 
of the individual and her external conditions on the other.  We would want to 
see whether the combination of the personal features (needs, endowments, 
conversion skills) and external conditions (material, social) provide the real 
opportunity to the person to achieve the functioning of interest.  Does it 
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approximate the notion of the capability we have in mind?  A capability to 
achieve a single functioning, such as being nourished, is obviously the 
simplest version of a capability, and really works only in theory.  Any human 
capability is likely to be complicated entailing the effective opportunity to 
achieve a cluster of iterative and interactive functionings and capabilities.  
For example, the simple capability of walking to the door really is made up of 
a complicated set of iterative capabilities and functionings occurring at the 
sub-molecular level up to the immediate physical conditions in the 
environment.   
194. A second dyadic distinction the CA frequently uses is that between 
capability and functioning.  A capability, as previously described, is the 
practical possibility of exercising or achieving a functioning.  The necessity of 
making such a distinction is grounded in the central value of having 
opportunity; being able to choose how to pursue one’s life.  The third dyadic 
distinction is between the individual’s personal features and external material 
and social conditions.  Some of the CA literature simplifies this distinction as 
being internal versus external aspects of capability.  It may be much more 
helpful however, to clearly identify the four components as personal 
features/needs, conversion skills, external goods, and social conditions.   
195. The fourth dyadic distinction is between well-being and agency 
functionings.  All acts carried out by a person are not necessarily beneficial to 
the person.  An example often presented is that of a person A enjoying a 
picnic who jumps into a frigid river to save another person B in distress. 
(Alkire, 2005b)  Jumping into the cold river was not immediately beneficial to 
person A enjoying the picnic, but she nevertheless, was able to carry out the 
act.  The act of jumping in the river to help B illustrates A’s agency 
functioning but it would not be A’s well-being functioning.  So there is an 
important distinction which should be made between acts that are ‘beneficial 
to’ or ‘good for’ the person acting, and acts that are done for ‘other purposes’.  
In the CA, acts beneficial to the actor are referred to as ‘well-being 
functionings’.  They include mental and physical states of the person and 
which are both subjectively and objectively positively valued.  And, acts 
aimed for other purposes are referred to as ‘agency functionings’.  Agency 
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functionings are intended to encompass the full breadth of acts that 
individuals undertake in determining, revising and pursuing their conception 
of the good life.  And of course, there is value in being able to have 
capabilities to exercise both types of functionings.  
196. Indeed, beneficial can mean a range of things including beneficial 
according to the person’s own valuation, or according to some objective 
criteria.  Acts that are beneficial to the person acting can also have other 
secondary purposes.  They can also be interdependent where beneficial acts 
allow the person to carry out other acts for ‘other purposes’ or visa versa.  
There is no hard rule that separates well-being from agency functionings.  
The basic point is that any single act can be identified as being directed at 
adding to the well-being of the individual or for achieving other goals.  
Indeed, it is suggested that agency functionings make up a much larger 
category than well-being functionings, and that agency functionings are 
crucial to realizing well-being functionings.10   
197. In Sen’s version of the CA, a capability is conceived as having four 
dimensions or vectors.  They include a) agency-freedom; b) agency-
achievement; c) well-being freedom; d) well-being achievement. (Sen, 1999a; 
Alkire, 2005b)  For any meaningful capability, these four dimensions identify 
the importance of there being ability or ‘effective freedom’ in terms of breadth 
of extant opportunities, and abilities to choose to follow any of them.  
Importantly, this four-quadrant, multi-dimensionality of any given capability is 
said to exhibit ‘internal plurality’ for assessing capabilities.  Equal capabilities 
do not mean identical vectors but that there are equal ‘effective freedoms’ to 
achieve the functionings across individuals.     
198. It is important to point out that Nussbaum does not identify a 
distinction between well-being and agency, but does make use of the 
distinction between freedoms and achievements, or capabilities and 
functionings.  Her reasoning for not using such a distinction is based on the 
potential for confusion caused by the term ‘well-being’ being closely 
associated with utilitarianism.  She sees no additional benefits in highlighting 
                                                 
10 This is reflected in the debate about the instrumental importance of liberties in 
promoting economic and social well-being, or priority of liberty. (Sen, 1994b)    
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or separating well-being from agency functionings that could not be handled 
within the distinction between capabilities and functionings.  (Nussbaum, 
2000: p14)  In fact, Nussbaum categories capabilities as being basic, 
internal, or combined. (Nussbaum, 2000: p84-85)  Combined capabilities 
being those which entail internal capabilities combining with suitable external 
material goods and social conditions in order to exercise a function. 
199. The difference between Nussbaum and Sen on the importance of 
agency and well-being distinction lies perhaps, in their different primary 
disciplines.  Sen is supremely concerned with how to make comparisons 
among individuals about their quality of life.  The impossibility of making 
interpersonal comparisons of utility has been a long standing assumption in 
neo-classical economics.  What Sen has achieved, and is committed to 
asserting, is that though one might not be able to make interpersonal utility 
comparisons, we can make comparisons of people in each of the four 
quadrants.  Adherents to the Senian conception of capabilities are asked to 
think of each capability as being multi-dimensional and more practically, to 
conceive of each quadrant as a vector contributing to the capability.  This 
allows to conceptualize that different vectors or quadrants may be able to 
compensate for the weakness of one or more of the other vector/quadrants.  
Moreover, importantly for an economist, Sen is asserting the possibility of 
making comparisons across people along these vectors/quadrants, and not 
their utility function.  In contrast, Nussbaum’s primary grounding in ancient 
and modern philosophy motivates her reasoning for a conception of human 
flourishing and its relation to social justice.   
200. Dan Brock identifies various philosophical advantages of using these 
four quadrants/vectors. (Nussbaum et al., 1993 p.99)  The most important of 
these is that it allows that a full conception of a good life does not reduce to a 
single property, and is thus able to incorporate some valuable aspects of 
diverse ethical theories separately and together.  That is, the focus on either 
hedonic conscious experiences or preference satisfaction in welfarist theories 
can be part of the well-being quadrants.  It may not have supreme or 
significant weight, but it can be included.  Indeed, Brock highlights that each 
of these four vectors can be thought as being made up of sub-vectors. 
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(Brock, 1995)  So, for example, the well-being freedom vector can be made 
up sub-vectors representing physiological achievements that make possible 
others, access to nutrition, and so forth.  Brock’s argument affirms the notion 
that any given capability is really made up of a complex set of iterative and 
interdependent capabilities and functionings.    
201. The fifth and final distinction needs to be identified.  Within agency 
functionings, or acts that are not directly or immediately beneficial to the 
individual, Sen makes a further distinction between what he calls ‘power’ and 
‘process’ agency. (Sen, 2001c)  This serves to distinguish between a 
person’s interest in controlling the process that aims to achieve a goal versus 
the emphasis on achieving the goal even if or when the person does not 
have direct control over the process.  In either situation the person has the 
capability to achieve the goal, but the person’s interest can either be on the 
acting in the first, or the achieving in the second.  For a myriad of simple and 
complex functionings, a person may not be able to have control over the 
process of exercising a functioning, or making it possible to exercise a 
functioning.  Philip Pettit refers to this second kind of functionings 
achievements as ‘indirect liberty’ and ‘passive empowerment’. (Pettit, 2001)  
Consider when a child is bathed, a disabled person is carried up the steps, or 
new laws restrict air pollution allowing one to breathe easier.  In each of 
these examples, the individual achieves functionings though they could not 
control the process to the achievement.  At a prior point in time, however, 
they each possessed a capability to achieve the functioning.  But the 
importance may not always be on highlighting the point in time when they 
had the capability.  Given the four vectors, the achievement of the well-being 
functioning may compensate for the person not having agency-freedom over 
the process.  In regard to some functionings, however, it may be much more 
important that the individual have the well-being freedom.  For example, 
performing surgery on a person to remove a cancerous growth may produce 
a well-being achievement, but their ability to choose to have that operation 
may have significant ethical weight.  Thus, in the Senian version, the 
distinction between power and process agency, combined with the four-
vector distinctions, outline a conceptual device or architecture to assess a 
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person’s capability.  It should be clear of course, that this device becomes 
real only through content, or when particular capabilities are defined and how 
different functions, vectors, and vectors within vectors are causally related, 
prioritized, and weighted.   
202. To summarize, as a helpful tool, it was suggested keeping in mind 
five dyadic conceptual distinctions. 
202.1. ideal capability vs. personal features, external conditions 
202.2. capability vs. functionings 
202.3. personal features vs. material goods and social conditions 
202.4. well-being vs. agency functionings 
202.5. control agency vs. power agency 
203. The Senian capability device is presented as having four vectors. 
203.1. well-being freedom, well-being achievements 
203.2. agency freedom, agency achievements 
204. Section III: Nussbaum’s CHCs 
205. Nussbaum’s initial interest in the CA is said to be motivated by the 
shared observation by Drèze, Sen and Aristotle that the focus of moral 
concern should not be on commodities, but on what individuals are able to be 
and do.  Sen and Nussbaum originally overlap in their approaches in their 
shared theoretical critique of Rawlsian primary goods and utilitarianism.  
Since then, the most significant difference between the two which Nussbaum 
herself identifies is her explicit account of valuable human capabilities. 
(Nussbaum, 2000 pp 11-15)  Thus, one basis for dismissing Pogge’s 
assertion that the CA has no public criteria of justice is Nussbaum’s list of 
capabilities.  The ten CHCs identify some basic political principles for 
organizing a minimally just, liberal society.  Nussbaum maintains that all 
societies should ensure that every citizen achieves a certain threshold of 
each central capability.  In brief, the ten central human capabilities include 1) 
living a normal length of lifespan; 2) having good health; 3) maintain bodily 
integrity; 4) being able to use senses, imagination, and think; 5) having 
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emotions and emotional attachments; 6) possess practical reason to form a 
conception of the good; 7) have social affiliations that are meaningful and 
respectful; 8) express concern for other species; 9) able to play; and 10) 
have control over one’s material and political environment. (Nussbaum, 2006: 
pp 76-77) 
206. Nussbaum continues to affirm that the social goal is normally to 
ensure that individuals have capabilities and not their achievements 
(‘functionings’), unless dignity and respect are at stake.  However, for 
children, the social goal should be the achievement of functionings.  
Capabilities, not functionings are the focus for adults because of the 
necessity to respect the choices of citizens to determine their own lives, and 
importantly for Nussbaum, in order to achieve overlapping consensus 
regarding her ten CHCs.  At the same time, she still allows for the possibility 
that some functionings may be considered to be so valuable that they will not 
be allowed to be neglected or fail, even if it means overriding individual 
choice.11 (Nussbaum, 2000: pp 91-96) 
207. Nussbaum’s list of CHCs is profoundly influenced by Aristotle and 
Marx, and is centred on the concept of moral worth or human dignity.  That 
is, she conceives of a human being’s dignity as being uniquely constituted by 
its neediness, sociability, and ability to reason.  She starts from the intuitive 
idea that certain basic functionings are so central to human life that their 
absence or presence reflects the absence or presence of human life form.  
From there, the Marxian component is reflected in recognizing that to be ‘fully 
human’ requires that the person does these functions differently than what 
would be normal for other animals.  In addition, for Aristotle, a conception of 
human flourishing and conditions for human flourishing are both necessary 
components.  Thus, Nussbaum asserts that the abilities to exercise these 
central functions in a way worthy of the dignity of the human being requires 
supportive external material and social conditions.  Bringing together 
Aristotle, Marx and some aspects of Grotius, Nussbaum argues that a life 
worthy of the dignity of the human being is made up of opportunity and 
                                                 
11 This space for paternalism for adults should be understood as protecting the right 
of exit.  Certain functionings are so valuable that a person who allows them to fail 
would destroy her ability to revise her choices. 
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activity that reflects the neediness, sociability and ability to reason of the 
human animal.  That is, these functions are not done purely by animal 
instincts or through being passively shaped and pushed around, but infused 
throughout by reasoning, cooperation, and reciprocity with other human 
beings. (Nussbaum, 2000 p. 72)  
208. Her list of basic capabilities, contrary to some cursory criticisms, 
does not advocate a form of an ideal human being or ‘perfectionism’. 
(Nussbaum, 2006: pp 69-81)  Unlike others who do advocate a version of 
Aristotelian perfectionism, Nussbaum argues for minimum threshold levels of 
central capabilities.  These levels of capability or opportunity ensure that 
each human being is able to pursue diverse conceptions of life, and in a way 
worthy of the dignity of the human being.  The list of ten CHCs does not 
describe a comprehensive conception of the good life for every human being.  
Rather, the list of basic capabilities identifies a level of freedom, thresholds of 
capabilities and functionings, which every society should ensure to its 
citizens.  Beneath these thresholds, human beings do not have basic 
functionings which allow for a life worthy of the dignity of being human.    
209. A second criticism that has been directed at the list of ten CHCs and 
the CA in general is that it constrains possible conceptions of the good.  The 
list is said to be patently illiberal for specifying and valuing content of a life.  
In fact, Nussbaum has been explicit in taking a position that a commitment to 
liberalism does indeed involve making some minimal normative commitments 
to a conception of the good.  The ten CHCs reflect a conception of the 
human being as a ‘needy enmattered being’ and of a life worthy of its dignity.  
Eschewing a purely biological account of the human animal or moral 
perfectionism, she identifies the prerequisites for living a fully human life.  
(Nussbaum, 2006: pp 81-84) 
210. The charge that the CA or CHCs constrain the conception of the 
good for human beings also depends on how critics believe human agents 
come to have rationality to conceive their life plans and where ethical theory 
should begin.  For example, Rawls avoids this problem largely by requiring 
from the start that his hypothetical contractors have full rationality.  That is, 
his ‘thin theory of the good’ requires that individuals be rational in order to 
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conceive their life plans, and have a sense of justice.  Their capacity for 
impartiality is reflected in the use of the veil of ignorance.  Moreover, in order 
for there to be any interest in making a contract, individuals must be free, 
equal, independent, and in an environment of moderate scarcity.  For Rawls, 
the representatives behind the veil of ignorance embody the minimum 
conception of the person, and what they seek to achieve.   Having such a 
scenario of moral contractors in mind, a list of central human capabilities may 
seem to be super-imposing on the rational capacities of individuals to 
determine their own lives.  However, it should not be easily ignored that in 
Rawls theory construction, those who are significantly unequal, either in 
mental abilities to reason or physical functionings are excluded from the 
theoretical procedure.  They become secondary beneficiaries, post 
agreement, comparable to how one might think about children and their 
interests.  Nussbaum eschews such a social contract procedure with 
idealized rational agents precisely in order to conceive her moral agents as 
‘enmattered beings’ which are needy, sociable and capable of rationality to 
varying degrees over the life course. (Nussbaum, 2006: pp 159-164)  In fact, 
if we compare what Rawls requires of his moral agents in terms of each 
being free, equal, independent, having two moral powers, and with 
impartiality provided by the Veil, with the minimum level of opportunity and 
activity Nussbaum seeks to ensure through the ten CHCs, there is not such a 
big difference in either of their ‘thin’ theory of the good.  Nussbaum, at least, 
does not seem to be conceiving much more than what Rawls requires for his 
contract procedure to get off the ground.   
211. The charge against CHCs and the CA that it constrains the good 
though it aims to ensure capabilities instrumentally valuable to conceiving 
and pursuing the good seems misplaced.  In an extreme example, some 
have argued that asserting that human beings need to be alive in order to 
pursue the good is ethical imperialism or constraining the good by valuing life 
over death.  (Nussbaum et al., 1993)  On the other hand, Rawls faces 
significant problems by assuming the rationality of his contractors and that 
they are fully free, equal, and independent agents.  As Rawls himself points 
out, the problem of individuals who are severely physically and mentally 
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disabled gets pushed out of the realm of justice.  Nussbaum points out the 
further implication that this erases the additional burdens of individuals, most 
often women, who provide care for the disabled.  Rawls’s assumptions and 
starting point also put aside the pressing reality that as human life 
expectancies become longer, the periods of dependency on other human 
beings will occur more frequently and for more extend time-periods at the 
end of the life course.  In any case, eschewing Rawls’s approach to such 
matters, Nussbaum addresses the objections that her CHCs constrain the 
good by being imperialistic or paternalistic. 
212. Nussbaum could reply that the list is neither a final nor a complete 
account, but the necessary minimal account of activity and opportunity in a 
human life.  If, however, critics believe that the list of ten CHCs could force 
individuals to be and do what they would not choose if they were fully free 
and independent, rational agents, the charge may have some impact.  
Nussbaum’s commitment to liberal principles leads her to argue that the list 
of ten CHCs does require making negative judgements on certain practices 
and beliefs which violate the equal respect and concern for individuals.  The 
ten CHCs, at the least, allow people to have a real choice in deciding 
whether to limit some of their own capabilities, and preserve an exit option 
from situations where their capabilities are limited.12 (Nussbaum, 2000: pp 
91-96)  Moreover, certain functionings-achievements may require collective 
provision, or public goods, thus it is forthrightly admitted that there will be 
some areas where individuals do not have control over the exact 
mechanisms or processes of achieving functionings. 
213. Aside from the prevalent criticisms that the capability list is 
perfectionist or that it constrains conceptions of the good, a secondary 
criticism has been that the list does not prioritize among the ten capabilities.  
Going against the received view that any list of moral goods that are to be 
provided are to be ranked, Nussbaum vehemently asserts that the ten 
capabilities are not open to trade-offs. (Nussbaum, 2006: pp 166-167)  Every 
single one of the ten capabilities is an important aspect of a dignified human 
                                                 
12 Bryan Turner also emphasizes the importance of an exit option.  See p.8 (Turner, 
2006) 
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being, and the foremost social goal is to ensure every citizen is above the 
threshold for each.  She is clear, however, that the entitlements provide 
political principles only up to the point where all citizens achieve various 
thresholds of basic human capabilities.  Perhaps, ranking of capabilities is 
required or compatible with a theory of justice above the thresholds.  Where 
not all capabilities can be supported, perhaps in the short term, on the path 
towards full support, it should simply be recognized that justice is not yet 
being done. 
214. Nussbaum’s ten CHCs, as they partly provide a source for political 
principles for a pluralistic liberal society, are meant to serve as the basis of 
national constitutions. (Nussbaum, 2006: pp 69-81)  They are meant to 
establish one of the central purposes of governments.  And, as it is not meant 
to be a complete list, content could be added based on local values as long 
as that they do not violate the existing CHCs nor seek to undermine the 
equal dignity and worth of every citizen.  This shows, contrary to criticisms of 
the CHCs as constraining the conception of the good or being intolerant of 
cultural diversity, that within justifiable constraints, the minimal conception of 
social justice is open ended.  Furthermore, aside from providing the political 
principles for domestic governments, the list of basic human capabilities is 
aimed also to provide coherence and philosophical justification for 
international human rights law.  Nussbaum has argued that because the 
CHCs are derived from a conception of a life worthy of the dignity of a human 
being, it is a species-wide conception.  Duties and obligations in regard to 
supporting basic capabilities of non-compatriots would be more expansive 
than today and what is being advocated by modern social contract theorists, 
but still less than what would be required within national borders. (Nussbaum, 
2006) 
215. Section IV:  Two Objections to CA 
216. This brief discussion should now make it possible to understand that 
in terms of the CA, a person’s single instance of being or doing is really inter-
related and inter-dependent with numerous others in a causal chain of well-
being and agency functionings; any of which may have been directly or 
passively achieved.  A person has a capability to exercise a functioning when 
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she has either control over the process to achieve or passively realizes the 
functioning.  The repeated emphasis is on the importance of individuals 
having real opportunities to achieve functionings, and a meaningful breadth 
of choices of functionings opportunities.  For Nussbaum, ‘meaningful’ and 
‘breadth’ are determined by the sufficiency of threshold levels of the content 
of the ten capabilities.     
217. Someone either misunderstanding the CA or mounting an objection 
could say that a profound flaw in the CA is that it considers someone to have 
a capability whether or not they have control over the process of realizing the 
capability.  In essence, such an attack directed at the Senian CA would be 
that if a capability is understood as the combination of four vectors, then the 
‘achievement’ vectors could compensate for the freedom vectors.  Thus, 
‘achievements’ which can really just be social inducements of certain well-
being or agency functionings would still be considered as the person having 
capabilities.  Another objection could be that even if the CA asserts stringent 
criteria for determining which functionings can be induced, just the privileging 
of certain capabilities over others is still dangerous.  Social arrangements can 
go a long way to encouraging or supporting certain kinds of beings and 
doings without actually forcing or inducing an individual directly to be and do 
certain things.  It is this aspect of the CA that Dworkin finds frightening. 
(Dworkin, 2000 p302) 
218. Against this criticism of the Senian capability device, one may also 
be able to better appreciate the almost automatic response to Nussbaum’s 
ten CHCs as being oppressive, or illiberal.  Surely, given incommensurable 
conceptions of the good, conflicts in values, and necessity for respecting 
diversity in the contemporary world, identifying ten personal features that 
every human being must be able to be and do is patently illiberal?  Against 
such a broad brushed criticism, Nussbaum mounts a strong defence of her 
list of ten CHCs.  Her conception of a person which she has in mind with 
those ten capabilities is not very different from the implicit conceptions in 
competing theories including in Rawls’s theory, and perhaps, even Dworkin’s. 
(Dworkin, 1993; Dworkin, 2000)  Moreover, paternalism and coercion are 
both unavoidable in organizing large and complex societies, and come to the 
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forefront almost immediately when considering health concerns. (O'Neill, 
2002c; O'Neill, 2002a; O'Neill, 2002b; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2007)  
Furthermore, objective assessments and public deliberation on the content of 
capabilities, including which will require the inducement of functionings, the 
identification of levels, and so forth are meant to be constrained by the over-
arching respect for dignity and moral worth of human beings.  Inducing 
people into being and doing certain things that undermine their dignity and 
calling them achievements would be unacceptable within the CA.  
Engendering choice and opportunity to reason in all aspects of life plans is 
central to the notion of human capabilities in the CA and Nussbaum’s CHCs.  
Of course, the possibility of abusing the language and ideas of the CA surely 
exists.  Just as rights language can become just a shell for asserting 
interests, so the language of CA also has the potential to be abused.   Such 
potential for abuse is not necessarily a fatal flaw.   
219. A second objection to the CA comes from exactly the opposite 
direction.  G.A. Cohen argues that Sen and the CA privilege the ‘freedom to 
achieve’ more than the actual achievements. (Cohen, 1989)  Do we care 
about individuals having freedom to achieve more or equally as much as the 
individual achieving the functioning; even some basic functionings?  Cohen 
argues that emphasis on freedom more than achievements makes the CA 
too ‘athletic,’ and proceeds to develop his theory of entitlements to ‘mid-fare’.  
Mid-fare includes some objective functioning achievements advantageous to 
human beings as they pursue their own ends.  While Cohen’s critique has 
been addressed by Philip Pettit who points to the CA’s recognition of ‘passive 
empowerment’ or inducement of functionings, there is still a meaningful 
question regarding the space between a person possessing the capability 
and actually achieving the functionings.  Nussbaum is much more forthright 
in identifying the persuasive role of moral education, restrictions on letting 
functionings wither, and direct inducements to close this space between 
availability and achievement.  But given the CA is centrally motivated by 
human deprivation, and such pressing concerns as the deaths of millions of 
individuals due to health threats such as HIV/AIDS and other preventable 
causes, does the CA sufficiently balance our value of both the freedom to 
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achieve and the achievement?  Though the CA has achieved success in 
expanding the focus of economic and justice theories to include human 
capabilities, the CA’s advocates have not yet begun to fully consider the 
theoretical and practical issues in the self-realization of capabilities and the 
process of choosing to exercise capabilities and functionings.  Sabina Alkire’s 
research offers one of the first documented efforts at the praxis of the CA. 
(Alkire, 2002b)  
220. Provided the previous discussion has been a sufficiently general 
review of the CA, some of the cutting edge issues for the CA include the 
following.  Thomas Pogge picks up on the foremost question for the CA 
namely, which capabilities?  On the one hand, Sen has repeatedly talked 
about certain capabilities as being basic, or even asserted the priority of 
liberty.  Nevertheless, there is uncertainty to how Sen supports the idea of 
capabilities beyond their use in making comparisons about the quality of life 
of people in the ‘primary goods space’.  He has recently tried to ground 
human rights in the capabilities framework, showing his interest in asserting 
capabilities as universal entitlements. (Sen, 2004c)  On the other hand, 
Nussbaum strongly asserts that the list of ten CHCs should be ensured in 
their entirety, and are applicable to all members of the human species.  
However, the process of justification or achieving reflective equilibrium on the 
list is not delimited in any way.  The open-ended process, and its occurring at 
a global level, striving to achieve global overlapping consensus, seems to 
make the justification only tentative, if it could be fully achieved ever at all.  
Given that reflective equilibrium is not just an affirmation process, but a truly 
dialectical process, there is no assurance that the list we have now is the one 
that will achieve overlapping consensus.  So how will Sen, Nussbaum and 
others committed to the CA proceed in identifying the content of capabilities?  
221. A related point to the content of capabilities is the question of 
measurement and weights.  Sen identifies multiple dimensions or vectors for 
each capability, but there is still a lot of theoretical and empirical work to be 
done on developing methods to measure these dimensions.  It cannot be 
overstated how important measurements are, given that what we measure 
has to reflect exactly the importance CA gives to distinguishing between 
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effective freedom and functioning-achievement as well as well-being and 
agency.  Some progress has been made by Alkire in her research on the 
multi-dimensionality of capabilities and development of a variety of 
measurement tools. (Alkire, 2002a; Alkire, 2005a)  Nussbaum on the other 
hand, avoids the four vectors approach and distinguishes only between 
capabilities and functionings. (Nussbaum, 2000: p 14)  She believes that 
such a distinction is sufficient to handle the various aspects of effective 
freedom the CA is concerned about.  However, such a version may be even 
more difficult to measure given the greater room for interpretation. 
222. A second measurement question pertains to weights given to 
different capabilities.  That is, how does one rank different capabilities not 
only in terms of lexical priority, but with different weighting to better capture 
how much more or less important a capability is than the one below or above 
it.  For Nussbaum, this problem is simple as she vehemently rejects the 
separation or selecting out certain capabilities from the ten CHCs.  All the 
CHCs must be provided to every human being.  However, asserting that all 
ten CHCs must be present does not mean each has to be present in the 
same amount or weight.  The capability for play must be present, but does it 
have to be present in the same ‘amount’ as the capability for bodily integrity?  
But even more problematic is that the ten CHCs are not singular, 
unidirectional functioning.  Every embodied functioning is a complicated, 
iterative set of functionings and capabilities that can keep being peeled away 
all the way down to the processes at the sub-molecular level.  So the 
question of measurements and weights is a concern not only at the level of 
ten capabilities but also within each capability.  Interestingly, though Sen’s 
arguments for capabilities does not directly go to the weights issue because 
he does not identify any particular capabilities as valuable, he has 
nevertheless, expounded on the difficulties of measurements, particularly in 
reference to health capability. (Sen, 2001a) 
223. Considering content, measures and weights of capabilities goes 
directly to concerns about implementation.  While it is true that the CA has 
been the basis for measuring quality of life such as in the United Nations 
Human Development Reports, aside from references to the theory, the actual 
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use of the concepts have been fairly minimal.  Moreover, the articulated aim 
of the CA and ten CHCs as possible basis for international human rights law 
and national constitutions is ambitious.  But how one gets there is unclear.  
The hurdles range from the complexity of the theory, and the lack of 
overlapping consensus, to the issues in realizing political theory, more 
generally.  And perhaps, even more foundational to implementation is the 
question of whether the CA is an approach to evaluating quality of life, is it a 
partial theory of justice, or is it still developing into a full theory of justice?  
Indeed, for Nussbaum, the ten CHCs are a moral minimum making it a partial 
theory of justice.  Nevertheless, she argues, achieving the moral minimum for 
every human being is such an overwhelming task that it is not a weakness to 
defer identifying whether equality of full capabilities or some other social 
goals come next.    
224. Still, the place where it supposed to have the most relevance, or 
have the most moral force, is in developing countries.  The advocacy for 
entitlements that governments must provide in locations where there is a 
weak or non-existent state seems to require more thorough consideration.  
As some philosophers frequently assert, ought implies can.  If there is no 
state or functioning social structures to speak of, a list of entitlements 
becomes just a list.  Of course, Nussbaum argues that functioning states 
have obligations to realize the ten CHCs of human beings outside of their 
societies.  But, given how the ten CHCs identify a sufficiently comprehensive 
account of how the society should be functioning—what each individual 
should be able to be and do—foreign assistance will have to involve the 
actual formation or possible profound transformations of individuals and 
societies.  This is hardly just the discrete transfers of resources to build 
structures or mitigate threats.  Engendering basic capabilities may be the 
most significant and thoroughgoing kind of foreign intervention imaginable, 
far more involved than even the Marshall Plan. (Behrman, 2007)     
225. Section V:  Conclusion 
226. Needless to say, this discussion has only been a cursory introduction 
to the CA.  The two creators and others have written numerous books and 
analyses on the approach.  It would be unwise and redundant to attempt to 
 118 
 
explain it better in a few pages.  Rather than recapitulate the history and 
content of the CA, the main purpose of this chapter was to provide the 
background for the CH argument which can be seen as a hybrid argument.  It 
brings together the analytical structure of Sen’s CA and the entitlement-
causal theory with Nussbaum’s CHCs that are grounded in a conception of 
human dignity and give rise to pre-political moral claims for social support.  
Sen’s refusal to identify any basic capabilities precludes using his conception 
of capabilities for a species-wide conception of human health.  No capability, 
or a minimal account of a life and the good, can be thought of as being 
shared across every member of human species.  In contrast, Nussbaum’s 
fully evaluative conception of human life form and its grounding in human 
dignity provides justifiable entitlements for every member of the human 
species. (Nussbaum, 2006: p181-183)  But Nussbaum does not ground her 
central capabilities in any causal theory.  Chapters 1 and 2 were aimed to 
show how Nussbaum’s ethical argument fits in with the existing debates on 
the philosophy of health as well as explicate a theory of causation and 
distribution of health capability that is more coherent than existing theories in 
epidemiology.  The next chapter discusses the CH argument and shows how 
it brings together Sen’s analysis of the causality of capability sets and the 
capability device itself with Nussbaum’s content and justification for central 
human capabilities and functionings. 
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Chapter 4:  CA and CH 
 
 
 
227. The capability to be healthy (CH) describes a person’s ability to 
achieve and exercise a cluster of basic capabilities and functionings at a level 
that constitutes a life worthy of equal human dignity.  Making use of 
Nussbaum’s conception of CHCs, the CH can be usefully understood as a 
‘meta-capability’ to achieve or exercise ten CHCs.  These ten CHCs are a 
minimal conception of a fully human life, that provide the basis for 
determining the decent social minimum of entitlements in the relevant parts 
of an individual’s life.  (Nussbaum, 2000: p 75)  Nussbaum asserts that basic 
capabilities of human beings ‘are sources of moral claims wherever we find 
them: they exert a moral claim that they should be developed and given a life 
that is flourishing rather than stunted’. (Nussbaum, 2006: p278)   
228. The ten basic, inter-dependent and iterative capabilities reflect 
biological functionings of the human organism, or ‘human nature’, as well as 
include other functionings which reflect the neediness, sociability and 
capacity for ethical reasoning of the human animal.  It is a fully evaluative 
and ethical conception of the human being.  A person who has all the ten 
CHCs, each above a certain threshold level, has a life of activity and 
opportunity that represents a life that is fully human.  It is clearly not a 
conception of a barely human life, or that of an ideal human life.  It is a notion 
of a human life possessing a sufficient level of opportunity for achieving 
reasonable and diverse conceptions of the good life. (Nussbaum, 2006: 
p182)   
229. Thus, health understood as the CH, or a meta-capability to achieve 
CHCs, is an assessment of a set of opportunities and activities of an 
embodied human being pursuing life plans in contemporary global society.  It 
is not just an assessment of the functionings of a biological organism or 
characteristics and claims of an idealized moral agent.  Minimal human 
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dignity reflected in the breadth of the ten CHCs, and in the notion of threshold 
levels of each CHC, provides a species-wide standard for human health.  
Such a standard is also a source of moral claims for every member of the 
human species for social support.  That is, a pre-political commitment to the 
equal respect of dignity of every human being entails supporting a sufficient 
level—commensurate with minimal dignity—of a CH produced by the 
interaction of unique features/needs, conversion skills, material goods, and 
social conditions.  Such support works through the social basis of the CH, or 
more accurately, the social basis of each of the causal components of the 
CH. 
230. The compulsion to whittle down the components of a CH to some 
‘core’ biological, statistically normal, ‘species typical,’ or perhaps, culturally 
relative capabilities and functionings should be resisted from the start.  
Human health viewed as a capability and grounded in the respect for human 
dignity and equal moral worth has more coherence, and is more robust in 
assessing the empirical aspects of human mortality and impairments, than is 
the commonplace understanding of health as either the absence of disease 
or as total well-being. (Boorse, 1975; Boorse, 1977; Khushf, 1987; Lafaille et 
al., 1993; Boorse, 1997; Nordenfelt et al., 2001a)  The absence of disease 
model, despite being the background conception in contemporary health 
sciences, relies on a notion of statistical abnormality that is not ‘value-free’ as 
claimed and exhibits many defects in theory and practice. (Nordenfelt et al., 
2001b)  And the total well-being notion is grounded in a crude perfectionist 
account of human life, and often summarily dismissed as being a purely 
aspirational idea. (Lafaille et al., 1993)  In contrast, as argued in Chapter 1, a 
coherent conception of human health is best conceived as being able to 
achieve certain vital goals; to acquire and exercise a cluster of basic 
capabilities and functionings that constitute a life of activity and opportunity 
worthy of the dignity of the human being.  Nussbaum’s CHCs or conception 
of minimal human dignity provides a defensible set of such basic activities 
and opportunities as well as limits the conception of CH from becoming too 
expansive such as the notion of health as complete physical, mental, and 
social well-being.  The idea of a meta-capability to achieve CHCs allows for 
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the jettisoning of the narrow focus on impairments of biological functionings 
while preserving the demarcation between health and complete well-being.  
To be healthy is to have a sufficient level of capabilities to pursue life plans in 
contemporary, global, society with equal human dignity. 
231. Section I: Health and CA 
232. The argument for the CH is partly motivated by the need to address 
the CA’s currently ambiguous conception of health capability.  Reviewing the 
existing CA literature produces the impression that CA advocates understand 
health capability as largely referring to biological functionings and diseases 
as ‘un-freedoms’ or constraints on health functionings.  The CA literature is 
centrally concerned with premature mortality and restrictions on freedom by 
impairments.  The idea of health as being coextensive with the absence of 
disease predominates, and the CA’s response to such health un-freedoms is 
currently biased towards economic analysis and interventions addressing 
gender equality and micro-credit, or community development and economic 
development. (Alkire, 2002b)  If the CA continues to accept the prevalent 
conception of disease, and existing disease categories, it becomes open to 
the same criticisms that are levelled against those advocating health as the 
absence of disease model.  At the same time, both Sen and Nussbaum are 
very aware of the place of subjective experience of pain and anguish in 
ethical reasoning.  Because they both recognize that subjective experiences 
or preferences can be adaptive, they would not want to rely on subjective 
experience to wholly determine the concept of health or subsequent claims.  
So there is a need for the CA to find a conception of health capability that 
does not rely on health as absence of disease notion and one that avoids 
purely subjective notions.  A purely objective notion of health also has to be 
rejected because it is impossible to define health as an objective notion and 
besides, subjective well-being should have some part in assessing a 
person’s health.  A person’s health cannot be evaluated without any 
consideration of how the individual feels about her own functionings. 
233. Nussbaum includes the ability to live a normal life span, be healthy, 
and have bodily integrity on her list of CHCs.  Given the importance of such 
capabilities as all purpose means, Nussbaum questio
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put the social basis for health on the list of primary goods, just as he included 
the social basis for self-respect.  Nussbaum reasons that Rawls thought of 
primary goods as being fully external to the individual; they are all goods that 
the social structure can provide.  Because health is not wholly determined by 
the social structure, he did not include it on the list.  Rejecting the notion that 
entitlements can be only to completely external goods, Nussbaum argues 
that the social basis for natural goods such as health and imagination can 
also be listed as entitlements.  (Nussbaum, 2000: p89)   
234. In responding to what the capabilities consist of or what the priorities 
should be, Sen has often replied that it depends on the situation, or what is 
being assessed.  But it seems to be that whatever comparisons are being 
made across people, the capability to be alive which includes some basic 
somatic and psychological functionings has to be the basis for all other 
capabilities.  Nussbaum brings the concern for the embodied aspects of 
human beings to the forefront by the use of the Marxist idea that human 
beings are firstly needy and social beings.  She agrees with Sen and Rawls 
that liberty is important and should not be denied for advancing economic 
capabilities, but she does not prioritize her list of central capabilities.  
Guaranteeing all ten capabilities would mean that human beings are alive 
and be able to participate politically.  In fact, she argues that when it comes 
to health, which is predicated on being a human life form, there might be 
enough justification to push through to realize some functionings for all 
human beings. 
235. The CA, aside from references to premature mortality, must include a 
more explicit and coherent conception of health.  Without the concept of the 
CH as presented here, health related capabilities pose a significant 
conceptual challenge for both versions of the CA.  Indeed, there have been 
some modest attempts at discussing capabilities in relation to the subjective 
and objective aspects of defining and measuring health status, and the 
legitimate extent of paternalism.  Both Sen and Nussbaum’s concern with 
being able to make comparisons of quality of life, and Nussbaum’s 
conception of CHCs as the foundation of political principles, are centrally 
focused on the deprivations experienced by human beings, particularly the 
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worst kind experienced by poor women in poor countries.  The CA literature 
often refers to specific deprivations affecting somatic functionings such as 
immobility, hunger, or impairments from disease, and so forth.   
236. Both Sen and Nussbaum have indeed referred to human health 
concerns in terms of capabilities.  Sen has suggested such a capability 
through various examples of health functionings.  And Nussbaum has 
explicitly identified a capability to be healthy among the ten CHCs.  However, 
the writings of both create much uncertainty about the content of a capability 
to be healthy in either of their versions.  An example from each may elucidate 
such an assertion.  In the monograph Inequality Re-examined, Sen contrasts 
the subjective welfarist understanding of well-being with the ‘well-ness’ of a 
person understood as the achievement of a set of interrelated functionings 
that can include ‘being adequately nourished, being in good health, avoiding 
escapable morbidity and premature mortality, etc…’  (Sen, 1992 p.39)  
Looking beyond his concern to distinguish between well-being and wellness, 
his listing of being healthy as a separate functioning from being adequately 
nourished and avoiding morbidity and premature mortality is confusing.  Lest 
this is seen as a one-off instance of ambiguity, Sen’s vehement refusal to 
identify any ‘core’ or ‘basic’ capabilities has meant that there has been a lack 
of comprehensive evaluation of any single capability aside from the use of 
examples to buttress the general arguments for the CA in various areas of 
social concern. (Sen, 1998a; Sen, 1999a; Sen, 1999c; Sen, 2002a; Sen, 
2002b; Sen, 2004b)  Important for the present for CH, Sen’s refusal to 
identify any basic capabilities also means that his version of the CA cannot 
provide a species-wide conception of health.  Like Nordenfelt, Sen offers only 
an empty set of capabilities.  Health capability will be whatever different 
societies choose to include as being basic through public deliberation. 
237. In contrast, Nussbaum provides the most thorough discussion so far 
of the capability to be healthy persons in Women and Human Development.  
(Nussbaum, 2000 pp. 70-96)  However, she too leaves a lot undone.  In that 
exposition, Nussbaum points out the need to determine which health 
functionings should be induced, rather than just ensuring the capability, as 
well as what threshold levels of various functionings must be achieved in 
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order to be considered adequate.  Nevertheless, she defers that important 
discussion to a future legislative stage and public deliberation. (Nussbaum, 
2000,p 91)  Even if all ten capabilities are important for Nussbaum, it is hard 
not to notice that life and health are still listed first and second on her list.  
Such covert priority can be avoided or reduced if and when the CH is 
understood as an assessment of the entire cluster of basic capabilities, as it 
is done here.    
238. Nussbaum’s partial theory is commendable for making physical and 
mental impairments of human beings a central concern of the basic principles 
of justice.  She emphasizes that taking into account the interests of severely 
impaired individuals at the first stage of ethical reasoning on basic principles 
will result in substantive guidance for the basic structures of society rather 
than cursory accommodations.  But she does not go further and consider the 
implications for such first principles that would result from integrating the 
most current research, debates and theories of causation and distribution of 
health functionings.  The health functionings she does outline should be 
understood as just referring to avoidance of disease.  She does not seem to 
have yet considered more fully the current debates on the determinants and 
distribution of human impairments and mortality or the epistemology of the 
underlying individual biomedical model of disease causation.  Her writings on 
capabilities seem to take the concepts disease and health as given.  Given 
that health institutions are equipped with necessary but often abused powers 
of coercion and paternalism combined with the remarkable research on 
social determinants of health constraints/inequalities, providing only a rough 
outline of a capability to be healthy, while asserting its centrality to human life 
and dignity, leaves far too much work undone.     
239. One implication of giving more consideration to health capability, 
which is particularly relevant to Nussbaum’s approach, is that in light of the 
recent social determinants research and global experience with new and 
resurgent infectious disease epidemics, ensuring the social basis to even just 
a sufficient threshold level of health capability for every citizen will require a 
stringent and irrevocable commitment to certain basic social arrangements.  
Nussbaum conceives her list as being a source of political principles up to 
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the individuals reaching certain thresholds of capabilities.  Social 
determinants research shows that even above a threshold level of material 
sufficiency, social inequalities in such things as control, stress, and respect in 
the workplace have influence through psychobiological pathways.  Thus, 
there will be a need to permanently regulate or prevent certain social 
inequalities in order to prevent or mitigate resulting inequalities in health 
capability.  That is, some kinds of social inequalities across individuals and 
groups should not be allowed even after every individual has the minimum 
level of central capabilities.  This leads to discarding the possible notion of a 
minimal conception of central capabilities as a water-level mark that needs to 
be reached through provision of minimal material goods and social 
conditions.  Rather, whatever the level of material and social conditions, 
ensuring a minimum set of CHCs means that certain kinds of social 
inequalities cannot be allowed for they will always threaten to undermine 
minimum thresholds of CHC or CH.  This understanding of social 
determinants are being possible permanent threats to human capabilities 
casts doubt on Nussbaum’s openness other possible schemes of social 
justice, such as Rawls’s theory, after achieving certain threshold levels of 
every citizen.  Instead of levels being reached, perhaps a better conception is 
to think of a society as system.  A more thorough appreciation of the 
causation and distribution of the ten CHCs in light of social determinants 
research will more than likely mean that some of the stringent requirements 
for or against certain social conditions under a threshold capabilities regime 
will have to be permanent features of societies, or any theories applicable 
above the thresholds.   
240. Section II:  The Capability to be healthy  
241. The CH and each CHC are formed and influenced by the 
independent, interactive, and iterative processes that make up a person’s 
unique internal features/needs, conversion skills, extant material goods, and 
social conditions.  As described in Chapter 2, this causal model of the CH 
coherently reformulates the biomedical model of disease causation which 
posits the causal factors of ‘health’ as genetic endowment, individual 
behaviour, and exposure to pathogenic materials.  Such a model actually 
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identifies the causes of health constraints, and even then, excludes social 
causes.  The present CH model is also more explicit about and focused on 
causation of capabilities than Nussbaum and her classification of capabilities 
as being basic, internal, or combined. (Nussbaum, 2000: 84-86)  Her analysis 
of capabilities as either being naturally endowed ready to function, or 
requiring various kinds of external material and social support is too causally 
simplistic.  Such a descriptive model also creates too firm a distinction 
between personal features and external material and social conditions.  
When examining health functionings in particular, given the growing 
recognition of the psychological pathways between external social conditions 
and complex internal physiological processes, a firm distinction between 
internal and external may need to be less emphasized.  In any case, for a 
person to have a certain level of CH, all four components— personal 
features/needs, conversion skills, extant material goods, and surrounding 
social conditions—must sufficiently interact to create practical possibility to 
achieve each CHC up to or above the specified thresholds.  The differential 
distribution patterns or asymmetrical achievements of the CH across 
individuals can be explained by individual diversity in each of the four causal 
components—in the differences of how individuals are uniquely ‘constructed 
and situated’. 
242. Nussbaum’s ten CHCs are grounded in a freestanding conception of 
human dignity and thus, because the CH is seen as meta-capability to 
achieve these ten CHCs, so too is the present conception of the CH.  
Nussbaum argues that every human being has claims to social support 
arising from the dignity of the human being as an inherently ‘needy temporal 
animal being’. (Nussbaum, 2006: p160)  Furthermore, for Nussbaum, there is 
importance in recognizing the difference between capabilities as instrumental 
to achieving a life with dignity versus capabilities creating dignity within ‘areas 
of life human beings typically engage’. (Nussbaum, 2006:161)  By pointing to 
such a subtle difference she wants to establish a theory of the good prior to 
any social agreement or political principles.  An instrumental notion of 
capabilities would make her theory similar to contract theories that build 
structures to distribute valued goods.  By intertwining a conception of human 
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dignity and central human capabilities without one being prior to another, she 
is able to argue that a life worthy of human dignity gives rise to pre-political 
moral entitlements to the central human capabilities.  Because capabilities 
and dignity are mutually constitutive, the list of CHCs is a freestanding theory 
of the good. (Nussbaum, 2006: 160-164)  Such an account of the CHCs is 
thus enormously helpful for an argument for the CH because it also allows for 
a species-wide conception of human health.  Every member of the human 
species is covered under such a conception and it identifies the bases of a 
moral entitlement prior to any social contract or other types of political 
agreements.   
243. Admittedly, the argument for the CH is grounded in a concept of 
dignity and the related ideas of sufficient and equitable capabilities that need 
to be discussed more thoroughly than they are here.  Indeed, the concept of 
dignity used here relies on Nussbaum’s conception which in turn, may not be 
adequately represented here.  The argument for the CH relies on the 
coherence of Nussbaum’s reasoning on dignity as presented in Frontiers of 
Justice.  And it is hoped that in the future, a concept of human dignity related 
to physical and mental vulnerability to ground the CH can be developed more 
fully reflecting the work of others including Richard Sennett, Bryan Turner, 
and Elaine Scarry. (Scarry, 1985; Sennett, 2004; Turner, 2006)    
244. But more presently, an individual’s CH should be understood to be 
dynamic.  Most often, the CA literature presents a capability as a static 
attribute of a person, or as a simple unidirectional process moving from 
capability to functioning achievement.  In contrast, a person’s over-arching 
CH or a particular CHC may be more accurately understood as a dynamic 
and iterative system made up of the four causal components of individual 
endowments, conversion skills, extant material goods, and surrounding social 
conditions.  At any given moment and over the life course, each of the ten 
capabilities and the over-arching CH is continually in flux, being shaped by 
dynamic processes underlying each causal component.  Processes occurring 
at various levels ranging from biological processes at the sub-molecular level 
within the person (endowment) to the political and economic processes at the 
national and global level (material and social conditions) constantly influence 
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the capabilities of individuals.  The relative influence of each causal 
component on a person’s CH is specific to each individual and constantly 
changing over the life course.  That is, national economic policies may 
constrain the CH of one individual as much or even more than the constraints 
produced by genetic endowment in another.  And the individual’s conversion 
skills and volitional choices affecting functioning achievements may expand 
or contract at different points in her life time.     
245. Acknowledging the dynamicity and differences in causal components 
across individuals and the fact that the CH is ever-changing over the life 
course brings to the forefront the need to consider in more detail the concept 
of thresholds.  A minimal standard of dignity is profoundly helpful because it 
provides a metric to compare capabilities across individuals and over time.  
But in fact, identifying a single standard over the life course of one individual 
or across different individuals of the same or different ages, sexes, economic 
positions, abilities, talents, ambitions, and so forth is a daunting endeavour.  
The theoretical idea of a common standard is useful, but practically it has 
multiple dimensions. (Sen, 1998b; Sen, 1998a)  Nussbaum provides a more 
detailed argument that the respect for the equal moral worth or ensuring 
minimal dignity of individuals entails ‘supporting’ or ‘providing’ threshold 
levels of each CHC.  Entitlements to such social support or provision are not 
to the achievement itself, most often, but to the social basis of each 
capability.  (Nussbaum, 2000: 81-82)  So far, Nussbaum only provides 
various examples of possible social basis of particular CHCs such as 
adequate nutrition, education of the faculties, protection of bodily integrity, 
and so forth. (Nussbaum, 2006: p278)  Her version of the CA has not posited 
a model of causation of CHCs, and the identification of the breadth of social 
basis, along with the exact levels of each CHCs are under-described or 
deferred to a later stage and expertise of various professionals.  Such 
openness is partly due to the need for public deliberation and engendering 
the possibility of achieving global overlapping consensus on the list. 
(Nussbaum, 2006: 291-295)  Though such openness to public deliberation is 
necessary, there is still much theoretical work to be done to integrate the 
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concept of CHCs with a coherent conception of health, and theories of health 
causation and distribution. 
246. The present argument for the CH pursues the line that the 
entitlement to each capability should be understood as the entitlement to the 
social basis of each causal component.  And providing or supporting 
threshold levels of CH entails social action through influencing the social 
basis of the causal components of each capability.  That is, protecting, 
promoting or restoring the CH of individuals to adequate levels is realized 
through the justifiable influence on personal features/needs, conversion 
skills, extant material goods, and surrounding social conditions.  
Furthermore, the range of agents with obligations to protect, promote or 
restore the CH of individuals to the specified level, and the extent of their 
obligations will depend on how they stand in relation to the causes, 
consequences, and distribution patterns of CH achievements and failures.  
For example, Onora O’Neill has written on the need to expand the breadth of 
relevant agents and obligations in light of individuals living where there are 
failed nation-states and where health threats cross national borders.  (O'Neill, 
2002b; O'Neill, 2004b; O'Neill, 2004a)  Thomas Pogge’s recent arguments 
for negative, positive, and intermediate duties may also be useful to map 
obligations of agents in relation to the causes, consequences, and 
distribution patterns of CH. (Pogge, 1989; Pogge, 2001; Pogge, 2002b) 
247. The argument for a sufficient level of CH does not in fact, produce an 
easy or single, uniform standard.  Minimal dignity will be commensurate with 
different levels across ten CHCs. Even then, the breadth of social basis, and 
the extent of justifiable intervention into those social basis of different causal 
components of each CHC will vary across persons.  For any society, 
ensuring the CH of citizens means the assessment of the multiple 
dimensions of causes, consequences, and distribution patterns of CH 
achievements and failures.  The response will require varied actions to 
protect, promote or restore the CH of individuals to sufficient levels.   
248. In contrast, the prevalent discussions on possible justice claims 
related to health often quickly turn to the distribution of healthcare.  
Sometimes, they extend to the provision of ‘public health’ goods such as 
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sanitation, potable water, food safety, and so forth. (Daniels, 1985; Kass, 
2001; Kass, 2004)  However, in the context of rich countries where clinical 
healthcare and public health goods and services are abundantly available, it 
is perhaps more readily apparent than in poor countries that avoiding 
premature mortality and impairments requires material goods such as 
healthcare as well as having control over one’s body and behaviour.  For 
example, when considering the spread of HIV/AIDS it becomes easy to see 
that in the absence of an HIV vaccine, avoiding infection requires having 
control over one’s body and behaviour over the entire life course.  Prior to 
global experience with HIV/AIDS and the women’s health movement, it was 
commonplace to think that healthcare is necessary and sufficient to address 
health concerns.  Now, in the face of new and resurgent infectious diseases 
and research findings on social position and causes of chronic impairments, 
it is more readily acknowledged that over the life course, and in different 
physical and social environments, commodities and ‘autonomy’ and ‘agency’ 
can both be crucially important.  For example, the ability to directly secure 
food becomes much more important as one gets older than when one is an 
infant being cared for by another person.  Or, a person who has full access to 
clinical care may still need refuge away from physical abuse at home. 
249. Such examples show that the focus only on goods, whether food, 
clinical care or something else, would only protect health functionings during 
some of the time periods in the life course.  Individuals require autonomy and 
agency both to ward off avoidable physical threats as well as to seek out 
resources to achieve, maintain, protect, and restore their own physical and 
mental functionings.  This need for a mix of material goods and supportive 
social conditions for autonomy is reflected in the causal model of the CH.  
Autonomy can be thought of as part of conversion skills component of the 
CH.   
250. The importance of a person’s abilities to act in addressing health 
concerns can also be shown in the Senian vector-idea of a capability.  When 
a well-being functioning such as achieving internal immunity from a vaccine 
is not possible, then agency functionings become much more important in the 
protection of health functionings and indeed, all other capabilities.  That is, for 
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example, if direct beneficial immunity through a vaccine cannot be induced 
then abilities to be vigilant against exposure to infection become more 
important.  Even when a vaccine is available, agency functionings can still be 
important in order to identify its availability and in procuring it.  Perspectives 
which focus only on producing well-being functionings such as immunity 
through ‘vertical-health programmes’ or other healthcare goods aim to 
bypass inadequacies in agency functionings/ conversion skills.  The causal 
components of conversion skills, material goods, and social conditions are 
thought to be ‘distal factors’ of health functionings that are outside the 
purview of health sector interventions.        
251. It has been repeatedly argued that the needs for different types and 
amounts of commodities will vary across individuals, and over the life course.  
And the abilities to convert commodities into health functionings will also vary 
across individuals and over the life course.  Not only can internal biological 
processes require different amounts of the same commodity among two 
individuals, they may also differ in their immediate abilities to reach for, 
ingest, apply, or inject the commodity.  This amounts to a difference in 
converting available resources into functionings.  Importantly, individuals may 
also directly suffer from the provision of a standard amount or type of good 
when their particular individual needs and conversion skills are not 
sufficiently taken into account.  It is quite common for public health policies 
applying a maximization approach to improving health achievements to 
accept that some individuals will suffer negative consequences from being 
providing a standard public health good.  For example, government 
programmes which promote or require the use of particular contraceptives 
without taking into account the unique needs of individuals may induce 
temporary or life-threatening consequences.  When that occurs, the 
justification that the benefits to many outweigh the burden of the few shows 
that the individuals that suffer have not been treated as their own ends, or as 
a bearer of equal moral claims to a CH and equal dignity. 
252. The maintenance and protection of CHCs of individuals in different 
places and times requires addressing threats in the environment that cannot 
be undertaken by a single individual or small group.  That is, the required 
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capacity to ensure the CH may be greater than that of any single individual.  
And, protecting individuals against certain kind of health threats sometimes 
requires the social provision of protection for all individuals.  Maintaining safe 
water supply, immunizing schoolchildren, and engaging in epidemiological 
research are some examples of the social provision of public goods aimed to 
ensure the capability to achieve health functionings of groups of individuals.  
And in certain places and times, protections of health functionings may 
require direct inducement of certain biological functionings such as producing 
herd immunity to particular infectious organisms through vaccinations.  
Protecting the capabilities of people through the provision of public goods 
can be seen as realizing ‘passive’ agency achievements of individuals. 
(Pettit, 2001; Sen, 2001c) 
253. If the causal pathway to the functioning, or the method to avoid an 
impairment is not fully known, the claim to the social basis can entail claims 
to further research.  How?  Because social justice aims for the sufficiency 
and equity of capabilities among individuals.  When individuals are 
constrained by impairments that cannot be mitigated or prevented, they are 
constrained from pursuing the beings and doings of a richer human life.  In 
Nussbaum’s conception, they are being denied a fully human life.  In Kamm’s 
words, they are restricted from fully experiencing and enjoying life’s 
experiential goods.  Moreover, inequalities in CH across individuals 
unavoidably results in inequalities in many other capabilities or areas of life.  
Health capability and functionings determine the worth of other human 
capabilities.  While respect for equal dignity would point to addressing 
avoidable causes of inequality in the CH, the value to a human life of having 
all the basic capabilities, and preserving the worth of all capabilities, drives 
the research in how to mitigate impairments with unknown causes.  Thus, 
social and medical science research into causes of impairments constitutes 
part of the social basis of capabilities.   
254. The CH argument is centred on the conception of human dignity as 
partly arising out sociability or desire to live amongst other human beings in 
reciprocity and respect.  However, it is important to recognize the 
vulnerability to impairments or premature mortality as a direct result of 
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engaging in social cooperation.  The moral relevance of the direct 
vulnerability to impairments from being among other human beings has been 
surprisingly under-considered by political philosophers.  When one assumes 
away or excludes health issues in theorizing about basic principles of social 
justice, health threats which arise only and directly because of social 
cooperation are understandably going to become invisible.  Yet, the threat of 
infectious diseases only arises when there are a sufficient number of other 
human beings around to sustain the propagation of the infectious organism.  
And, in such a case, the achievement, maintenance, protection, and possible 
restoring of CH of an individual is unlikely to be fully achieved by the 
individual acting alone.  The predominant focus on individual behaviour and 
volitional choices in dealing with vulnerability to infectious diseases 
fundamentally underplays the social basis of vulnerability to infectious 
diseases.  Additional vulnerability to impairments and mortality arising directly 
from social cooperation must be thought of as another ‘burden’ in distributing 
the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.  The CH argument is able to 
recognize such vulnerability through the social conditions causal component.  
255. Furthermore, Chapter 2 described the growing understanding of 
social determinants of health research.  Social inequalities in the 
psychological experiences of individuals such as stress, social support 
networks, income inequality, discrimination, and hopelessness produce 
differences in health capability.  A life that is made up of few choices and 
which is lived in an unsupportive or unresponsive environment leads to the 
impairments of basic biological and psychological functionings.  An organism 
that is stressed becomes vulnerable not only to a specific impairment but 
becomes generally more prone injuries and accidents as well as to 
pathogenic organisms.  The CH presented here is able to capture both the 
social conditions that affect access to material resources as well as the social 
conditions that affect individual psychological experiences. 
256. Alternative ethical approaches that do not focus on capabilities either 
recognize claims only to achieving certain mental states in terms of pleasure 
production or preference satisfaction, or eschew concern for mental states 
altogether and focus only on the provision of resources.  The CA falls 
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somewhere in between as resources are necessary for realizing a capability, 
and the mental state of a person is both a source of information and also a 
locus of well-being for that individual.  Mental functionings or ‘beings’ are 
valuable achievements in a human life.  Once again, Nussbaum’s cluster of 
CHCs proves useful for establishing the inter-dependency of capabilities and 
functionings, including psychological functionings.  She identifies the 
capabilities to use senses, imagination, and thought; being able to exercise 
emotions; being able to form social associations, and importantly, being able 
to use reason. (Nussbaum, 2006: 76-77)  The CHCs reflect both physical 
functionings and psychological functionings.       
257. Section III: CH as a ‘cluster-right’. 
258. In fleshing out the entitlement to the CH, or to the cluster of CHCs, it 
seems plausible and advantageous to argue that such an entitlement 
contains within it a multitude of claims, powers, privileges, and immunities.  
The claim to the social basis of the CH is clearly broader than being just a 
‘positive’ claim to things.  It is easy in the first instance, to outline an 
argument that the entitlement to the CH entails a positive claim to health care 
or other health affecting goods.  Yet, the supportive social conditions causal 
component can also contain ‘negative’ claims against harmful physical and 
social phenomena.  Both positive and negative claims can be far reaching 
and inter-related.  Moreover, the emphasis on having the freedom to choose 
among opportunities means not only positive and negative claims but also 
powers, privileges, and immunities.  But more work needs to be done to map 
out these various kinds of entitlements within a cluster-right to the diverse 
range of corresponding agents and their actions. 
259. Judith Jarvis Thomson’s identification of a ‘cluster-right’ is very useful 
to flesh out entitlements to any capability in the CA, and particularly in 
relation to the CH as advocated here.  The CH, and indeed, every capability 
is really a cluster of iterative capabilities and functionings.  The picture of a 
capability as being the opportunity to achieve a functioning which then is 
chosen to be achieved is a simplified image that abstracts from complex 
processes underlying any single capability and functioning achievement.  
Nussbaum’s advocacy of threshold levels of CHCs also gives the impression 
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that a capability can be quantified and compared across individuals using a 
single metric.  However, the causal model of capabilities put forward here 
shows that a single capability cannot be easily isolated from a cluster of inter-
related capabilities and functionings, or easily distinguished as being a wholly 
internal or external capability.  Each capability is constantly in flux, being 
formed by the iterative and interactive processes underlying personal 
features, conversion abilities, exposure to material goods, social conditions 
and importantly, the choices made by the individual.  In light of the more 
complicated picture of a capability and its causal components, an entitlement 
to a capability, or more accurately, to the social basis of each of the causal 
components of a capability, should be understood as being a ‘cluster-right’. 
260. Thomson’s cluster-right is a ‘right that contains rights’. (Thomson, 
1990: p 54-56)  In contrast to the standard notion of a right as being a single 
claim with a corresponding duty-holder, Thomson’s cluster-right can contain 
various combinations of claims, privileges, liberties, immunities, and powers.  
As a result, not all rights involve corresponding duty holders.  Furthermore, 
equality or equity of a cluster-right across individuals, and even over a single 
life-course, is indeed more difficult to evaluate than a simple claim-right, but it 
is not impossible or novel.  In fact, Thomson argues many familiar rights such 
as the rights to life, liberty, and property are more accurately understood as 
cluster-rights. (Thomson, 1990: p55, 272-293) 
261. The notion of a cluster-right is latent in various aspects of the CA 
literature.  The Senian analytical device of a capability is described as having 
four vectors: well-being agency, well-being freedom, agency freedom, and 
agency achievement.  These four dimensions are said to describe plural 
dimensions of a capability.  Continuing in that vein, one would expect that an 
entitlement to such a capability would be to all four vectors, and that claims to 
well-being and agency functioning would entail different kind of actions by 
various agents.  For example, agency functionings can entail both freedoms 
from interference and also positive claims to goods necessary to act.  And as 
Brock argues, each of these four vectors can be thought as being made up 
even more indeterminate number of sub-vectors. (Brock, 1995)  Thus, 
articulating any sort of entitlement to a Senian capability would lead to an 
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idea of an entitlement to a cluster of multi-dimensional claims.  The range of 
well-being and agency freedoms and achievements would require various 
kinds of liberties, powers, privileges, and immunities. 
262. Thomson’s argument for a cluster-right buttresses Nussbaum notion 
of CHCs by making plausible that different CHCs can each have unique 
thresholds, and that they do not have to be the same across individuals.  The 
notion of a single threshold across individuals and across a life time was 
open to the criticism that it is impracticable or does not accurately reflect the 
causation of each CHC.  With Thomson’s cluster-right, each CHC and all the 
ten CHCs can be thought of as being plausible despite giving rise to different 
sorts of claims across each of the ten CHCs, across individuals, and over the 
life course.  Indeed, Thomson’s idea of cluster right, and its close 
approximation to a cluster of capabilities, initially motivated pursuing the 
concept of the CH as a meta-capability.  And Nussbaum’s ten CHCs, when 
more thoroughly considered, are not seen as being distinct but as an inter-
related cluster of basic capabilities.  Thus, Thomson’s cluster-right and 
Nussbaum’s ten inter-related capabilities work well together.  The causal 
model of a capability and the idea of a cluster-right give the argument for ten 
CHCs more integrated conceptual grounding.     
263. Section IV: Kamm and capabilities 
264. There is an alternative path to arriving at a conception of the CH 
instead of directly from Nussbaum’s CHCs and notion of dignity, or from 
Nordenfelt’s argument for achieving vital goals.  For any person, being alive 
can be inherently valuable, while staying alive can also be crucially important 
to pursuing any possible conception of life plans.  The moral force of such 
bland statements may become more apparent when death is seen in terms of 
the loss of the ‘goods of life’.  By goods of life Frances Kamm refers to such 
things as experiences, achievements, character and wisdom, and 
relationships. (Kamm, 1993)  Death is a morally bad thing because it 
deprives individuals of experiential goods (deprivation), is a loss of goods for 
an already existing person (insult), and it forecloses any further possibilities 
for the person (extinction). (Kamm, 1993)  She writes that if these kinds of 
losses happen from death after a normal lifespan, then a premature death 
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must be an even more troublesome thing because it would be the loss of 
even more experiential goods than would have been lost after a normal life 
span.  Indeed, aside from dying with less experiential goods in absolute 
terms, the good of having the opportunity to choose among experiences is 
also lost.  Kamm overlooks that good of life.   
265. Interestingly, Kamm’s experiential goods can also be understood in 
terms of capabilities as they both refer to beings and doings that human 
beings have reason to value.  Death can be seen as a bad thing because it 
deprives people of experiencing various capabilities and functionings; it is a 
loss of previously held capabilities; and it forecloses acquiring any further 
capabilities.  There is again, value in being able to choose which capabilities 
to pursue and therefore, death would also be the loss of the good of being 
able to choose among capabilities.   
266. Pursuing this line of thought, a set of basic capabilities and 
functionings could be identified that allow a person to pursue the beings and 
doings one has reason to value, or in Kamm’s terms, the goods of life.  Seen 
as the essential or basic capabilities and functioning that make all other 
possible, the CH is valuable because it determines the real ‘worth’ of all other 
capabilities to pursue one’s life plans.  At the same time, physical and mental 
impairments can significantly constrain the effective opportunities to pursue 
the goods of life.  Paralleling the effects of death on the goods of life and 
capabilities, so too can impairments deprive individuals of experiencing 
capabilities, lead to the loss of existing capabilities, and foreclose certain 
other capabilities.  Death and impairments simply belong to a spectrum of 
constraints that restrict the goods of life.   
267. While Kamm’s analysis can give structure and coherence to some of 
our moral intuitions regarding death and impairments she does not seem to 
identify what claims exist to such experiential goods, or what the social 
response should be to losses of such goods.  At the same time, death and 
impairments can indeed lead to various kinds of losses of capabilities.  But 
why capabilities are morally important, and what claims human beings have 
to their capabilities must also be identified and justified.  Such questions 
regarding claims and justification may be more productively answered 
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against the frameworks of theories of social justice.  Thus, it is a significant 
achievement that Nussbaum presents an accessible, freestanding theory of 
the good.  Nussbaum identifies claims to some central capabilities that are 
grounded in the respect for the equal dignity and worth of human being.  
268. Section V: Summary  
269. On the one hand, the present argument for the CH provides a 
coherent conceptual vehicle for evaluating the descriptive aspects of the 
determinants, consequences, and distribution of human impairments and 
mortality.  On the other hand, the moral, pre-political entitlement to the social 
basis of a CH is also more coherent and justifiable than the hitherto received 
view of health claims as either claims to healthcare resources or health 
welfare (subjective and objective) achievements.  Part of the weakness of 
both resource and welfare health entitlements are that they are significantly 
qualified by a range of limitations including the emphasis on individual 
volitional choices and behaviour, social borders and the amount of local 
resources, current limits on scientific knowledge and technology, the 
requirements of other social goals, and luck.  As such, the weaknesses of the 
arguments for entitlements to healthcare or health achievements closely 
parallel the weaknesses of the more general arguments for distributing 
resources or welfare in pursuing social justice.  The next chapter reviews 
how resource and welfare theories handle health claims, reviews their 
weaknesses, and argues that the CH can do better than them in many 
respects.
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Chapter 5: Welfare or Resource Health Claims 
 
 
 
270. The preceding two chapters have presented the background of the 
CA, and argued for the coherence of the moral entitlement to the CH 
understood as a cluster of capabilities and functionings grounded in human 
dignity.  The purpose of this chapter is to argue that such a perspective 
provides a superior conception of health claims to those derived from 
competing liberal approaches which focus just on the distribution of 
resources or welfare.1  Furthermore, it will be argued that the shift of focus 
neither to antecedent opportunities for welfare nor to access to advantage 
overcome all the shortcomings or accomplish as much as the focus on 
capabilities, and in the present case, the CH.  The summary review 
presented in Chapter 3 briefly contrasted the CA with resourcist and 
welfarist/utilitarian approaches.  The differences are brought into greater 
relief here, in particular as to how they handle health related claims.  As with 
Chapter 3, the discussion here is not meant to be original or comprehensive, 
but aims to highlight the salient differences and how the CH argument does 
better in some ways than the competing ethical approaches in evaluating and 
responding to human health concerns.   
271. A brief review: the central argument of the CA is that the right focus 
of social justice should be on the fair distribution of capabilities to achieve 
functionings—the beings and doings that constitute planning, pursuing and 
revising one’s own ends.  According to the Senian version of the CA, in so far 
as a liberal society is committed to treating every member/citizen of society 
equally in some respect, it should be through ensuring the equitable 
capabilities to function.  Alternatively, according to Nussbaum, the respect for 
the equal dignity and moral worth of every human being requires ensuring 
                                                 
1 Liberal theories distribute a range of ‘value objects’ such as Rawls’s primary 
goods, Dworkin’s personal and impersonal resources, Singer’s utility, Nozick’s 
liberties, Sen’s capabilities, Van Parijs’ income, and so forth. See (Daniels, 1996a; 
Clayton et al., 2002) 
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that every person has entitlements to the social basis of ten central 
capabilities; some of these capabilities have to be equal among all persons, 
while others should reach a threshold level of adequacy.  For example, 
political liberties should be equal while some material goods such as shelter 
may only need to be sufficient.  The varying thresholds are linked to the 
intuitive notion of dignity, and public reasoning in different societies will 
partially define the levels and locally appropriate content.  Among these ten 
CHCs there will be capabilities where the social goal will be to induce 
functionings in some persons rather than just ensuring the capabilities.  Such 
inducements may be required in light of such factors as the person’s age, 
limited capacity for reasoning and agency, when the social basis of the 
functioning is a public good, and when there is interdependence of 
capabilities within and across human beings.2   
272. Though a capability to achieve or exercise a functioning can be 
simplistically presented as a single uni-directional action moving from 
potential to actual achievement, a capability is more accurately described as 
an iterative conglomeration of capabilities and functionings.  In order for a 
person to have a capability, or effective freedom to achieve a functioning, the 
person’s unique needs for material goods and social conditions and their 
conversion abilities must sufficiently match with available external material 
and social conditions.  The focus is neither exclusively on the person’s 
physical and mental achievements, nor exclusively on the external material 
goods and conditions independent.  The ‘capability space’ is the space of 
opportunity and activity made up for all four causal components.  Moreover, 
with some justifiable exceptions, the moral entitlement is not to the actual 
achievement of the functioning but to the capability to achieve that 
functioning.  The main point of the CA is to create meaningful and sufficient 
opportunity for the individual to choose how to pursue their life plans.  
273. There is clear instrumental value in capabilities as being a means to 
pursue one’s ends.  There is also intrinsic value in both possessing 
                                                 
2 For Sen, the inducement of functioning is justified not from a conception of human 
flourishing or dignity as in Nussbaum’s arguments, but possibly from 
counterfactual choice.  The person would have chosen it had they been able to have 
choice and control over the process to achieve the functioning.  See (Sen, 2001c)   
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opportunities to achieve a functioning as well as in having meaningful choice 
among capabilities.  ‘Meaningful’ is meant to indicate that it is not any 
choice—having a choice of dying by hanging or by guillotine is not the kind of 
choice we want—but choices among of valuable and valued beings and 
doings.  Such multiple dimensions of intrinsic value arise from a notion of 
human dignity as constituted by a life of certain breadth of opportunity and 
activity as well as from a narrower notion of a life having value because a 
person chooses to make their own life in their own way.  Both dimensions of 
opportunity can have independent value.   
274. While a person’s overall or complete set of capabilities at any given 
time can reveal how well the person’s life is going, justice claims for social 
support apply only to certain kinds of capabilities and even then, only to the 
social basis of those capabilities.  There are ‘good’ and ‘bad’ capabilities; the 
CA advocates only for entitlements to a set of central capabilities that are 
grounded in equal human dignity.  And the social basis of a ‘good’ capability 
refers to aspects of the causal components or pathway to achieving a 
functioning that can be justifiably influenced by social structures or agents 
external to the individuals.  The social basis does not mean just social 
provision of external material goods or social conditions, but also aspects of 
personal features and conversion skills that can justifiably be affected.  For 
example, compulsory basic education is intended to induce internal 
intellectual functionings and is generally thought to be acceptable.  By 
contrast, compulsory surgery to ameliorate deafness or indeed, any kind of 
non-emergency surgery without consent is not thought to be acceptable.  
275. And though it may be easy to conceive of claims to the social basis 
of capabilities as positive claims to things, a capability contains a variety of 
different kinds of claims, liberties, powers, privileges, and immunities.  
Because of the diverse cluster of entitlements within the CH, it cannot be 
understood as being an entitlement that is a ‘perfect obligation’ with a single 
corresponding duty holder.  Nevertheless, where obligations map on to 
identifiable agents, their varied obligations aimed to protect, promote or 
restore the CH of individuals will the agent’s relative position to the causes, 
consequences, and distribution patterns of CH achievements and failures.   
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276. Section I: Welfare theories and CA. 
277. In contrast to the diversity of entitlements encompassed by a cluster-
right, the multiple dimensions of causes, consequences, and distribution, and 
the varied duties to protect, promote, and restore the CH, a welfarist 
perspective would likely focus just on maximizing a single metric of health 
across individuals.  Such a metric could be as basic as ‘mortality cases 
averted’ or be more complex such as life years spent without impairments.  
Welfarist or utilitarian reasoning is pervasive in health policies and programs 
worldwide.  Such policies seek to maximize certain physical and mental 
states in the majority of the population while tolerating the impairments and 
preventable deaths of individuals whose resources needs are thought of as 
being cost-inefficient. 3  Similar to its hold on economics, utilitarian reasoning 
in health policy making exhibits a number of defects and should be rejected 
for being morally inadequate.  A purely welfarist view is inadequate for both 
its myopic focus only on ‘health outcomes’ and healthcare, while ignoring the 
moral relevance of the breadth of causes, full breadth of consequences, and 
distribution patterns as well as for disregarding the separateness of persons.  
As Nussbaum states with uncompromising clarity, aggregating across 
individuals, such as singularly aiming to maximize health achievements while 
sidelining the needs of the few must be rejected because it is of supreme 
importance that we recognize ‘a moral fact of paramount importance—that 
each person has only one life to live…’ (Nussbaum, 2006: p 237) 
278. Indeed, it is in the area of health that some of the most convincing 
examples are found for why welfare and preferences are not justifiable as the 
focal points of social justice.  Pain and suffering from impairments are often 
the first and most compelling aspects of a person that come to mind in 
reasoning about the moral relevance of health.  Yet, despite the external 
visibility of pain and suffering, people’s valuation of their own physiological 
functioning is not a good indicator of their claims for social support.  On the 
one hand, individuals suffering severe deprivation may consider it to be the 
                                                 
3 See the World Bank’s initial public policy recommendations for responding to the 
spread of HIV/AIDS in developing countries.  (World Bank, 1997) And for an 
excellent critical review of the utilitarian health metric, Disability Adjusted Life Years 
or DALYs see (Anand et al., 1997)  
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normal way of living and thereby, not express any dissatisfaction.  One the 
other hand, individuals who are sufficiently functioning may express intense 
dissatisfaction over minor impairments, be unduly worried about non-visible 
impairments, or express frustration for not possessing superior functionings.  
While visible indications of pain and suffering, or physical trauma may 
evidence impairments, the intensity of the pain and suffering a person 
exhibits is not a reliable indicator for the strength of claims for social 
assistance.  The ‘happy-sick’ or ‘worried-well’ both point to the possible 
perverse results of relying wholly on subjective desires or preferences. There 
needs to be an alternative or supplemental source of information in 
determining the scope of social response to health concerns. 
279.  On the other hand, assessing a person’s health against a standard 
of physical and mental states irrespective of a person’s self-valuation also 
has problems of its own.  The problem of adaptive preferences aside, there is 
also the problem that even when the pain and suffering is real, there needs to 
be some method to determine the priority for action.  Thus, there is a 
compelling motivation to pursue an objective metric for addressing health 
concerns even when the pain and suffering of individuals is unassailable.  
However, as discussed in Chapter 1, developing such a list without any 
values is implausible.  A purely biological account of what a ‘normal’ human 
being is like is impossible to give without any evaluative judgements.  
Alternatively, a value infused list of health functionings must be justified for 
advancing a specific conception of the good and the right.4  Furthermore, the 
method of aggregating health functionings within and across individuals 
presents further ethical challenges for those advancing an ‘objective’ list of 
physical and mental states.  What value do these objective functionings have 
that compels social action?  And, why is the separateness of persons not 
relevant if such individual health functionings have value?    
280. The persistence of welfarist thinking in health policy making is driven 
largely by the pursuit of epidemiological and fiscal efficiency.  For example, it 
is illuminating to see even the strongest advocates of the priority of liberty in 
social arrangements defer to the use of coercive measures during an 
                                                 
4 See (Daniels, 1985; Dworkin, 1993) 
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epidemiological crisis.  The threat of impairments or death from the 
transmission of pathogenic organisms is thought to be sufficient grounds to 
restrict fundamental liberties. 5  Such deference shows the extraordinary 
authoritative power of epidemiological science has to affect social 
arrangements.  The goals of epidemiological efficiency suggests that the 
chosen course of action should be the one which will maximize the most 
number disease cases averted, or the number of persons treated.  During an 
infectious disease epidemic, pursuing epidemiological efficiency is often the 
motivation behind implementing coercive measures of social control on 
individuals who carry an infection or who are most likely to be come infected, 
against a background of coercive measures applied widely across society.   
281. But from the perspective of capabilities, it is possible to argue that 
individuals who are carriers of a harmful infectious disease, or most 
vulnerable to it, exhibit acute failures of capabilities.  These failures are in 
turn likely to have been preceded by endemic ‘low intensity’ capability 
failures.  The analysis of Drèze and Sen on endemic and acute malnutrition 
can be easily transposed onto the spread of infectious disease epidemics.  
An acute health crisis evidences the failure of social structures to ensure at 
least sufficient capabilities, particularly those relevant to biological 
functionings.  For example, the acute failures in the capabilities of poor girls 
and women to protect themselves form HIV is often linked is often just the 
intensification of long-term endemic capability failures to achieving good 
reproductive and sexual health functionings.  The spread of HIV/AIDS or 
other preventable infectious epidemics reflect the extent of unjustness of 
societies because they explicitly evidence capability failures.  Indeed, the 
consistent neglect or sacrifice of the capabilities of those who are peripheral 
to the goal of maximizing total health of the population is often at the root of 
epidemiological crisis.  As Jonathan Mann pointed out, epidemiological 
efficiency may be more achievable when societies ensure basic freedoms for 
all citizens than in following a course that restricts the liberties of those most 
vulnerable in the face of an epidemic. (Mann et al., 1994; Mann, 1996; Mann, 
1997)  The deference to coercive authority to achieve epidemiological 
                                                 
5 The criteria for such abrogation of liberties are often that they are constrained by 
legal means, the least intrusive, and time-bound. 
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efficiency is an embarrassing capitulation for both welfarists and libertarians 
which could be avoided by alleviating the endemic and acute inequalities in 
capabilities.   
282. The pervasiveness of utilitarian and welfarist underpinnings of health 
programs is not limited to infectious diseases.  In addressing chronic 
impairments, achieving epidemiological efficiency suggests that lowering the 
risk of the majority of individuals in the population slightly will prevent more 
cases of disease, and for the longer term, than by focusing on the individuals 
who are most at risk.  In statistical terms, lowering the mean-level exposure 
of the population will avert more disease cases and be more efficient 
expenditure of resources than trying to prevent disease in those with the 
highest exposure in the tails of the population. (Rose, 1985)  Such an 
analysis that pits the interests of the few against that of the many is familiar 
to philosophers as containing various defects, but in epidemiology and health 
policy, it is seen as offering clear guidance on the right course of social 
action. 
283. Fiscal efficiency in addressing health concerns entails achieving the 
maximum benefits from the available resources.  An initial crude method 
would be to assess the leading causes of preventable mortality and allocate 
resources to mitigating those causes which will avert the most number of 
preventable deaths.  More sophisticated approaches incorporate diverse 
subjective and objective measurements of the quality of life of individuals 
affected by different causes of morbidity and preventable mortality.  Fiscal 
efficiency also entails allocating resources to causes which will maximize the 
chosen measurement variable(s).  This drive for fiscal efficiency does not 
take into account that health outcomes, or achievements of physical and 
mental states, are not the only morally relevant feature of evaluating and 
addressing health concerns.  The determinants, distribution patterns, and full 
breath of consequences of impairments are also relevant in determining the 
social response.   
284. In response to the shortcomings of equality of resources and the 
equal opportunity for resources Richard Arneson proposes equality of 
opportunity for welfare.  He suggests that equality of opportunities for welfare 
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and the CA are largely similar.  Indeed, the CA advocates the opportunities 
for individuals to achieve ‘beings’ which can be mental states.  But Arneson 
stops short of fully endorsing the CA because he believes that it is necessary 
to have a complete index of capabilities in order for it to be a candidate 
conception for distributive equality. (Arneson, 1990: p 193)  However, Sen 
has defended the plausibility of a conception of distributive justice which 
achieves only partial ordering of capabilities.  On the other hand, 
Nussbaum’s non-perfectionist account of ten CHCs as a social minimum 
would undercut Arneson’s critique that CA has no indexed content.  Despite 
its aims, Arneson’s move to equal distribution of opportunities for welfare 
does not overcome the shortcomings of pure welfare theories.  
285. The focus on the CH goes much farther than welfarism in fully 
evaluating the moral relevance of the determinants, distribution, and 
consequences of constraints on health functionings.  The CH argument 
presented here also clearly articulates the various causal components of 
health functionings as including personal features/needs, conversion skills, 
exposures to material goods and social conditions.  Whether in pursuit of an 
‘objective’ list of healthy physical and mental states, or satisfaction of a 
person’s own preferences regarding health functionings, welfare theories 
exhibit a broad range of shortcomings in responding to health concerns.  The 
foundational and Kantian liberal principle of ‘each person as end’ interpreted 
by Nussbaum as ‘each person’s capability’ provides a strong basis to reject 
the singular focus on an individual’s welfare in addressing health concerns. 
(Nussbaum, 2006: p 216)  Purely welfarist approaches to health concerns 
must justify the (1) capability constraints incurred by some for the sake of 
increasing the health benefits of the greater population; and (2) the singular 
focus on biological outcomes while ignoring the moral relevance of the 
causes, distribution patterns, and non-biological consequences of health 
constraints. 
286. Section II: Resource theories vs. CH.  
287. Reasoning that the moral concern for the health functionings of 
persons gives rise only to claims to healthcare resources, whether an 
‘essential’ package, or even more broadly defined healthcare goods and 
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services, fails to take into account the extra needs and varying conversion 
abilities of individuals in achieving any and all valuable health functioning.  
Claims only to a standard set of healthcare resources also excludes 
considering the possible non-healthcare material goods and social conditions 
necessary to maintaining physiological and agency functionings.  Aside from 
the diverse requirements just for the maintenance of functionings, the 
capabilities to avoid threats of impairments and premature mortality over a 
normal lifespan certainly requires much more than clinical medical care and 
public health services.  Healthcare is often valued for its restorative or 
ameliorative function, but for prevention, the ‘upstream’ requirements 
become much broader that even public health goods and services broadly 
defined.  Goods and social conditions such as physical safety, access to 
income, and freedom to access and share information are all crucial factors 
in determining the extent of vulnerability or risk to impairments and premature 
mortality.  The focus on healthcare alone does not fully appreciate the 
interaction of personal features, conversion skills, materials goods and social 
conditions in the production of somatic and psychological functionings. 
288. One type of resourcist theories that tries to distribute healthcare 
starts with the notion of basic entitlements or human rights.  These basic 
entitlements are said to be foundational or basis for all further human 
activities.  There are two ways these theories justify the ‘basic rights’ thesis.  
The first approach is to argue that ‘if there are any rights, then there have to 
be these rights first’.  That is, these theorists do not directly justify the basic 
entitlements, but argue that if there is any justification found for any other 
rights then the basic rights being advocated must be recognized first as they 
are logical pre-requisites for those rights. (Shue, 1996; Jones, 1999)  For 
example, right to political participation is predicated on individuals being alive 
and able to participate. (Pogge, 2001)  Such basic rights include entitlements 
to such things are food, shelter, and healthcare.  A second approach to 
justification for the ‘basic rights’ thesis is by way of rule utilitarianism.  Though 
rights and utilitarian analysis are often pitted against each other, in this 
instance, it is argued that if these basic rights were consistently recognized 
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then, human welfare or utility would be better overall, or there would simply 
be more of it. (Jones, 1999)   
289. Both types of justifications of the basic rights or needs approach fail 
in various ways.  In terms of justification, the latter attempt at asserting the 
greater social welfare from realizing everyone’s basic entitlements hinges on 
empirical analysis.  If in fact, it were not the case that overall utility is higher 
from fulfilling these basic rights, then the argument would fail.  And it is 
possible to show how rule-utilitarianism, even with a guarantee to a social 
minimum for each individual, could still not be acceptable on other grounds. 
(Kymlicka, 2002)  But most importantly, the basic rights/needs resources 
approach fails because by asserting a standard package of resources for 
every human being, it fails to recognize the different needs and conversion 
abilities of individuals.  The focus on commodities such as food, shelter, and 
healthcare, also fails to give sufficient attention to the necessary supportive 
external social conditions aside from the provision of commodities.  Minimal 
resources or basic needs approaches, though they are grounded in the 
material reality of the lives of people, focus on the goods independent of the 
personal features of the individuals.  Such approaches envision a minimal 
conception of human life, and then assert entitlements to intermediate means 
to such a conception. 
290. Resource theories which do not even distribute healthcare 
specifically but expect income and wealth to satisfy the health needs of 
individuals over the life course especially evidence the inadequate ethical 
consideration of the determinants, consequences, and distribution of human 
health functionings.  For example, Rawls excludes health issues in identifying 
and distributing ‘primary goods’.  Any additional material needs or difficulties 
in dealing with the social conditions in order to achieve, maintain, protect or 
restore health functionings are relegated to the personal sphere, or 
considered to be outside the scope of justice.  Most importantly, individuals 
with severe and long-term impairments become second class citizens as 
their ‘extra-ordinary’ needs are outside the scope of justice.  Their interests 
are to be taken care of by guardians.  The financial costs and non-financial 
resources such as time and energy of others needed to provide care are 
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invisible from the calculation of primary goods.  In the extreme, when 
personal resources and/or public beneficence are not enough to achieve 
sufficient health functionings, the constraints consequently restrict, if not fully 
extinguish, the practical possibility of an individual to pursue their own ends.6 
291. Resource theory advocates either have a blind spot to this significant 
consequence or are willing to accept this sort of inequality in substantive 
freedom caused by health constraints.  They highlight the possible role of 
individual volitional choices and preferences in creating extra health needs 
and therefore, their justifiable exclusion from legitimate claims for social 
support.  For example, health needs that are caused directly from 
participating in dangerous sports or smoking would not have to be met as a 
matter of justice because the individuals knowingly chose to place 
themselves in that position of risk.  Such a focus on personal accountability 
may alleviate some guilt for resourcists, but it does not fully manage to offset 
disregarding the price paid by the remaining individuals who may be the most 
vulnerable of all members of society; individuals who did nothing to expose 
themselves to harm but whose health related costs exceed the standard set 
of entitlements.   
292. This disregard or inadequate consideration of the needs of 
individuals outside of the ‘standard set’ violates the fundamental principle of 
showing equal concern to all members of society.  Moreover, the emphasis 
on choice versus luck places resourcists in the position of having to assume 
the causation of the health impairment is clear and established; it either has 
to be a result of choice or brute luck.  Otherwise, how would one determine 
whether the person is responsible for their own extra health needs?7  What 
                                                 
6 One of the major drawbacks of Rawls’s theory is that when a person’s financial 
needs become very expensive, the theory tries to transform the needs into 
preferences and thereby absolve any requirements for social provision.  And even if 
there is agreement that there are legitimate, very expensive needs, the theory 
allows for caps on such expenses because of the prudential reasoning of 
contractors.  Contractors would have an interest in restricting one person from 
being a large drain on social resources.  (Pogge, 1989; Pogge, 1995; Pogge, 2004)  
7 This parallels Cohen’s critique of Rawls that though he recognizes that talents are 
a mix of inheritance and effort, individuals cannot claim their full benefits, but when 
preferences are also a mix of inheritance and choice, Rawls holds them fully 
responsible for their tastes.  Where there is a mix of individual volition and 
genetics/unknown reason, how does one identify whether that should fall under 
choice of brute luck?  (Cohen, 1989; Cohen, 1997) 
 151 
 
these resourcists also miss is that every human being at one time or another 
over the life course will experience severe impairments that will make them 
dependent on others.  And it is quite certain that human societies will 
continue to experience major health crises in the immediate future.  Human 
beings are and will continue to be vulnerable and interdependent human 
beings.  A standard set of ‘primary goods’ or healthcare resources does not 
adequately account for the different needs and vulnerabilities of human 
beings over the life course or provide security against changing threats to the 
embodied functionings of the human species.   
293. In that process of abstracting away from the personal features, 
choices or preferences that individuals may make or have in order to reflect 
on the just distribution of resources, resourcists do not seem to exhibit a 
thorough enough understanding of the causes, consequences, and 
distribution of mortality and impairments among human beings.  For example, 
in responding to Rawls who excludes all health issues in A Theory of Justice, 
Dworkin specifically identifies differences in physical and mental abilities as 
constituting morally relevant inequalities in personal resources under one’s 
command.  Dworkin then goes on to argue that the sufficient social response 
to addressing physical and mental impairments should take the form of 
providing additional compensation to those who had no control over the 
cause of those impairments. (Dworkin, 1993; Dworkin, 2000)  Dworkin may 
be commended for pointing to the moral relevance of health impairments.  
Yet, Dworkin’s analysis is too simplistic for idealizing health functionings as 
being caused either by innate features or volitional choices.  And he seems 
to see no problem with reasoning that the effects of either a temporary or 
permanent impairment on a person’s life can be justly addressed through 
individual, monetary compensation.  One criticism is that impairments can 
impinge on equal dignity, and may not be just about monetary compensation 
for loss of social advantage.  It may be that social conditions need to change.  
A second critique is that disability results in both earnings handicap 
(inadequate or low income) and conversion handicap (disadvantage 
converting earnings into good living). (Sen, 2004b)  Disabled individuals may 
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require both additional income as well as assistance with converting 
resources into pursuing their plans of life. 
294. Viewed from the perspective of capabilities, resource theories are 
inadequate with respect to what they include and exclude in their standard 
conception of persons—as indicators of what they consider morally relevant 
features of persons.  They are also inadequate in looking at intermediary 
resource holdings to assess how well the lives of people are going.  Indeed, 
Rawls and resourcists after him do recognize human diversity.  But such 
diversity is seen in the varying conceptions of the good, and the differing 
effects on a person’s life course by the (supposedly) random and unequal 
distribution of natural goods (talents, skills, intelligence, health), volitional 
choices, and random events of bad luck.  The CA does not deny the moral 
significance of the human capacity for moral reasoning in conceiving the 
good, the differences in innate qualities, the role of volitional choices, or even 
bad luck.  However, the CA recognizes more fully the moral relevance of how 
every human being is as G.A. Cohen states, differently ‘constructed and 
situated’. (Cohen, 1989)   
295. Sen makes a compelling point that the assertion of equality of one 
‘value-object’ or resource in social justice theories will surely result in 
inequalities elsewhere precisely because of the diversity among human 
beings.  If human beings were uniform, creating equality in one space would 
produce equality in the effects in other spaces.  Because of the diversity of 
human beings, forcing the equality of persons in one aspect also requires 
justifying the consequent inequalities in another aspect. (Sen, 1992: p 21)  
The price paid for conceiving social justice as the equality of resources is the 
resulting unequal capabilities of individuals to pursue their own conception of 
the right and good; inequalities in freedom.  This is quite opposite to what 
theorists intend when they argue for the equality of the means to purse one’s 
ends.  The response to consequent or persistent inequalities in freedoms is 
often ad hoc attempts to provide additional compensation for various types 
claims.  For example, additional resources are provided to satisfy expensive 
tastes one has been raised with rather than those that are chosen; handicaps 
one is born with; or the additional needs of pregnancy.  However, resourcists 
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cannot adequately justify such pervasive inequalities in basic freedom as 
they are avoidable.   
296. The lack of sufficient recognition and consideration of the diversity 
across human beings in the needs for material goods and in abilities to 
convert these goods and social conditions into life’s beings and doings 
results in two significant challenges for resourcists.  They have to justify the 
inequalities consequent to pressing for equality of resources.  And they have 
to argue that knowledge of the determinants, consequences, and distribution 
of health constraints has no effect on the basic epistemology of their theories 
and resulting basic principles.  That is, once resource theorists do become 
aware of these aspects they must be able to show that their reasoning does 
not need to change.  In specific, a pure equality of resources approach to 
health concerns must justify at least the following sources of inequalities.   
(1) Inequalities in health functionings can remain with the equal 
distribution of resources and/or  
(2) equal distribution of healthcare resources;  
(3) inequalities in non-health related capabilities can result from 
providing equal healthcare resources; (e.g. rich get richer from 
subsidized healthcare costs) 
(4) equal distribution of healthcare and/or other material goods does not 
affect psycho-social determinants of impairments. 
 
297. Section III: Why the CH 
298.  In order to make up for shortcomings of prevalent resource theories, 
a ‘sophisticated resourcist’ could argue that the concern for the health needs 
of individuals requires the provision of healthcare commodities as well as all 
purpose means such as liberties and equality of opportunities.8   Such a 
theorist would recognize the necessity for both internal capacities, and 
external commodities and social conditions for individuals to be healthy.  
They differ on how much individual health in terms of physiological 
functionings is thought to be determined by internal capacities and how much 
by external social factors.  The most limited understanding of health in this 
type of sophisticated resourcism sees health as largely a ‘natural good’ which 
                                                 
8 The idea of a sophisticated resourcist is based the approach of Thomas Pogge who 
criticises Rawls’s theory, the pre-eminent resourcist approach, but nevertheless, 
contends that resources are still the right focus. See (Pogge, 1989; Pogge, 2001; 
Pogge, 2002a; Pogge, 2005) 
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is affected by luck and choice.  The only thing that can be the social basis of 
health is access to healthcare, encompassing individual clinical care and 
public health services.  The difference between these resourcists and 
capabilities advocates is over whether the resourcists can accommodate the 
diversity of needs and conversion capacities of individuals.  On one level, it 
can be seen as a difference between the breadth of the resources available 
to cover the diversity of individuals.  Can the concept of healthcare be 
adjusted to sufficiently cover all the needs and conversion abilities that 
capabilities theorists keep pointing out?  On another level, it is a profound 
disagreement about the conception of the person and its consequent 
assumptions for ‘ideal theory’.  Why should needs and conversion abilities be 
an after thought for compensation rather than central to ethical reasoning on 
basic principles?   
299. A CA advocate would argue that even if sophisticated resourcists 
were able to keep extending resources to cover needs and conversion 
abilities, they simply do not appreciate the full extent of the social basis of the 
CH.  Moreover, sooner or later, even sophisticated resourcists will place 
limits on resource claims because they take away from the claims of others.  
And they will call such caps on resource claims just.  The focus on 
capabilities would be more on-target, and when social structures cannot 
provide resources to one individual because it will undermine the minimal 
dignity of others, it will clearly be recognized as justice not being done to that 
individual.   
300. One important thing that resourcists and capabilities theorists alike 
must recognize is that experiences of social inequality such as from income 
differences or through discrimination based on race, gender or sexuality 
cannot be understood as simply an absence of a resource or primary good.  
When conceiving of individuals as pursuing mutual advantage, discrimination 
looks like the denial of equal access or opportunity to the pursuit of life plans.  
Yet, in the context of health functionings, discrimination is not just the 
absence of primary goods such as social basis of self-respect, or lack of 
equality of opportunity.  Perennial stress and anxiety from discrimination gets 
converted through psycho-biological pathways into impairments and early 
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death.  The lack of primary goods does not mean just the lack of instrumental 
means but also that it is a source of harm.  The capability space, by being 
grounded in dignity, and focused on ensuring a sufficient level of opportunity 
and activity is not only instrumentally and intrinsically valuable, it can also be 
protective.  Ensuring a sufficient level of capabilities means that the human 
animal’s neediness, sociability and ability to reason are not allowed to 
function but that such functioning is protected because it is necessary for its 
survival.   
301. Aside from avoiding the shortcomings of resourcist or welfarist 
approaches, the entitlement to the CH also expands the traditional scope of 
health claims.  The scope of the entitlement to the CH includes all social 
bases of impairments and mortality.  In contrast, even the most committed 
advocate of the CA currently takes as given existing disease categories and 
evidentiary power of available statistics on the prevalence of morbidity and 
mortality.  Theorists who understand health claims as being only those 
arising in the clinical setting, or having to do just with disease, are blind to 
other sources of health claims.  Such an understanding comes from the 
pervasive and incoherent notion of disease in the medical sciences.  The 
concepts of disease, and health as the absence of disease, must be 
jettisoned as our knowledge of the causes of impairments and mortality has 
outstripped their value.  As the causal model of the CH argues, the breadth of 
components including personal features/needs, conversion skills, exposures 
to material goods, and social conditions produce health capability and have 
moral relevance. 
302. A sufficient social response to health capability constraints must 
evaluate the social basis of all the causal components.  For example, poor 
nutrition of girls and women in developing countries is hardly ever considered 
within a medical setting, and even less likely a topic for health policy or 
bioethics.  The distribution of food within the household in resource poor 
settings has been shown to be a function of the gender of individuals.  Yet, 
the consideration of the social conditions within and outside the household 
affecting gender and consequent access to nutrition is rarely, if ever, part of 
health policy.  As malnutrition is not due to disease, or even when it does 
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lead to disease, the social determinants are still left unaddressed.  There 
needs to be a reorientation of health concerns away from the narrow focus 
on disease to the CH.  An entitlement to the CH would be able to recognize 
the nutritional deprivation of females as a health issue, and provide the moral 
force to address the social basis. 
303. The next chapter reviews what may be called a ‘sophisticated’ 
resource theory to address health concerns.  Norman Daniels’s has extended 
Rawls’s theory twice now to address health issues which Rawls initially left 
out.  The first time, Daniels extended the theory in way he thought was 
defensible in order to address the fact that individuals experience 
impairments over the life course.  This second time, Daniels has revised his 
earlier extension in order to address difficulties he faced with distribution 
resources based on his original principles as well as to incorporate a whole 
body of research he had missed earlier on the social determinants of health.  
The revision also allows him to incorporate the various critiques offered by 
the CA as well as try to address the issue of global health inequalities.  The 
next chapter will evaluate the success of his latest revisions in comparison 
with the arguments for the CA and CH.  The evaluation continues in Chapter 
8 where the international dimensions of his theory are considered. 
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Chapter 6:  Thomas Pogge and Norman Daniels 
 
 
 
304. The present chapter reviews Norman Daniels’s recently revised 
theory of health justice, and contrasts it with the argument for an entitlement 
to the CH.  Daniels’s theory is worth examining in detail because it is a rare 
example of ethical reasoning that aims to put forward a full theory of health 
justice.  Furthermore, his argument is also unique as it extends Rawls’s 
theory to address health issues.  Both these aspects make Daniels’s theory 
worth examining more closely if the CH is to be adequately defended.  Before 
pursuing Daniels’s argument, a slight detour is taken to consider Thomas 
Pogge’s comments on the contrast between resource theories and the CA.  
Such a detour is needed because his view on the contrast relates specifically 
to health functionings and thus, could have some bearing on evaluating 
Daniels’s argument.   
305. Pogge is one of the best defenders of the Rawlsian and other 
resourcist approaches to justice as well as one of their best critics.  He 
argues that the only real contrast between a ‘sophisticated resourcist’ (SR) 
approach and the CA is the way each would address significant differences 
in the ‘natural features’ of persons. (Pogge, 2002a)  An SR approach is said 
to be a resourcist approach such as Rawls’s theory which is adjusted for its 
shortcomings in relation to personal diversity in needs and conversion skills 
but still keeps the focus on distributing resources.  If we accept Pogge’s 
remarks at face value, then there are likely to be starting off with substantial 
similarities between Daniels’s argument, which is an example of a Rawlsian 
argument, and a capabilities argument like the CH.  Furthermore, Daniels 
aims to address health issues which Rawls is widely recognized as ignoring 
or simplifying too much.  Thus, trying to highlight the differences between 
Daniels’s argument and a CH argument may seem futile if Daniels is erasing 
their only point of difference or disagreement.  It may seem as though small 
differences are being exaggerated while ignoring their larger and 
fundamental commonalities that exist, as Pogge seems to claim. 
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306. However, the following discussion aims to show that there are indeed 
significant differences between Daniels’s extension of Rawls’s theory and the 
argument for the CH.  And Pogge’s comments need to be examined more 
critically.  Even if Pogge’s assessment is appropriate, he did not have 
available Daniels’s recently revised argument, and Pogge probably did not 
take into account Daniels’s initial argument either.  Because Daniels’s initial 
argument for distributing healthcare according to Rawlsian principles was 
thought to be so particular to the situation in the United States, it is unlikely 
that Pogge would have had it in mind when making general comments about 
SR approaches and the CA.  However, Daniels now explicitly advocates his 
theory as being a general theory of health justice as well as being applicable 
to different societies.  Thus, his argument is the closest ethical competitor to 
an argument for a species-wide entitlement to CH.  In order productively to 
compare Daniels’s argument with the CH it may be helpful to see how it 
intersects with Pogge’s analysis and conclusion the CA’s commitment to 
meeting the resource needs resulting from biological features is the only real 
difference between an ideal SR theory and the CA. 
307. Section I:  Pogge and ‘pure’ personal heterogeneity 
308. Pogge points out that CA advocates consistently argue that the 
scope of social justice must address the diversity in individuals’ needs for 
types and amounts of commodities as well as in their abilities to convert 
commodities and social conditions to their advantage.  He overlooks that CA 
advocates also recognize the diversity in abilities to convert one’s own 
personal endowments into beings and doings and not just to convert things in 
the external environment.  In any case, Pogge identifies the sources of such 
personal diversity in needs and conversion abilities as including age, sex, 
geographical location, pregnancy, family situation, community practices, and 
so forth.  Thus, Pogge seems to correctly understand that the capabilities of 
a person are determined by the person’s internal features and conversion 
skills combining with the surrounding material and social conditions.   
309. Nevertheless, useful as this type of capability analysis may be, 
Pogge believes that most or all of the diversity and needs and conversion 
abilities from such sources can be addressed through a ‘sophisticated’ just 
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distribution of resources.  That is, resource theories can make adjustments or 
reason more thoroughly than they do now to account for all these different 
forms of diversity.  The primary goods space and distribution principles can 
be tweaked.  A pregnant woman actually needs resources for two people; or 
a person may claim more resources for warmer clothing for equal opportunity 
to work, and so forth.  What resourcists and capabilities advocates disagree 
on, Pogge writes, is how to handle any ‘extra resource requirements’ beyond 
this minor tweaking that particular individuals might have as a result of their 
own, internal ‘natural features’.  CA advocates and some other critics of 
Rawls would provide extra resources to individuals to compensate for 
aspects of their personal features (needs and conversion abilities) which 
lessen their abilities to pursue their life plans relative to the abilities of others.  
So a person with lesser ‘natural’ talents and skills should have the same 
capabilities as a person with the most talents and skills.  A person with 
severe physical impairments should have capabilities equal to someone who 
is not impaired.  For the CA, the focus is on achieving a sufficient or equal 
level of capabilities and does not identify any limits on the resources to 
expend on influencing the causal factors to create such capabilities. 
310. Therefore, Pogge argues that the only meaning differences between 
a SR approach and CA is how they would address the needs from ‘pure’ 
personal heterogeneity.  By pure diversity, he means specifically the diversity 
in personal features that arise from ordinary genetic variation, self-caused 
factors, and differential luck.  These are causes of diversity in needs which 
he sees as having no social basis.  If they did have social basis, they would 
have already been tweaked as part of an SR theory.  According to Pogge, 
advocates of a SR theory and the CA would disagree on satisfying claims for 
extra resources needed as a result of non-socially determined heterogeneity 
from innate biology, individual choice, and bad luck.  Rawlsians, for example, 
say justice does not apply, or that there are no justice claims resulting from 
those kinds of situations.  Capabilities theorists, according to Pogge, argue 
that justice does apply but are vague about exactly how.   
311. Daniels can be seen as closing the gap between the SR and CA 
theorists by expanding the scope of social support within a resource theory to 
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cover many aspects of these three sources of personal heterogeneity over 
the life course.  Individuals are given claims to a range of ‘species-typical’ 
functioning over the life course irrespective of whether the constraints are 
caused by genetic endowment, choice, bad luck, or indeed, any other cause.  
As a result, Daniels may be able to assert that the only remaining difference 
is how the two approaches deal with people who never had species-typical 
functioning or those who cannot be restored to the species-typical range 
during the life course.  Daniels, like Rawls, is neutral about the natural 
baseline, or what individuals are born with.     
312. It is important to note at this point that Nussbaum rejects a purely 
resourcist approach to justice, especially one based on a social contract, 
partly because she sees it as denying the equal dignity and moral worth of 
every human being. (Nussbaum, 2006)  The resourcist’s primary focus on the 
strategic or ‘prudential’ value of resources in achieving life plans results in 
treating individuals who cannot ‘rationally and independently’ pursue the 
good life with lesser dignity by excluding them and their interests from the 
scope of justice.  Resource theorists treat such individuals as second-class 
citizens in two ways.  They are excluded from being primary agents of justice 
because they lack certain prerequisite traits.  And, the consideration of their 
needs is deferred to a secondary stage after the basic social institutions and 
needs of the ‘normals’ have already been laid down.  Resourcists assume 
that the concerns—the needs, conversion skills, the dignity—of the severely 
impaired individuals, whether those who are born impaired or become 
impaired over the life course, will not require changing the form or scope of 
basic social institutions.   
313. Pogge has a somewhat related critique of Rawlsian justice. (Pogge, 
1989: pp 161-207)  He initially concurs with Rawls that an individual’s ability 
to pursue a conception of the good is not only determined by social 
resources but also by natural endowments.  But Pogge wonders why the 
social contractors should be neutral with regard to the random or ‘natural’ 
distribution of physical and mental endowments.  Because random natural 
endowments significantly affect the access to social resources and success 
of pursuing the good life, that is precisely why the contractors would likely 
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want to ensure that there is no correlation between being lucky with better 
natural endowments and possessing more social resources.  Pogge is not 
convinced that the contractors behind the veil of ignorance would be so 
willing to accept the relative inequality produced by the Difference Principle—
that individuals with lesser innate talents and skills end up on the lesser end 
of resource distribution curve in contrast to an equal distribution of resources. 
(Rawls, 1971: p 151)  Pogge thinks that it is plausible that contractors would 
prefer lesser but equal shares of resources over the option of receiving 
relatively less than others but more than equal shares.  Such scepticism 
seems to be related to the self-esteem or social bases of self-respect that is 
affected by the knowledge that one has lesser social resources than the 
‘naturally lucky’ who get more social resources.1 
314. While Nussbaum focuses on ensuring the equal dignity of human 
beings who have limited interest in or capacities to pursuing the good, Pogge 
is concerned that individuals with lesser natural endowments will have 
relatively less share of social resources.  Despite Nussbaum and Pogge 
sharing this common concern over how the Rawlsian system of justice treats 
individuals with lesser natural endowments, Pogge nevertheless dismisses 
the CA for very particular and peculiar reasons.  He argues that the CA does 
not articulate how diversity in work-related natural features will affect the 
benefits and burdens of economic cooperation.  Expressing a concern which 
evinces his resourcist roots, Pogge focuses on how the CA deals with a non-
productive or non-cooperative member of society as the basis of his rejecting 
the CA.  For Pogge, even his naturally lesser endowed individuals are 
economically productive agents pursuing their life plans.  
315. Pogge contends that the CA does not offer any specific answer to the 
question of how an economy made up individuals with sufficient or equal 
capabilities would function.  In contrast, a Rawlsian system does consider 
how an economic system can function which is made up of individuals with 
great personal heterogeneity.  Rawls allows socio-economic inequalities in 
                                                 
1 The answer for Rawls is that his social contractors do not envy, and that because 
each is self-interested they would accept the Difference Principle as it would ensure 
that every share is better than if there were equal resources.  (Rawls, 1971: pp 150-
161) 
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order that economic incentives motivate individuals to create more wealth in 
a society, which is then distributed in a way that is said to benefit all.  The 
trade-off for allowing inequalities is that those endowed with lesser talents 
and skills will be better off—have a bigger economic share—than if all socio-
economic goods were divided equally.  Rawls does not directly compensate 
for lesser natural talents like the CA, but indirectly through the Difference 
Principle.  Partly because of this concern for the efficient functioning and 
growth of the economy, Pogge defends the Rawlsian resourcist approach 
over the CA. 
316. Even more surprisingly, Pogge contends that CA advocates 
stigmatize individuals, and destroy the social conception of human diversity 
as being ‘horizontal’.  That is, the CA is said to do harm by seeking to directly 
compensate for personal features that are publicly identified as being 
deficient.  Pogge appears to be arguing that explicitly identifying the needs of 
individuals for them to achieve sufficient and equitable capabilities and 
functionings is an affront to their dignity, and supposedly destroys the notion 
that personal diversity is horizontal and not hierarchical.  It is unclear whether 
he thinks that the indirect method of compensation under the Rawlsian 
system, through the Difference Principle preserves dignity.  But why would a 
person under a Rawlsian system who recognizes themselves as having a 
lower share largely because of their lesser natural talents not suffer any 
insult? Or why would diversity be thought of as horizontal even though the 
gradient in valued social resource holdings parallel such natural diversity? 
317. Pogge’s trenchant analysis is valuable in highlighting both similarities 
and differences between Rawlsian and CA.  However, his criticism of the lack 
of analysis of human capabilities and economic cooperation is misdirected.  
Both in terms of theory and practical policy analysis, Sen has applied the CA 
to economic systems. (Sen et al., 1999)  It would be quite surprising if Pogge 
is accusing Sen, a Nobel Prize winning economist, of not fully thinking 
through the implications of the CA on economic systems.  What Pogge is 
pointing to perhaps, is the problem of aggregation or making trade offs in 
terms of economic productivity versus capabilities.  Under a Rawlsian 
scheme, there is a trade-off between the growth of the economy and equality 
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of distributive shares.  Perhaps, there is a similar trade-off to be made 
between economic growth and equality of capabilities?  Yet, Sen has 
demonstrated, taking India as an example, that more economic growth can 
happen by supporting capabilities.  And, theoretically, if there was a trade-off 
to be made between supporting the capabilities of some versus growing the 
economy, it would have to be decided through a process of public reasoning.  
In contrast, there is no argument made that economic growth can happen or 
increased through supporting equal shares of primary goods. 
318. Because Sen and Nussbaum envision economic growth to be more 
sustainable and robust through improving the capabilities of all citizens rather 
than increasing GDP through ‘fast growth’ projects.  Pogge’s very theoretical 
question as to how the CA envisions an economic system where individuals 
have different talents and skills related to production puts up a false trade off.  
The equality of economic shares versus growth of the economy in the 
Rawlsian system is in conflict.  But the choice between improving the 
capabilities of individuals versus growing the economy seems to be in conflict 
only when the idea of economic growth is short-term or only in terms of 
increasing year-on-year GDP or GNP.  And even if it were the case that GDP 
or GNP could grow by not supporting capabilities, then it could be argued 
that economic growth, seen as increase in opulence, has no value on its 
own.  The purpose of opulence is to increase capabilities.  Thus, the CA does 
not see a need to make a trade-off between opulence as a means to 
capabilities and capabilities.   
319. Pogge’s second criticism that the CA stigmatizes individuals based 
on their personal features is surprising.  Nussbaum would argue that the CA 
aims to protect and respect dignity of individuals through promoting and 
protecting capabilities, particularly a sufficient level of ten central human 
capabilities.  Her conception of human dignity is thoroughly intertwined with 
the possession of capabilities.  Pogge’s criticism may be more pointed about 
the disrespect shown in the method of assistance.  By directly identifying a 
personal feature that makes a particular individual in need of assistance, 
somehow the individual is being stigmatized or embarrassed for being 
deficient.  This notion of stigma that Pogge uses is problematic, as stigma is 
 164 
 
actually a concept that reflects what individuals in the surrounding 
environment express about a person.  Indeed, it is clearly possible and has 
sometimes been true that social institutions created to assist individuals also 
create stigma for the recipients in order to discourage the making of claims.  
But that is not what the CA advocates.  And, it seems counter-intuitive that 
social institutions geared towards engendering capabilities of individuals 
through direct assistance with material goods or through transforming the 
social environment would at the same time allow the social environment to 
stigmatize individuals for the lack of capabilities or for receiving assistance.   
320. Pogge may be trying to make a similar criticism to the one made by 
Elizabeth Anderson against liberal theories which resort to directly 
compensate individuals for their bad luck. (Anderson, 1999)  But Anderson 
comes out in support of the CA.  Perhaps Pogge is seeing the CA as too 
much of a compensation scheme rather than as one seeking to engender 
activity and opportunity.  Protecting, promoting and restoring capabilities 
addressing the diverse needs and conversion skills arising from personal 
features would include countering the social stigma in the environment.  
Given that entitlements to human capabilities are grounded in equal human 
dignity, it would undermine the central motivation to allow or induce stigma 
during the process of supporting capabilities. 
321. So Pogge’s assessment of the differences between SR theories and 
CA can be useful to highlight how each would deal with natural inequalities 
differently.  Yet, it should not be over looked that Pogge is not offering a 
specific SR theory, but suggests that improvements could be made to one 
such as Rawls’s theory in order for it to become a SR theory. (Pogge, 2002a)  
The differences he is pointing to are between a not yet existent ideal 
resource theory and the CA.  Furthermore, his two criticisms of the CA do not 
seem to hold up under closer scrutiny.  His concern for economic efficiency 
and growth really makes him vulnerable to the general criticism that 
resourcists see justice as narrowly being centrally concerned with the pursuit 
of mutual advantage or economic benefit.  His criticism that the CA affronts 
dignity of individuals by making negative value judgements on personal 
heterogeneity can be superficially addressed by pointing to the importance of 
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dignity to the CA.  A more thoroughgoing response really requires a fuller 
articulation of the role of dignity in the CA, and how the CA seeks to ensure 
equal human dignity.  Something which Nussbaum does in defending her ten 
CHCs.   
322. This review of Pogge’s comments then leads to concluding that the 
supposedly minimal differences between an ideal SR theories and the CA 
are quite important differences, and which in fact, go to the heart of the 
reasons to reject resource theories.  An ethical approach which denies the 
equal moral worth and dignity of every human being provides a strong basis 
to reject it as a plausible theory of social justice.  Pogge’s analysis does 
provide one benefit for CA advocates.  He provides an analysis which shows 
that even an ideal conception of a resource theory will continue to have 
difficulty in dealing with differences in biological and psychological 
functionings that are not socially caused.  It gives us good background to see 
how an example of a Rawlsian conception, even though Pogge does not 
consider it to be a SR in its present state, handles health issues.  Does 
Daniels’s bring Rawls’s theory up to the level of a SR theory?  Does it go 
beyond the limitations of the SR to handle the health claims of every human 
being like the CA and CH?  Unsurprisingly, the answers to both questions are 
that he does not.  
323. Section II: Daniels’s revised theory of health justice. 
324. Daniels initially extended Rawls’s theory to the realm of human 
health in the early 1980s. (Daniels, 1985)  Daniels had reasoned that 
because health is not something that is greatly under social control, Rawls 
was right in not putting it on the list of primary goods.2 (Rawls, 1971: p 62)  
Instead, Daniels claimed, the right focus should be on healthcare, broadly 
conceived, as it could be socially provided.  But that too could not be put on 
the list of primary goods as it would create the problem of having to rank it 
                                                 
2 Both Rawls and Daniels appear to think that because health, or lack of disease, 
cannot be fully guaranteed by external social structures, then it cannot be put into 
the primary goods space.  There seems to be confounding between a social 
guarantee of a good, and the social guarantee of the social basis of a good.  They 
also underestimate the extent of social basis of health and other functionings.  In 
contrast, Nussbaum identifies entitlements to the social basis of basic capabilities 
such as bodily functioning, emotions, and reasoning abilities.   
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against the other primary goods, particularly with income and wealth.  That is, 
even though Rawls prioritized the distribution of primary goods through the 
Difference Principle, identifying how to make the particular tradeoffs between 
healthcare and other primary goods is seen as over-determining the life plans 
of individuals. (Arrow, 1973; Pogge, 1989)   
325. Daniels focused instead on one of the existing primary goods on the 
list, the fair equality of opportunity.  In the original argument, Daniels 
conflated Rawls’s equality of fair opportunity with the equal opportunity to 
attain jobs and careers with pursuing a plan of life or conception of the good.  
(Rawls, 1971: pp 83-90; Daniels, 1985: p27)  He argued that a person’s 
health is an important determinant of their fair equality of opportunity to 
pursue public offices and careers.  From this link between health as a 
determinant of the fair equality of opportunity, and the causal link between 
healthcare and health, Daniels argued that healthcare institutions should be 
understood as one of the basic institutions of society that functions to ensure 
equality of opportunity to pursue life plans.  Exemplifying the analysis of the 
CA advocates, Daniels focused on the specific good of healthcare because 
of its instrumental value to what individuals can be and do.  Asking whether 
the conception of the beings and doings is justifiable or if other factors may 
also causally determine such beings and doings is put aside in striving to 
establish entitlements to the particular good. 
326. Daniels’s initial argument became well known within the field of 
bioethics and health policy discussions in the United States.  Its prominence 
was in large part due to the rarity of any philosophical consideration of health 
issues at the level of ethical theory.  That is, philosophical discussions on 
health issues in industrialized countries had until recently mostly focused on 
the doctor-patient relationship and the casuistic application of the bioethics 
principles, ‘non-malfeasance, beneficence, autonomy, and justice’. (Daniels, 
1996b)  Philosophical reasoning about health issues in poor countries was 
even rarer and thought to be about fundamentally different issues—about 
famines, over-population, and basic needs. (Singer, 1972; O'Neill, 1975; Sen, 
1985; Shue, 1996; Unger, 1996)  These ‘macro’ types of health concerns 
were thought to be categorically different from the concerns of developed 
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country bioethics.  In any case, Daniels’s argument also received a 
significant boost when Rawls noted that he generally supported Daniels’s 
approach to addressing health needs. (Rawls, 1993)   
327. Nevertheless, despite Rawls’s support for the argument, the 
widespread acknowledgement of its originality and importance, and the 
animated discussions it generated, Daniels himself has now openly identified 
its shortcomings. (Rawls, 1993: p 184; Daniels, 2007)  He readily identifies 
the theory’s lack of practical guidance in making resource allocation 
decisions simply based on the effects of health impairments on equality of 
opportunity.  And second, he admits to the egregiously generous causal 
connection made between healthcare and health that ignores the non-
healthcare determinants of health, while also lacking a broader ‘population 
health’ perspective.  His two major revisions are his creation of a list of 
principles of fairness to the decision making process of allocating healthcare 
resources.  And second, he claims to have incorporated social determinants 
of health research, and a population health perspective. 
328. So, taking into account his two revisions, how does Daniels now 
specifically integrate health concerns into the Rawlsian framework, and then 
defend it?  He starts his argument by discussing the concept of needs, and in 
particular, health needs.  He writes that there is widespread agreement that 
needs related to normal species functioning have special moral weight.  In 
order to lay the groundwork for connecting these special ‘health needs’ with 
Rawls’s use of an ‘objective index of well-being’ that are represented by 
primary goods, Daniels draws on Scanlon’s discussion of an ‘objective’ 
truncated scale of well-being by which individuals can make claims on one 
and another for assistance.  That is, Daniels wants to establish that health 
needs are ‘objective needs’ that work in a similar way to Rawls’s idea of 
primary goods, and they can now also be supported by Scanlon’s moral 
contractualism: what we as reasonable individuals owe each other.   
329. Though Daniels wants to establish the objectivity of health needs, he 
recognizes that health needs are thought of as morally important because of 
the common belief that health is instrumentally necessary to doing anything 
in life or alternatively, in order to avoid pain and suffering.  He dismisses 
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health as being necessary for achieving every goal in life.  It seems obvious 
to Daniels that people can accomplish many other goals without species-
typical functioning.  And he considers the ethical motivations to meeting 
health needs as a way to mitigate pain and suffering as being vulnerable to 
the defects of utilitarianism that places happiness and its maximization as the 
only goal to life.  While not fully rejecting the validity of meeting health needs 
in order to reduce pain or suffering, Daniels argues that he can offer an 
alternative account for meeting health needs that does not largely rely on an 
empirical relationship between meeting health needs and reducing pain and 
suffering.  That is, Daniels wants to build a moral account of what is health, 
why it is important, and what justice requires in relation to it that rejects a 
purely consequentialist and utilitarian philosophy.  And he does so not by 
building an entirely new theory but by extending what he and many others 
consider as the strongest alternative to utilitarianism, namely, Rawls’s theory. 
330. Daniels upholds and further clarifies his original conception of health 
as being the absence of pathology.  Pathology entails the deviation from the 
normal range of natural functional organization of a species, and which 
causes harm.  Based on Boorse’s account of health as the absence of 
disease, Daniels asserts this conception of health to be ‘naturalistic’ or non-
normative, meaning he considers this conception of health to be made up of 
‘biological facts’ which are then overlaid with some value judgement about 
harm.  So it is not simply that a functioning falls outside of the normal range, 
but there must be some aspect of harm consequent from it.   
331. Daniels then identifies six objective ‘health needs’ which roughly 
include adequate nutrition, safe living and working conditions, exercise and 
rest, medical services, non-medical personal and social services, and an 
appropriate distribution of social determinants of health. (Daniels, 2007: pp 
41-42)  He then argues that meeting these needs is necessary in order to 
protect normal functioning which in turn protects access to the fair share of 
the range of life prospects.  Rational individuals, such as those behind 
Rawls’s veil of ignorance, will want to maintain their normal functionings to 
pursue as well as revise their life plans.  Thus, they have a fundamental 
interest in maintaining normal functioning or more accurately, avoiding and 
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mitigating pathology.  In order to protect their access to their fair share of life 
plans, these individuals will seek to satisfy the six objective ‘health needs’ of 
citizens. 
332. After trying to explain the moral importance of health needs, health, 
and its instrumental role in the equality of opportunity to pursue life plans, 
Daniels moves to justify his requirement to protect such equality of 
opportunity by drawing on Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness.  If health is 
the absence of pathology—or the presence of normal functioning—justice 
requires protecting normal functioning as it is an important component of the 
equality of opportunity to achieve a fair share of the range of life plans in a 
given society.  By asserting the objectivity of health needs, and articulating 
their crucial role in a person’s life course, Daniels considers it possible to 
integrate health needs with Rawls’s list of primary goods and distribution 
principles.  It is important to recognize that in advocating for the satisfaction 
of health needs, Daniels transforms Rawls’s equality of fair opportunity 
principle into a principle of careers open to talents, and then that into an all 
encompassing pursuit of a fair share of the normal range of life plans.  
Daniels envisions a thoroughly meritocratic society which Rawls did not 
intend.  (Rawls, 1971: p 105-108; Daniels, 2007: p 54)    
333. This expansion of opportunity from jobs and offices to normal range 
of life plans, Daniels terms the ‘broadening of fair opportunity’.  While he 
recognizes that such a broadening requires altering Rawls’s theory, he 
considers such changes to be defensible.  Indeed, such a broadening of fair 
opportunity to include health needs is considered to give Rawls’s theory more 
power.  While highlighting the role of health in the fair opportunity to achieve 
fair share of life plans, Daniels fully recognizes that other goods, such as 
socio-economic goods are also strategically important.  He sets aside a 
discussion on what variety of other goods could be strategically necessary or 
considered objective needs by stating that his argument rests on a ‘specific 
calculation’ that institutions meeting health needs have a central impact on 
shares of the normal opportunity range and therefore, should be governed by 
the equality opportunity principle. (Daniels, 2007: p56)  
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334. In order to see concretely how Daniels merges his argument for 
health/health needs into primary goods, it is necessary to consider how 
Rawls handles inequalities among individuals.  Rawls identifies two sources 
of inequalities in the lives of individuals, keeping in mind that he assumes 
that all individuals fall within a normal range of physical and mental 
functionings over the life course.  One source is the natural lottery, which 
determines the quality and breadth of psychological and somatic talents and 
skills one is endowed with at birth.  This natural lottery is also thought to 
affect to some extent motivational traits, attitudes, and preferences.3  The 
second source of inequalities is the social lottery which encompasses early 
life conditions determined by family, caste/class, and so forth.  Such early life 
environments are also thought to affect psychological traits such as 
preferences and motivational traits.  Rawls aimed to correct the arbitrary 
disadvantages that arise from the ‘non-chosen’ social malformations of the 
talents and skills a person is born with.  And in recognizing that those with 
naturally lesser talents and skills would be at the bottom of the social 
hierarchy, even after the arbitrary influences had been corrected, he aims to 
ensure that they are as advantaged as possible through the Difference 
Principle.       
335. Neither natural nor social inequalities are deserved by individuals, 
Rawls argued, thus the two distribution principles of justice worked in 
combination to mitigate the consequences of those inequalities while 
ensuring basic social institutions work to the advantage of the worst off.  One 
would ideally like to be born with abundant talents and skills as well as born 
into a family and social environment that is advantageous.  However, Rawls 
uses the Veil of Ignorance to show that the sheer possibility of being born 
into the opposite situation would compel individuals to reason in such a way 
that produces a society implementing his two distribution principles.  Whether 
                                                 
3 This distinction between natural and social sources of inequalities is difficult to 
sustain especially in light of social determinants of health research.  For example, 
Richard Barker’s research connects the impact of a woman’s deprivation on her 
child in-utero and the child’s health later in adult life.  And Pogge rejects the wholly 
random nature of natural talents by pointing to the caste and class influences on 
mating and procreation. Natural endowments are socially affected to some extent. 
 171 
 
individuals would indeed reason in this particular way has been extensively 
questioned in the literature that followed. (Pogge, 1989; Dworkin, 2000) 
336. Daniels builds on Rawls’s analysis of the inequalities arbitrarily 
created by the natural and social lottery by making an analogy between 
pathology and the social lottery.  Just as there is an ethical requirement to 
counter the disadvantages experienced by individuals from their early social 
environment or to balance out the advantages some individuals get from their 
social environment, Daniels argues that there is a requirement to mitigate the 
disadvantages produced by pathology.  While he does not use the term 
‘pathological lottery’, it may be apt to describe his analysis.  Moreover, 
Daniels implies that given the recent research on social determinants of 
health, the analogy between pathology and the social lottery becomes even 
closer.  Pathology in an individual can arise from the social environment—
’including class, gender, race, and ethnic inequalities in various goods’— and 
therefore, any disadvantages that follow are not deserved and should be 
mitigated from affecting a person’s life prospects. (Daniels, 2007: p55) 
337. Importantly, Daniels makes it quite explicit that his analysis of 
mitigating pathology in order to protect equality of opportunity functions in the 
same way as trying to correct for malformed talents as skills.  The aim is to 
put individuals back to the place they would be with respect to their life 
prospects had they not had the pathological condition.  The aims of any and 
all institutions affecting health of individuals, in order of priority, are to 
prevent, restore, rehabilitate, and compensate individuals in regard to 
pathology.  And interestingly, following Rawls, for those individuals where 
there is no possibility of restoring or approximating normal functioning, it is 
not principles of justice that apply but those of compassion and beneficence.  
The health needs of those individuals with severe and unalterable functioning 
constraints and those likely to die prematurely are outside the scope of 
justice.  (Daniels, 2007: p59)   
338. Two important points of Daniels’s analysis must be noted.  First, 
despite making an analogy between the disadvantages of life prospects that 
follow from early social conditions with the consequences of pathology, 
Daniels does not take a clear stand as to when individuals become 
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responsible for their own life prospects and pathology.  There is controversy 
as to why Rawls speaks about the necessity of individuals to take full 
responsibility for their preferences given that it is impossible to distinguish 
what part of those preferences are formed by nature, early social 
environment, and free choice.  Any claims for resources or primary goods 
beyond those allocated that can be traced back to preferences are not likely 
to be recognized in a Rawlsian system.  Daniels, however, readily admits his 
silence on the role of individual responsibility for one’s normal functioning.  
Despite the multiple causal factors that determine species typical 
functioning—genetic endowment, conversion skills, exposure to material 
goods, and social environment, individual choices—Daniels is silent about 
what justice requires in relation to the different types of causes of constraints 
on normal functionings.     
339. Because social determinants are increasingly recognized as 
influencing species-typical functioning, Daniels finds it justifiable to continue 
with the focus on claims to normal functioning irrespective of the causes of 
constraints.  That is, while individuals in a Rawlsian society must self-
regulate their preferences in order to ensure that their resource requirements 
fall within their entitlements, Daniels does not hold individuals responsible for 
how frequently or large are the amounts of resources required to bring 
people back into the normal range of functioning.  For example, a skier can 
repeatedly draw on resources to mend broken bones.  And his claim cannot 
be evaluated based on his particular chosen life being largely made up of 
skiing.  Rather, the claims to resources are evaluated in relation to his fair 
share of the normal range of life plans in the society. But they are not 
unlimited claims.  Daniels expects that limits on the amount of resources 
individuals will be able to actually get will be decided through public 
deliberation using his benchmarks of fairness.  Nevertheless, the role of 
volitional behaviours (agency/responsibility/ preferences) influencing the 
causal pathways to health functionings is morally ambiguous in Daniels’s 
theory. 
340. As previously stated, Daniels began revising his initial argument for 
two reasons.  First, his initial framework for assessing health needs based on 
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their effects on opportunity did not provide sufficient guidance in the 
allocation of healthcare resources.  Other philosophers and the public 
disagreed with his analysis that the most reasonable way to allocate 
resources is according to effects on opportunity.  From this, Daniels derived 
the lesson that reasonable people disagree on the proper reasons for 
allocating healthcare, and so there must be a fair process to determine such 
an allocation.  So Daniels embarked on identifying criteria for public 
deliberations that could be added to his initial social justice framework.  
Meanwhile, Daniels also became exposed to research on the social 
determinants of health.  This challenged his previous understanding of health 
needs as being satisfied by healthcare institutions, even broadly construed 
as including clinical and public health.  But rather than undermining his 
argument, Daniels perceives that a fair or just distribution of these social 
determinants approximates a Rawlsian just society.  That is, his extension of 
Rawlsian justice would not only justly distribute healthcare, but can also be 
seen to be justly distributing things that are being talked about in the social 
determinants of health research.  Thus, he argues that ‘justice is good for our 
health’ meaning that a scheme of Rawlsian justice will also improve overall 
levels of health in a population as well as relative inequalities in health. 
341. In order to see how Daniels distributes the social determinants of 
health, it is helpful to see how he initially introduces the concept of social 
determinants of health.  Daniels states that in societies throughout the world 
there is a socio-economic gradient in health.  That is, the higher ranking 
social groups in a population usually have better health, or normal 
functionings.  While it may seem logical to see gross poverty in developing 
countries as the cause of such a socio-economic gradient in health, such a 
health gradient also exists in developed countries.  So, Daniels argues, there 
must be a link between the socio-economic gradient and the health gradient 
in populations.  Aside from just this socio-economic gradient, there are also 
visible differences or inequalities in health functionings across various social 
groups defined by race, ethnicity or sex.  Such differences exist even after 
controlling for income, education or access to health insurance which means 
that something about the group characteristics is correlated or causing the 
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health inequalities rather than healthcare, individual choice, or material 
poverty.  Given these two observations about the gradient and social group 
inequalities in health within societies, Daniels refers to a range of empirical 
research findings on the social causes of health inequalities.   
342. While Daniels seems to be aware of much of the broad range of 
research on social determinants, he links such research to Rawls’s theory by 
transfiguring the breadth of social determinants into Rawlsian primary goods.  
So, for instance, health and social capital research points to the level of 
political participation, as one social determinant.  Daniels translates this into 
the primary good of political liberties.  Other social determinants such as level 
of education, day care and early childhood programs, social inclusion of 
persons with disabilities, level of healthcare, and workplace conditions are 
categorized as part of the equality of opportunity and social basis of self 
respect primary goods.  After finding it possible and justifiable to transform 
what are currently identified as social determinants of health into primary 
goods, Daniels then considers their distribution.  He evaluates how the 
Rawlsian distribution of these social determinant-primary goods will improve 
overall health of populations as well as produce just health inequalities.  His 
two main conclusions are that as a Rawlsian system of justice morally 
requires improving the shares of the worst off in any society from where they 
are now, a Rawlsian scheme will certainly improve the absolute levels of 
health of the worst off.  And second, if it turns out that the income inequality 
thesis is indeed true, the ‘flattening’ of the socio-economic gradient from the 
two Rawlsian principles, based on certain empirical assumptions, means that 
there will be improved overall health and less relative health inequality. 
343. Because Rawls did not originally have in mind as Daniels does that 
health differences are morally important inequalities across individuals, 
Daniels expects that there will be conflicts or tradeoffs required by Rawls’s 
two principles of justice.  In the first instance, there is seen to be no conflict 
between highest equal political liberties and addressing health inequalities.  
And given that addressing health needs is part of the equality of opportunity 
good, it is not considered to be in conflict with the second part of the second 
principle.  Of course, with there is still ambiguity over how to rank one kind of 
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equality of opportunity measure against another.  Daniels expects that to be 
dealt with through the reasonable decision making process.   
344. Daniels does identify a possible real conflict between allowable 
socio-economic inequalities, previously geared to the advantage of the worst 
off, and distributing various social determinants of health.  That is, the 
Difference Principle allows rising inequality in income and wealth if the 
shares of the worst off are also improving.  However, social determinants 
research seems to show that rising income inequality affects health 
inequalities and thus, equality of opportunity.  The trade-off seems to be 
more income for less health/equality of opportunity for the worst off.  Indeed, 
the primary good of the social bases of self-respect should constrain the 
income inequality that would affect the psychological aspects of self-respect.  
And thus, income inequalities would probably be severely constrained in the 
first place, prior to their possible influence on psycho-biological pathways to 
health impairments.  That is assuming, however, that the social basis of self-
respect is a parallel concept to the psycho-social factors implicated in the 
income inequality and health inequality research.  For example, if Rawls’s 
social bases of self respect are unrelated to Wilkinson’s references to envy or 
anxiety related to income inequality, then there indeed may be a conflict 
between health achievements and allowable socio-economic inequalities.  
That is, even thought Rawls disallows envy in his theory, empirical research 
shows that ‘status anxiety’ has a causal role in premature mortality and 
chronic impairments. 
345. There is another possible conflict between Rawlsian principles and 
Daniels’s extension.  Improving the socio-economic share of the worst off can 
put their health at risk.  The worse off may choose to pursue opportunities 
that makes their socio-economic situation better but at the cost of risking their 
health functioning.  Mining, road construction, or working on an oil rig are 
jobs that often pay better because of the higher physical risks involved.  
Daniels worries that refusing to allow individuals to risk their health in order to 
acquire other goods, where conditions of choice are free and fair, can be 
unjustifiably paternalistic.  He suggests the pragmatic solution is to accept 
that justice will be rough, and it will not ensure the removal of all health 
 176 
 
inequalities.  Moreover, Daniels suggests that another avenue for resolving 
uncertainties in how the Rawlsian system distributes social determinants is to 
pursue deliberative democratic reasoning. 
346. As the second part of his revision, Daniels puts forward ‘benchmarks 
for fairness’ or accountability for reasonableness in decision making about 
health issues.  It seems fairly clear that these benchmarks for fairness are 
geared towards health resource allocation decisions within the traditional 
healthcare sector.  Importantly, the benchmarks for fairness are really about 
the fairness of processes that ration or set limits to resource claims.  They 
are not about the precautionary principle in public health, scientific objectivity 
of determinants of health, double-checks about justness of residual health 
inequalities, and so forth.  The four criteria he identifies for a fair process of 
deliberation include publicity, relevance of reasons, mechanism for revisions 
and appeals, and voluntary or required regulations to ensure the other three 
benchmarks are followed. Daniels considers his benchmarks to be applicable 
to both public and private organizations as well as for medical services, 
public health, and other non-health sector decision making impacting health.   
347. The reasons for these benchmarks, Daniels writes, is that reasonable 
people disagree on how to set limits, and the general principles of justice, 
specifically those provided by a Rawlsian analysis, do not resolve these 
controversies.  The particular rationing problems Daniels identifies include 
whether to allocate resources to those individuals that are worst off in terms 
of their health condition, or those who will likely have the best outcomes as a 
result of deploying healthcare?  Or, should healthcare be allocated to 
maximize overall health of a group or population or should it allocate it 
according to other principles?  Should finite resources go to helping many or 
to a few?  Daniels contends that the equality of opportunity principle does not 
tell us whether to allocate money and resources to those which will produce 
best outcomes, most overall benefits, or make use of fair, weighted chance 
lotteries.  While he suggests that there is great value in taking a case by case 
approach and building up a set of fine-grain set up principles, in the short to 
medium-term, he reasons that identifying a fair-process of decision making is 
necessary and best way forward. 
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348. Daniels takes the position that there is a priority for prevention.  And 
the priority of providing treatment, meaning restoring individuals to normal 
functioning, over enhancement, meaning improving someone’s functioning 
that is already within the normal range.  The difference between treatment 
and enhancement for Daniels lies in the pathology of the condition.  There 
has to be an ‘objectively ascribable need for the prevention or treatment of 
significant pathology’. (Daniels, 2007: p 166, pp 30-55)  Importantly, Daniels 
compares the motivation to enhance one’s health functionings as expressing 
one’s preferences.  Given that Rawls and Daniels will not compensate 
directly for the ‘natural distribution’ of personal features, it is the individual’s 
responsibility to rethink their goals, to adjust their conception of the good in 
light of their given personal features and the set of primary goods that they 
are guaranteed.  Strangely, if the individual suffers significant psychological 
distress from being unable to adjust their preferences then they would have 
claims to psychological care to deal with their frustration.  Thus, a person’s 
fair share of a range of life prospects is significantly determined not only by 
the nature of the equality of opportunity and other primary goods relative to a 
given society, but also by their initial natural endowment. 
349. In Daniels’s revised argument, and especially the expanded 
discussion in the draft monograph, he attempts to address a number of far 
reaching critiques and weakness of his previous argument. (Daniels, 2007)  
The most important of the weaknesses was that he simply extended Rawls’s 
theory which meant that if Rawls’s theory is fatally flawed then his extension 
would also fall.  He handles the complete dependency on Rawls’s theory in a 
fairly odd way.  Despite the fact that the bulk of the monograph and his main 
argument discusses how health is bound up in the justification for the equality 
of opportunity principle in Rawls’s theory, how a Rawlsian just society 
distributes social determinants of health fairly, and how his four principles are 
derived from some characteristics of Rawlsian ‘well-ordered society’ he 
nevertheless, repeatedly attempts to distance himself from Rawls.  He is not 
defending Rawls’s theory, he says, he is just showing one example of how a 
theory of justice could handle health needs.   
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350. While substantially relying on a Rawlsian analysis of objective needs 
as primary goods, Daniels also attempts to buttress his argument by drawing 
on other theories.  He draws on Scanlon’s arguments for objective needs of 
well-being that can be claims for assistance made by reasonable people on 
each other.  And interestingly, Daniels also attempts to show a convergence 
between his argument for the equality of opportunity and the two most 
prominent alternatives to Rawls’s theory.  He writes that the CA is different 
only in terminology and indeed, supports the same idea of opportunity.  And, 
Daniels writes, while those advocating the equal opportunities for welfare 
approach disagree with Rawls on whether to directly compensate for natural 
differences in talents and skills, they do not disagree on whether to address 
the disadvantages that result from disease or disability.  They just do not 
want to privilege the disadvantages from disease and disability over 
inequalities in talents and skills.  So, on the one hand, Daniels distances 
himself from Rawls by stating that he is not defending it as a theory.  On the 
other hand, he tries to show how his argument thoroughly works within it, 
while also showing how other approaches also have enough in common with 
Rawlsian conception equality of opportunity.   
351. Section III: Daniels’s theory versus the CH. 
352. The CH argument is different both in terms of avoiding the 
weaknesses of Daniels’s argument as well as in having independent 
strengths.  Daniels’s argument may initially seem quite similar to an 
argument for a CH.  It is true that early CA put forward arguments to replace 
Rawlsian primary goods with capabilities while generally agreeing with the 
rest of Rawls’s theory.  And it may seem that the present argument for CH is 
quite similar to Daniels’s as he also discusses the social determinants of 
health.  Moreover, it may seem that Daniels is making a similar cosmopolitan 
argument because he now discusses health issues in developing countries, 
human rights, and the right to health.  While meaningful and subtle 
differences can be shown in regard to each of these aspects, the CH 
argument differs fundamentally in that it is internally more coherent, while 
Daniels’s argument is a piecing together of what has been previously left out 
and opportunistic for trying to frame it as full, global theory of health justice.  
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In specific, Daniels notion of objective health needs is flawed for asserting 
that a coherent definition of health is ‘scientifically objective,’ and for 
identifying six health ‘needs’ that are not grounded in any epidemiological 
theory or research.  Perhaps, most importantly, Daniels profoundly 
misunderstands the social determinants of health research by transforming 
them into primary goods or resources to be distributed.  And indicative of the 
ad hoc nature of the theory, he remains silent regarding how social 
determinants have influence across national borders, and how that raises 
issues of both rights and duties across societies.  Daniels presents this as a 
challenge to his readers rather than as a fundamental shortcoming of his 
theory.  Given that threats to health cross national borders, and the greater 
connectedness between individuals across the world, the inability to have a 
thoroughly global approach is a fundamental weakness of a ‘full’ theory of 
health justice. 
353. Second, Daniels incorporates the recent research on social 
determinants of health into his argument in a very superficial and crude way.  
It was quite a glaring error to build an entire theory about health and only 
recognize healthcare as the primary determinant.  It showed an inadequate 
understanding of the determinants of health, and unfortunately, it still remains 
inadequate.  In the revised theory, health is now determined by healthcare 
broadly construed plus ‘inter-sectoral’ social determinants.  But his list of six 
health needs/healthcare now including social determinants, is not grounded 
in epidemiology theory of causation or distribution.  Simply adding social 
determinants to the health needs list does not reflect the monumental 
debates occurring in the field of epidemiology regarding what can and cannot 
be considered a scientific cause of  disease, or constraints on health 
functioning.  And adding social determinants at the end of the list actually 
repeats some of the items on the list showing an inadequate understanding 
of the level or scale of social determinants.  For example including adequate 
nutrition and safe working environment as needs along with social 
determinants as a need does not fully appreciate the ‘general thesis’ of social 
determinants research while the other needs are specific causes.  Adding 
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‘the right distribution of social determinants’ to the end of the list of health 
needs from his previous theory is akin to writing ‘and social justice’. 
354. Though Daniels has cooperated with social epidemiologists, he does 
not either fully recognize or want to identify social determinants as deep 
sociological processes.  Instead, he wants to translate them into goods or 
services that can be provided to people.  This translation of deep sociological 
processes into primary goods/resources is not convincing.  Furthermore, 
Daniels does not distinguish between or evaluate the various ‘schools’ of 
social determinants research. (Kawachi et al., 2004)  He picks and chooses 
between the various theories and finds that some of the determinants match 
the list of primary goods.  Social determinants research is quite nascent.  It 
has so far been productive in identifying the distribution patterns of health 
inequalities, but there is still much work to be done on the causal pathways. 
(Berkman et al., 2000; Berkman, 2004)  Is it psycho-social pathways, is it 
social support, is it the political economy, or is it all of them?  Can one model 
be able to incorporate all of them?   
355. And importantly, in selectively picking from the variety of proposed 
determinants, Daniels skips over discussing the important distinction in the 
causal pathways between social determinants of health of a group versus an 
individual.  Without an identifiable link between the health properties of a 
group and an individual, Daniels seems to be making arguments for group 
justice rather than arguing for a theory where individuals are primary moral 
agents.  He argues that a population has been treated badly if its overall 
health is worse than it could have been under another policy.  How a 
‘population perspective’ and a Rawlsian system can go together is not fully 
defended, especially as Rawls was motivated to counter utilitarian reasoning.  
No individual can make a direct claim with regard to social determinants 
affecting their health as the social pathways to impairments are identified in 
aggregate statistics, not in the case of particular individuals.  Health 
inequalities become unjust only at the population level, not at the individual 
level.     
356. In contrast, the CH argument builds up from the individual and 
argues for the importance of some central human functionings.  For a person 
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to be healthy over the life course, they should be able to achieve various 
biological and mental functionings as well as agency functionings.  That is, 
aside from their somatic functionings, they need to be able to have control 
over their body and behaviour.  Such autonomy and agency is not only 
strategically important in order to protect and promote one’s biological and 
mental functionings, it is intrinsically valuable for self-respect, dignity, or self-
worth.  Though healthcare is necessary to promote and protect health 
functionings in acute situations, it is the agency functionings over the life 
course that directly and indirectly have more effects on the biological and 
mental functionings of the individuals.  Social determinants research shows 
that such agency functionings are indirectly related to health functionings 
through psycho-immunological pathways to impairments.  That is, constraints 
on autonomy and agency can be a direct threat to health functionings such 
as through physical violence, while stress resulting from frustration of efforts 
to realize one’s intentions and life plans can produce impairments through 
psycho-immunological pathways.   
357. It is a profound misunderstanding to imagine that a CA is simply 
trying to provide the same resources according to a different calculus.  It is 
through examining the importance of autonomy and agency in the protection 
and promotion of health functionings throughout the life course that it 
becomes apparent how the CH envisions individuals as active participants in 
the pursuit of their life plans.  The CH of any individual must be evaluated in 
relation to their individual endowment and specific material and social 
environment.  More importantly, the active self-realization of agency or 
autonomy in pursuing health functionings or other goals is important in 
improving health of individuals.  Protecting one’s reproductive and sexual 
health as a woman in a developing country or protecting oneself from an 
infectious disease epidemic in a rich country requires active, vigilant 
engagement with the immediate determinants of one’s health over the life 
course.  It is an actor-centred approach rather than the recipient centred 
approach that Daniels envisions.      
358. In contrast to Daniels’s use of species-typical functioning, the CH 
argument rests on a coherent definition of health.  Health is based on 
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identifying various biological and mental as well as agency functionings as 
being intrinsically valuable and instrumentally valuable to pursue one’s life 
plans in the current global society.  It is a normative notion that is based on a 
cosmopolitan outlook that expects a minimum level of health functionings 
while also expecting there to be socially relative differences.  But socially 
relative does not mean restricted to the nation-state.  Socially relative can 
also mean relative to global society.  Such an analysis is initially based on 
the outlook of physicians practicing medicine in globally cosmopolitan cities. 
Such cosmopolitan physicians recognize that the human species has 
particular characteristics in order to be able to recognize the being that 
comes into the office as a member of the human species.  But the health of a 
given person is assessed based on whether there is any presence of 
impairments as well as how capable the individual is to pursue their goals in 
light of a variety of personal features and choices.  A person is compared to 
their age, sex, and race/ethnic group but also with their own goals.  Whether 
the person’s measurements fit on the normal distribution curve for the 
species useless and the comparison with the country’s population is a 
superficial and preliminary guide especially given the time lag between when 
the chart was created and the diversity of new members entering the 
population.     
359. The capability to healthy argument also makes use of a theory of 
causation and distribution of health functionings.  Daniels uses a list of needs 
such as nutrition, exercise, clinical services and social determinants.  In 
contrast, the CH clearly sets out to model the range of causal factors of 
health functionings, not just impairments.  The CH has descriptive power in 
explaining health inequalities by modelling the combined effects of the 
endowment, conversion skills, exposure to material goods, social factors, and 
individual choices.  Social determinants research can be incorporated in the 
model according to their influence on the range of causal components of the 
CH.  And importantly, the model posits the CH as a dynamic process that is 
continually changing over the life course.  Justice does not give individuals 
social determinants but ensures that individuals have capability through 
justifiably influencing the social basis of each causal component.   
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360. The CH has normative power through the argument that individuals 
have a moral entitlement to social basis of the CH.  Such an entitlement 
arises out of the equal moral worth and dignity of every individual.  This 
means that justice requires supporting central human capabilities and 
functionings through affecting genetic endowment, material/social conditions, 
and behaviour.  The extent of interventions into each of those arenas will 
depend on a range of factors including specific knowledge of the 
determinants, respect for choice, resources requirements, and public 
deliberations.  In some instances, such as with children and individuals with 
limited agency, there may be more basis for intervening.  In contrast, Daniels 
is mainly concerned with the inside and outside of health sector demarcation, 
and establishing the principles for reasonable and accountable deliberation 
on the distribution of healthcare resources.  The CA has no bias towards the 
health sector, and indeed, recognizes that health functionings over the life 
course are determined more by the social and material conditions outside the 
health sector.   The CA has always recognized the social determinants of 
health, and now through the causal model of a CH, it may be able to show 
how a capability analysis might be useful in integrating various empirical 
social determinants research.   
361. Two final points about the CH argument.  First, it remains to be seen 
to what extent public deliberation will play a role in a system of capabilities.  
What is clear however, is that public deliberation is not a result of the CA’s 
inability to guide decisions but because it considers such deliberation central 
to social justice.  In comparison, Daniels’s arguments repeatedly rely on 
public deliberation whenever the theory is insufficient.  His theory of health 
justice, in the end, does not assist in deciding which health issue to address 
first, second, or last.  Instead, Daniels defers to a reasoned public debate.  
Daniels’s theory also does not assist in deciding how to address health 
inequalities between groups.  Despite distributing social determinants justly, 
in applying his principles to real world health issues, Daniels’s argument 
cannot identify how to choose between improving the health of certain 
historically disadvantaged groups, or residual inequalities among groups, or 
any other offensive correlations.  Instead, once again, public deliberation will 
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decide.  Moreover, Daniels also expects there to be public deliberation 
whenever there is controversy as to whether a particular deviation from the 
normal range of functioning is harmful or not.  He writes that his theory is as 
strong as the current practice of the biological science’s understandings of 
pathology.   
362. The CH has the advantage of both arguing for a level of health 
functionings across the human species as well as being grounded in social 
reality.  That is, as Sen argues, the CA does not need to construct a 
comprehensive and perfect set of social conditions in order to evaluate the 
justness of particular situations.  Both version of the CA identify quite 
immediately where and how the capabilities of individuals are being 
constrained.  Importantly, Sen explicitly recognizes the multi-dimensionality 
of achieving equity in health capabilities across individuals.  One person’s 
health functioning may be more constrained than another because they have 
less money, have a second health constraint, and so forth.  Daniels, despite 
using Rawls’s distributional principles that explicitly articulate priorities, 
nevertheless, is faced with ambiguities about how to make tradeoffs once 
health needs are introduced.  Primary goods should be a clear indication of 
how individuals are doing.  But Daniels introduces inequalities that cut across 
the primary goods.  While the CA has consistently identified the multi-
dimensionality within and across capabilities, Daniels resorts to saying that 
public deliberation will have to decide how to make those tradeoffs.  The 
clarity and simplicity of an objective list of primary goods, and their 
distribution principles seem to be undermined and unstable if public 
deliberation has to be repeatedly invoked in order to make decisions. 
363. Lastly, the CA addresses the aggregation problem in two ways.  
Nussbaum clearly states that there are to be no tradeoffs between the ten 
central capabilities or across individuals with respect to those capabilities.  
They are pre-political entitlements such as basic constitutional rights.  Similar 
to how these constitutional rights are not traded-off, neither can the basic 
capabilities.  Sen, on the other hand, because he does not identify any 
minimal capabilities, has simply said that tradeoffs will happen.  But in light of 
his argument that there does not necessarily need to be a comprehensive 
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theory of justice identifying principles for aggregation, a ‘comparative theory’ 
could easily identify where and how to make a trade off in a particular 
situation.  And his discussions on incompletely theorized agreements go 
some way towards identifying how to make aggregative decisions when there 
is reasonable disagreement.  Neither Nussbaum nor Sen, however, seem to 
be so hard set in trying to identify a procedure to decide how to ration 
resources.  Daniels, who is keenly aware that the United States spends the 
most on healthcare with little improvements in health, is greatly concerned 
with the need to set limits and to ration resources.  The CH, because it is 
concerned with addressing the material and social environments determining 
individual capabilities, is less directly concerned with how to distribute 
expensive medical care.  Whether the CH can address healthcare rationing 
decisions in rich countries remains to be explored. (Anand, 2005; Anand et 
al., 2005)  The potential seems to exist as CA has been applied to other 
issues in developed countries such as unemployment and social exclusion.   
364. In summary, what a CH argument accomplishes is that it establishes 
a coherent conception of health, sets up a framework to evaluate the 
determinants, distribution, and consequences of health functionings, 
emphasizes the self-realization of rights/capabilities over the life course, and 
identifies universal entitlements to basic health functionings for every human 
being.  At this point, it does not offer case studies as does Daniels, nor has it 
been applied to particular problems such as aging populations, women’s 
health, or HIV/AIDS.  However, the CA and CH argument comes out 
empirical research on acute and endemic malnutrition.  And both Sen and 
Nussbaum consistently ground their reasoning in empirical research and 
personal narratives of individuals.  And the nascent but growing research 
such as by Alkire and others document real-world application of the CA.  
There is enormous potential for conducting empirical research on the CH to 
show its strengths. 
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Chapter 7: Group Capabilities 
 
 
 
365. The CA takes as its starting point that the individual human being is 
the primary agent of justice.  Such an approach is distinct from other 
approaches to social justice which start with a conception of community, or 
the nation-state when thinking about global justice. (Walzer, 1983; Kymlicka, 
1989; Taylor, 1992; Sandel, 1996; Rawls, 1999)  Furthermore, even though 
many liberal theories purport to begin with the individual as the moral agent, 
they implicitly assume insiders and outsiders; thus, they start with a group 
prior to reasoning about justice and individual moral agents. (Sen, 2005; 
Nussbaum, 2006)  The CA unequivocally begins with the individual, though, 
as discussed in Part Two, it also differentiates itself from other liberal theories 
that focus on distributing resources to individuals or increasing their welfare.  
The CA strives to avoid the inequalities across individuals that can result 
from the aggregate analysis used by utilitarians.  And it also strives to avoid 
the inequalities that arise under resource theories when individual needs for 
goods and social conditions fall outside their standard set of entitlements.  
One reason resource theories have limits on claims is to restrict individuals 
from draining social resources beyond a point where they threaten the 
continued social production of resources.   
366. In comparison, because the CA is exclusively focused on individual 
capabilities, or guaranteeing a minimum set of CHCs, the CA appears to 
avoid aggregate analysis within or across individuals.  It does not presuppose 
the maximization of capabilities or that there will be a need to put caps on 
per-person resource expenditures.  However, the CA almost certainly cannot 
avoid the puzzle of aggregating capabilities within and across individuals as it 
is a practical issue central to implementation.  At the same time, the CA also 
cannot continue to avoid recognizing group capabilities.  Group capabilities 
initially seem to be an abhorrent concept to anyone espousing the CA.  For 
example, the CA vehemently rejects the utilitarian treatment of aggregate 
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social welfare as if it was the welfare of a ‘super-person’.  Yet, certain kinds 
of health phenomena and their underlying sociological processes cannot be 
disaggregated to individual agents thus suggesting the notion of group or 
‘population health’.  As it is recognizable that some populations and sub-
populations are healthy while others less so, it seems there is a need to 
integrate such a population health notion into the CA through the idea of a 
group capability and group CH.   
367. Population health presents interesting challenges for any ethical 
approach or theory, including the CA, which focuses on the individual as the 
primary agent of justice.  The CA is premised on normative individualism and 
recognizes group or social phenomena only through their influence on 
individual capabilities and the expression of certain capabilities.  That is, 
social phenomena enter capabilities analysis through the social basis of the 
causal components of individual capabilities.  And sociability of the human 
animal is expressed in the specific content of capabilities such as some of 
Nussbaum’s CHCs.  But society or groups are never considered as entities 
with independent ethical status alongside individuals.     
368. It may be of no consequence to refer to group capabilities in 
descriptive analysis.  A group of individuals can be said to exhibit a certain 
kind of capability or be constrained in a particular way.  The Senian capability 
device, for example, can be applied to any sort of capability and indeed, one 
which belongs to an individual or a group.  The idea of group capability 
presents a problem only in the normative realm when ascribing ethical status 
and entitlements to capabilities.  Prominent among the worries is the 
possibility of a conflict between group and individual capabilities.  The 
shadow of the violence that can be perpetrated and justified by utilitarianism 
in the name of aggregate welfare looms large for the CA.  The puzzle is 
whether conceptualizing a group capability is possible without it ever being 
the justification for restricting or ignoring the capabilities of individuals.   
369. A full discussion of group capabilities is not possible presently but a 
few points in specific relation to health capabilities are put forward.  Given the 
central concern for the individual health in the CA, and obviously the CH, the 
present chapter explores the relationship between individual health and 
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population health.  Geoffrey Rose argued for recognizing the important 
difference in addressing the cause of impairments in individuals versus the 
causes of the incidence rate of the impairment in the population. (Rose, 
1985)   A discussion follows on whether social determinants of such 
incidence rates can be addressed as public goods or are indeed, group 
features.  Though clearly not a thorough analysis, the brief discussion on 
groups and health aims to present some material to motivate CA advocates 
to explore the possibility and implications of recognizing group capabilities, 
particularly in relation to the CH. 
370. Section I:  health and collective action problems  
371. In contrast to the social contract tradition which conceives of 
individuals as being purely self interested and seeking mutual advantage, 
Nussbaum emphasizes that the CA sees social cooperation as being made 
possible through individuals conceiving their good as having shared ends.  
The incorporation of the pursuit of the good by others into one’s own 
conception of the good is what defines interdependence, fellowship, and 
sociability of human beings.  However, the conception of individuals as self-
interested actors has been longstanding, compelling, and pervasive.  It 
motivates a variety of explorations into the types of problems such a 
conception of persons creates for social cooperation.  Such examination of 
the implications of a self-interested individual can be seen in political 
philosophy as well as in economics which considers problems of collective 
action and cooperative conflicts.   
372. Until fairly recently, the social or collective action aspect of human 
health functionings has been largely obfuscated by the general perception 
that health is an individual level phenomenon.  It must be recalled that the 
most prominent model of health causation focuses on individual-level factors 
of genetic endowment, exposure to hazardous materials, and behaviours.  
This is not to say that health and social cooperation problems have not been 
considered at all.  The influence of economics in the practice of public health 
has motivated the framing of some health issues as collective action 
problems, public goods, or externalities.  For example, in the study of 
population growth, fertility decisions are often framed as being made by self-
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interested individuals causing burdens on aggregate welfare.  Or healthcare 
expenditures are analyzed in reference to ‘moral-hazards’ or self-interested 
individuals unfairly or deceptively taking advantage of group resources.  In 
these types of situations, instead of an individual’s good seen as being partly 
constituted by another achieving their conception of the good, certain self-
interested individuals are seen to be violating the principle of mutual 
advantage that underpins social cooperation between individuals.   
373. The collective action or group-level problems in the health sphere 
have become more pronounced recently in light of at least two phenomena.  
First, the rise of new and resurgent infectious diseases has made it 
abundantly clear that the mortality of human beings is a function of the 
interactions between individuals within and across national borders.  In its 
clearest example, the transmission of infection from one individual to another 
is a social phenomenon.  But it is also clear that the social environment in 
which individuals are situated also determines their biological vulnerability to 
infectious diseases as well as their ability to mitigate their vulnerability.  The 
second collective action aspect of health is reflected in the growing corpus of 
epidemiological research that identifies social processes as determinants of 
health functionings.  That is, social processes not only determine the material 
exposure to harmful or necessary goods affecting health functionings; a 
variety of non-material social conditions’ influence on individual agency, 
autonomy, dignity, and other psychological experiences influence a person’s 
health functionings over the life course.  This was discussed in Chapter 2. 
374. Despite being a great achievement, the recognition of group-level or 
social causes of health constraints in individuals poses a problem for a theory 
propounding normative individualism.  Based on aggregate analysis, it is 
possible to identify the social cause of the incidence rate of impairments in a 
population.  But it may be impossible to connect a social determinant to a 
particular impairment in a particular individual.  At the individual level, the 
scope of ethical claims would be limited as it would only be possible to 
identify the proximate biological and material causes of the impairment.  A 
specific individual could not make a claim for protection against social 
determinants because it is not possible at present, if ever, to establish a 
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meaningful chain of causation between a social determinant and individual 
impairment.  Thus, the claim would only be to the mitigation of the 
consequences of impairments, if that is possible.  Thus, the normative 
individualist is faced with a dilemma of being able to affect the social 
determinant or cause at the population level for the benefit of unspecified 
individuals.  But does doing something in the interests of unspecified 
individuals constitute recognizing a group?  Utilitarians would see no problem 
here as influencing the social determinant would increase the aggregate 
welfare of the group, even if benefits could not be traced to particular 
individuals.  But normative individualists have a significant problem because 
there is no clear causal pathway between structure and the agent. 
375. An economist might immediately frame this as a public goods issue.  
A public good is a good that no single individual can consume exclusively, 
and the amount of the good does not decrease from being consumed.  For 
example, draining a malaria infested swamp next to a community of 
individuals would be considered providing a public good.  Draining the 
swamp in order to benefit one individual could not exclude its benefits to 
others.  And the benefit to one individual does not decrease the amount of 
the good.  Seen from the perspective of the CA, providing such a public good 
supports the health capabilities and functionings or CH of individuals living 
next to the drained swamp.  Such an effort is considered to be focused on 
individual capabilities because it is addressing the material, social basis of 
each person’s health capability.  We know that a mosquito bite is likely part of 
the causal chain that leads to an individual being impaired by malaria.  Thus, 
based on the knowledge of the causal pathway, the public good is provided 
in order to support the capabilities of individuals living within the community. 
376. However, when the cause of the impairment are social conditions 
which induce psychological experiences such as humiliation or stress which 
then lead to health impairments, it is hard to separate out the public good 
from the intrinsic features of the population.  The malarial swamp as a 
physical feature and the social conditions of inequality are not equivalent in a 
way that both can be addressed through the public goods framework.  
Material conditions may be more amenable to be assessed as public goods, 
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while social processes need to be recognized as group features.  Take 
another example.  Protecting the CH of individuals could be the basis of 
programs to help individuals quit smoking, a widely recognized cause of lung 
cancer.  However, helping one individual at a time to stop smoking, according 
to the each person’s capability as an end principle, would not necessarily 
stop new individuals from beginning to smoke.  The causes which initiate 
individuals into smoking continue to function in the surrounding social 
environment.  The same applies to other behaviours such as poor nutrition, 
or excessive drinking.  In order to intervene at the level of supra-individual 
influences on individual behaviour, such as culture, social norms, 
neighbourhood effects, and so forth we would have to acknowledge that 
individuals are not fully autonomous but partly or significantly formed by 
social practices.  What ethical status do these supra-individual influences, 
which cannot be ascribed to any individual agent, but yet significantly 
influence individual capabilities have in the CA?  It is insufficient to think of 
social conditions or influences on individual capabilities as simply being the 
combined actions of other individuals.  Recognizing sociological processes 
would seem to indicate the existence of an entity called society or group.           
377. Indeed, recognizing the causal factor of constraints on individual 
health capability may require recognizing groups.  When comparing different 
possible causal factors of a chronic impairment among individuals within a 
population, individual genetic differences are often statistically significant 
factors of causation.  In the CA, such genetic bases of a health constraint 
would be the basis for providing social support.  Interestingly, however, when 
comparing two significantly different populations with different prevalence 
levels of the same chronic impairment, individual genetic differences are 
replaced by population characteristics as important causal factors.  For 
example, individual genetic differences may be identified as significant 
causes or risk-factors for the high prevalence of heart disease in residents of 
Finland.  But when comparing the causes of heart disease in the populations 
of Finland versus Japan, the average intake of fat and high cholesterol levels 
appear as significant factors.  Because fat intake is high for most individuals 
in Finland, it does not appear as a statistically significant causal factor within 
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the Finnish population.  Thus, the only real differences between those with 
and without high cholesterol and heart disease within Finland are individual 
genetic differences.  The upshot of this is that the methodology of identifying 
causal factors of health functionings in individuals can involve comparing 
groups, and not necessarily individuals. 
378. Changing the mean level of exposure of the entire group would mean 
an intervention to change a feature affecting the aggregate capabilities of the 
group for the long-term, even generations.  Thus, despite specific individuals 
benefiting in differing amounts from an intervention or policy at a particular 
time, the primary beneficiary is actually the group.  By changing the group 
feature, the collective health capability is improved and kept above a 
threshold even as people pass through it by birth and death.  So now, even 
draining the swamp looks different from this perspective.  It cannot be simply 
thought that the CH of a large group of individuals is improved because of the 
features of a public good, and its efficiency.  Rather, the policy also improves 
the collective CH of the community in that location, irrespective of which 
individual is there currently or will pass through in the future.  Changing social 
conditions, whether they are material conditions or social processes, which 
are aimed to outlast specific individuals are really efforts at changing the 
features of groups, and thus, group capabilities. 
379. Addressing the cause of any impairment in an individual across the 
range of causal components is distinct from addressing the incidence rate of 
the impairment in the population.  The reach of the CH causal model in 
explaining how social determinants that have influence through psycho-
biological pathways and their varied effects across socio-economic groups 
are yet to be explored.  It seems easy to fall into thinking of a population as a 
‘super-person’ and explore social policies that can improve the super-
person’s ‘population health’ or capability.  Difficult ethical questions follow 
from giving a population its own ethical status, and from making decisions 
using aggregate analysis.  But it is hard to deny that individual health and 
population health are two distinct, inter-related phenomena.   
380.  Section II: Aggregation 
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381. It is familiar in political philosophy or economics to see groups as 
simply the aggregation of individuals, and the problem that follows from that 
tends to be about choosing between efficiency and equity.  At the same time, 
debates following Rawls’s distribution principles have focused on whether 
equality or equity is better understood as giving priority to some individuals 
rather than equal treatment as is often assumed.  Human health concerns 
can indeed be framed in terms of efficiency or equity as economists frame it.  
Or as philosophers, starting with John Taurek have framed it, do numbers 
count in deciding whether to help one group of individuals that is larger than 
another? (Taurek, 1977)  The issue of trade-offs or aggregation cannot be 
avoided even by the CA.  Even the approach advocated by Nussbaum, and 
the argument for the CH, which sees a set of capabilities as pre-political 
entitlements belonging to every human being, cannot avoid the issue.  
Nussbaum says emphatically, in those situations where every individual does 
not have all of the basic capabilities, it must be seen as justice not being 
done.  Some press such an argument further and point to the necessity to 
rank capabilities as resources are limited everywhere and must be efficiently 
allocated.  Nussbaum may likely respond by comparing the CHCs to basic 
rights and reply that no one argues for tradeoffs when it comes to basic 
constitutional rights.  Such basic rights are constrained only in relation to the 
exercise of other basic rights, but a right is never completely denied for 
another.  Similar is the case for basic capabilities and aggregation of 
capabilities across individuals.  The CHCs cannot be ranked but must all be 
provided.  Where some cannot be fully provided up to the threshold level, 
then it must be seen as justice not yet being done. 
382. Creating a supportive environment for individual capabilities often 
entails affecting the mean-levels of behaviour in the population.  Changing 
the legal age for drinking, harsher penalties for drunk driving, making 
condoms freely available and without embarrassment are examples of efforts 
to change the social norms.  However, the individuals who are most 
vulnerable to impairments are often the hardest to reach.  These efforts to 
change the social norms do not reach individuals who may be isolated by 
social, economic, and even physical and psychological constraints.  
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Moreover, addressing the vulnerabilities of these few individuals does not 
affect the level of risk to the entire population.  That is, the number of 
individuals who will face an impairment even though they are at small risk 
can outnumber the individuals in the high risk group or the ‘tail-end’ of the 
population.  Public health programs that aim to maximize the health 
achievements of individuals are faced with aggregation or efficiency 
problems.  Here, the CA and the argument for the CH reorient the moral 
function of public health.  The respect for the equal dignity of the every 
human being means that consequential evaluation of actions to maximize 
health capabilities cannot stop short of addressing the constrains of those 
most difficult to reach.  Improving the capabilities of the many does not make 
up for others not having their minimal or threshold level of capabilities 
commensurate with human dignity.   
383. Peter Singer challenges Nussbaum with the critique that surely she 
would not spend significant resources to improve the capabilities of one 
individual at the cost of improving the capabilities of all others a little bit. 
(Singer, 2002)  Such a challenge could be superficially addressed by 
responding that the CA would not deny the entitlement to the equal dignity of 
one individual for the benefit of the many.  But perhaps that is too superficial 
a response to the underlying utilitarian analysis.  A more measured response 
would be that it would depend on the causes and consequences of the 
constraints on the individual’s capabilities as well as the range of responsible 
agents. The entitlement is to the social basis thus, realizing the capability 
could only occur through socially available pathways, or social bases, that 
respect the individual’s agency and choices.  Moreover, the presentation of 
this dilemma in terms of distributing resources significantly underplays the 
influences of non-material goods on the capabilities of individuals.  It may not 
be just the distribution of resources that is necessary to address that one 
individual’s constrained capability.  And indeed, if it was just a pure matter of 
choosing to allocating resources to one, or for the many, respecting equal 
dignity would indeed mean less for the many in order to ensure the equal 
dignity for all.  That is, a slight improvement for all would be worthwhile giving 
up if all others had basic capabilities, while the resources could provide one 
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individual with basic capabilities.  If everyone is below the thresholds of basic 
capabilities then there is no dilemma of choosing between bringing the many 
and the one up to the thresholds; all of them have to be brought up to the 
threshold.  And justice is not done until every one reaches the threshold. 
384. Section III: Biology and group rights 
385. Identifying and mitigating the determinants and consequences of 
health constraints in individuals can have repercussions for various groups to 
which the individuals belong.  For example, if a genetic attribute is identified 
as a risk factor, then individuals who are identified with that attribute, their 
families, and others related to those individuals may find themselves facing 
discrimination.  Or indeed, as experience with HIV/AIDS around the world 
has evidenced, when certain individuals are identified as being at high-risk, 
various groups they belong to become the target of social discrimination.  At 
the same time, biomedical research can often have repercussions for groups 
while researchers deal respectfully with individual interests.  For example, 
collecting genetic material for databases can be garnered through consent 
from individuals, but the methods of handling biological materials may violate 
group beliefs and practices.  The creation of ‘immortalized’ cell lines may be 
anathema to shared group beliefs.  Or interestingly, biomedical research into 
the genetic make up of a group of individuals may reveal information that 
contradicts shared understandings of lineage or place of origin that are 
central to group identity practices.  These variety of ways in which addressing 
the health concerns of individuals can impact the shared beliefs and 
practices of groups highlights the necessity to recognize group capabilities, at 
least in particular reference to health concerns. 
386. Conclusion: 
387. The analysis of health at the population level is one of the most 
significant achievements in the field of public health.  Despite the ferocious 
academic debates in epidemiology regarding the sustainability of the 
individual level bio-medical model in light of the population level analysis, 
there is much to be gained from making use of population health analysis.  
However, one of the interesting aspects of population level analysis is the 
question of where to draw the borders of the population.  This challenge 
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becomes more pressing given that the conception of health as the CH 
advocated here is a species-wide notion.  For most epidemiologists, the 
largest population group is the nation-state.  But nations have been divided, 
and others have been unified.  It might be simple to use national borders to 
assess the capabilities of individuals as the Human Development Report 
does presently.  But that does not mean that intervention to improve 
capabilities will necessarily be most effective at the national level.  Individual 
capabilities can be affected by the features of the family, community, nation-
state, and global geographical region.  There are many ways to group 
individuals.  The type of health issue will likely identify which sphere provides 
the most robust explanation and required intervention. 
388. As the CA exhibits a deep commitment to normative individualism, 
with a clear focus on the capabilities of individuals, there is much left unsaid 
about how capabilities of individuals work together.  How is it possible to 
aggregate individual capabilities in order to see what the levels are, whether 
they are being affected by social policies, or how they have been influenced 
by any one factor?  Moreover, individual health capabilities and collective 
action is only one area of group capabilities that needs to be explored.  The 
argument for the CH derives its coherence from being a cluster of basic 
capabilities that are grounded in human dignity.  Such a health capability 
would not be possible for a group without also identifying a cluster of basic 
group capabilities.       
389. This chapter has aimed to introduce some of the group aspects of 
health concerns.  In particular, it has tried to point to the difference between 
identifying the cause of incidence rates of a health constraint and the cause 
of individual impairment.  The discussion tried to show that addressing 
incidence rates may involve recognizing the features of groups, and the 
possibly such a concept as group capability.  The brief discussion also 
touched on aggregation and how the CA, particularly the argument for the 
CHCs and CH might handle an allocation decision that pits the capabilities of 
the many against the one. 
390. Social determinants and health research demonstrate that health 
capabilities and functionings of individuals are really bound up in processes 
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that extend much beyond an individual’s own volitional choices and agency.  
The argument for the CH reflects this by asserting the interdependence of 
CHCs as well as the interdependence of individuals.  Yet, it is still uncertain 
as to whether inter-dependent individuals with shared ends constitute 
anything more than just individuals.  Nussbaum writes, ‘Living with and 
toward others, with both benevolence and justice, is part of the shared public 
conception of the person that all affirm for political purposes’. (Nussbaum, 
2006: p 158)  Though such a conception of shared ends and shared life 
produces obligations to everyone to ensure each others entitlements, 
different agents will have differing levels of obligations.  The next chapter 
looks at what sort of obligations across national borders can be identified 
regarding the CH. 
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Chapter 8: CH and Cosmopolitan Justice 
 
 
 
391. Unlike other arguments for social justice, the CA does not need to 
relax any assumptions, or make theoretical compromises that allow for the 
‘non-ideal’ considerations of the international system in order to identify and 
evaluate the ethical claims of individuals outside of political borders.  The CA 
expresses the view that a theory of justice has to be fully aware of the extra-
societal ethical issues from the beginning.  (Sen, 2005)  When a theory of 
social justice begins with the individual human being as the primary moral 
agent, and in order to do justice to every human being, the theory has to 
recognize the important differences in the abilities of persons to pursue life 
plans arising from their internal features, conversion skills, and their external 
social and material conditions.  The CA does not exclude considering the 
factors that influence material and social conditions from outside of national 
borders.  Nor does the CA deny moral responsibilities in relation to one’s 
actions influencing the social and material conditions affecting individuals 
outside of one’s own national borders.  However, while these two points may 
be uncontroversial, the CA stands apart from other leading social justice 
theories in identifying positive obligations to help realize capabilities of 
human beings outside of one’s own national borders.  The nature and scope 
of the obligations can vary according to the social basis of the causal 
pathways to the capabilities and functionings of foreigners.  Nevertheless, the 
source of such moral obligations, for Nussbaum at least, arises out of the 
respect for the equal human dignity and moral worth of every human being. 
392. Section I: Social contracts and equal dignity 
393. The conception of CH as a species-wide entitlement is central to it 
being an extension of the CA.  However, such a conception also has 
significant implications for any theory of social justice that intends to 
distribute health, or more accurately, the social basis of health.  Chapter 1 
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argued that a conception of health is only defensible as a fully ethical idea 
that is applicable to every member of the human species.  Thus, any theory 
of justice that seeks to guarantee the social basis of health, using this 
coherent idea of health, becomes a cosmopolitan theory of justice.  Put in a 
more pithy way, when the CH is placed in the primary goods space of any 
theory of justice, it explodes it into a cosmopolitan theory.  Furthermore, even 
if a liberal theory presupposes group membership prior to reasoning about 
fair terms of social cooperation, it would still be committed to respecting the 
equal dignity and moral worth of every human being outside the group.  
Thus, it would still be committed to ensuring the CH of foreigners as equal 
human dignity and CH are inter-twined concepts. 
394. Recognizing that to be healthy is to have dignity worthy of a human 
being and yet, not recognizing any ethical obligations to respect the dignity of 
human beings outside political borders raises the problem of parochialism.  
What does it mean to show respect for the equal dignity of every human 
being when only the dignity of members of one’s own society is actively 
realized? Or put in another way, how does group membership create 
immunity from the obligation to respect the equal dignity of every human 
being?  If health was defined as a purely descriptive idea, or a socially 
relative concept, then indeed, there would be no obligation to distribute social 
bases of CH to outsiders for the same reasons used for those inside.  But 
because health is not a purely objective idea, and though it may be a concept 
that is socially relative above a threshold, there is a central concept of health 
that is an ethical idea pertaining to the dignity of the human being.  
Respecting the equal dignity of every human being means ensuring a 
sufficient threshold of the CH that is commensurate with equal human dignity 
of those inside and outside of one’s societal borders.  Responsibilities of 
agents, however, will vary according to their relationship to the causes, 
consequences, and distribution of the CH achievements and failures. 
395. Health defined as a free standing ethical concept that is derived from 
a conception of human dignity means that guaranteeing an entitlement to the 
social basis of health to only a sub-population of human beings requires 
justifying the unequal treatment of the remaining human beings.  Social 
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contract theories, which were originally motivated to assert the equal moral 
status of human beings, are now put in a defensive position.  Advocates of 
social contract theories must explain how a hypothetical agreement among 
human beings in the state of nature to construct a just society has always 
had an implicit understanding that it was a society made up of only a sub-
group of individuals living in the state of nature.  How does a theory separate 
out a sub-set of human beings to create an agreement for social 
cooperation?  For all its universalist intentions, the talk of state of nature and 
man, or advocating the theoretical importance of using only a minimal 
conception of persons, social contract theories implicitly require that the 
theoretical contractors know that they are members of a particular society 
prior to determining the rules for that society.   
396. The exclusion of children, women, or slaves for that matter, was 
thought to be justified because these individuals were considered to be 
unequal in the state of nature.  Thus, it would not be mutually advantageous 
for everyone to cooperate.  Their interests would be addressed derivatively at 
a secondary stage.  It is quite a different kind of exclusion to exclude other 
rough equals.  Unless that is, it is somehow argued that societies based on 
social contracts are themselves tiered according to different levels of rough 
equality of members.  Furthermore, none of these theories address the 
possible impact on the terms of cooperation resulting from the knowledge of 
the existence of outsiders to the social contract.  Outsiders only appear after 
the social contract is finalized, and are often seen as unjustly demanding the 
same treatment as individuals inside the social contract.  Social contract 
theorists are faced with justifying how political borders or national citizenship 
should be allowed to determine life prospects.   
397. One way of solving this conceptual problem is to understand species-
wide characteristics as purely objective natural features with no moral 
implications.  It would be much less of a problem to apply species-wide 
empirical concepts to a sub-group of human beings because any moral value 
given to the characteristics of the species would happen within the social 
contract.  For example, every member of the human species requires water 
and oxygen to keep staying alive.  But only within the social contract does the 
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descriptive requirement turn into an entitlement.  The social contractors 
transform the descriptive requirement for water and oxygen into a moral 
entitlement for whatever reason they create amongst themselves.  They do 
not have to worry about whether any human beings outside the social 
contract have any entitlements to water or oxygen.  The worry about 
outsiders dissipates when such social contractors reason as if they were the 
only human beings in universe.  Similarly, it is quite handy if the health of 
human beings can be laid out in a purely descriptive way, such as species-
typical functionings.  Then it can be argued that nothing about the descriptive 
facts attach to any moral obligations.  It is simply what describes a healthy 
human being.  Only within the social contract does a human being get an 
entitlement to the social basis of achieving such a state of health.  That is, 
the value for species-typical functioning is created only within the social 
contract.  And human beings outside the social contract who are not 
achieving that descriptive idea of health would, unfortunately, not have any 
claims on the members within the society for assistance.   
398. Aside from the retreat from universalist intentions and rhetoric, 
another embarrassment for social contract theories is the attempt to use or 
apply species-wide moral concepts only in relation to a sub-group of the 
human species.  This is most obvious when advocates of various social 
contract theories identify a set of ‘human rights’ after the rights and duties of 
members within the social contract are finalized.  By human rights, of course, 
they mean the rights of humans outside of their own social contract.  They do 
not talk of human rights of insider members.  Some theorists, such as David 
Miller, do not identify the ethical basis for the human rights of outsider human 
beings but just that their own society has some sort of obligation to respect 
them.  A few, such as Rawls, at least identify a second social contract among 
peoples, or groups of outsider human beings, as the source of human rights.  
But what is the justification used for those human rights aside from just being 
entitlements sui generis?   
399. Advocates of social contracts may be able to identify obligations to 
protect the human rights of outsiders because their societies protect human 
rights within domestic institutions and those of outsiders equally.  Thus, it can 
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be argued that they are respecting equal dignity of all human beings.  It is 
simply the case that members of the social contract have more rights and 
obligations beyond just the minimum human rights that the society aims to 
protect for every human being everywhere.  The conceptual problem arises, 
however, when social contract theories do not recognize any obligations to 
outsiders; when they do not build their social contract on top of equal 
treatment of all human beings, and yet exhort principles such as equal 
respect and concern for every human being.   
400. Faced with theories that implicitly begin with a sub-group of human 
beings, it may be misdirected to point out such starting points as being 
incoherent; that it does not make sense how only a sub-group of human 
beings in the state of nature participate in a social contract when they are all 
considered to be equal in the sate of nature prior to forming a social contract.  
It may be mis-directed because social contracts are hypothetical contracts, 
so it is not the procedural accuracy of what happens prior to establishing the 
social contract that matters.  There would be no theoretical loss if a social 
contract theory explicitly said that the contractors belong to a certain society.  
The critique that matters is whether these social contract theories recognize 
any moral obligations across the entire human species, and moreover, if they 
allow the concerns arising with interactions with outsiders to inform the 
creation of the basic terms of social cooperation.   
401. Relaxing the assumption of a single society leads further to a number 
of conceptual difficulties for the social contract theories.  Just like theoretical 
inconsistencies or disrespect that arises from excluding individuals who are 
not rough equals or possess health functionings within the normal range, 
excluding the concerns of foreigners also results in similar effects.  The 
explanation that theorizing about global justice is a situation of non-ideal 
theory which requires working with things as they are is a confounding one.  
The divergence of beliefs and practices among individuals does not result in 
pursuing non-ideal theory at the domestic level and thus, it should not at the 
global level.  The notion that differences between societies are greater than 
differences among individuals within liberal societies would be difficult to 
sustain.  Human beings wherever they are situated are entitled to equal 
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dignity.  A theory that does not treat them with equal dignity is one that is 
disrespectful.          
402. Whether referring to peoples, societies or nation-states, Rawls and 
others who base their conception of social justice on the social contract 
tradition conceive of individuals as having different rights and obligations 
within their societal borders versus outside.  Taken to an extreme, this 
‘relational-statist’ position—though no particular theory or individual 
advocates the extreme—contends that there are absolutely no moral rights 
and responsibilities to individuals or other entities outside one’s own societal 
borders. (Sangiovanni, 2007)  Justice does not exist in the space or relations 
between societies.  At the other end of the spectrum, there is the extreme 
‘cosmopolitan’ position—also which no theory or individual advocate—which 
asserts that there exist the same moral rights and responsibilities between 
individuals irrespective of societal borders.  At this end of the spectrum, 
national borders simply have no moral significance.  Though the background 
spectrum of the global justice debates has been laid out as the relational-
statist versus the cosmopolitan positions, most of the well known arguments 
take a middle ground approach.  The debate is largely about the theoretical 
structure that defends a position closer to one side or another of the 
spectrum.  Rawls’s conception of global justice for instance, is clearly on the 
relational side of the spectrum. He advocates a two-stage approach which 
begins with a domestic social contract between individuals, and then a global 
contract between societies.  This second stage of the contract identifies 
some principles governing the interactions between societies including some 
basic duties to assist or intervene in other societies. 
403. In following through a social-contract/relational-statist approach to 
health and justice across societies, such a perspective holds that it is just that 
an individual’s life prospects that are relative to their society.  While certain 
philosophers argue for the value of respecting a society’s or community’s 
social values and other shared features, some philosophers also seek to 
apply that same notion of respect or neutrality to the economic and material 
conditions of a society.  Just as some philosophers may find it important that 
social justice claims related to an individual’s life prospects are evaluated in 
 204 
 
relation the opportunity range shaped by local moral values, other 
philosophers argue that an individual’s life prospects should be relative to the 
opportunity range determined by the society’s level of development and 
wealth.  Economic development is seen as being socially relative similar to 
culture and shared sympathies.   
404. One way of reaching this understanding is to see a society’s level of 
development and wealth as being determined wholly by domestic factors 
such as the social and political culture of its citizens.  The level of social and 
economic development is itself an expression of social values and thus, it is 
reasonable to evaluate the justness of social arrangements by comparing the 
achievements of individuals with what other individuals are able to achieve in 
that society.  What this means with respect to health, if it is taken to its logical 
conclusion, is that an individual’s health is compared to the health of other 
co-nationals.  So, for example, if the average or ‘normal’ life expectancy in a 
society is twenty-five years, then any individual in that society would have 
claims to an opportunity range for twenty-five years of life.  Alternatively, it 
could argued that the individual has a claim to the social basis of reaching 
twenty-five years of life because achieving twenty-five year life span is 
though to be a valuable thing for every member of that society.  So living for 
twenty-five years could be valuable because it is instrumentally useful to 
equality of opportunity or because of its inherent value to a member of that 
society.  In the former example, twenty-five years is the standard because 
that is the most common and represents normality.  In the latter, twenty-five 
years could have been chosen because there is something valuable about 
having the same longevity as others, or about living for close to or exactly 
twenty-five years of life.  However, it must be recognized that any of these 
diverse types of reasoning behind ensuring the claims to the social basis of 
achieving twenty-five years of life span could be fundamentally altered when 
it is made cognizant of the situation of another set of human beings who live 
for an average of seventy five years or more.  Referring back to Kamm, if 
individuals value the experiential goods of life, then individuals will likely want 
more them.  No matter how we may have identified the twenty-five year 
 205 
 
mark, everything changes when it is learned that it is possible that human 
beings can live three times as long. 
405. Irrespective of whether the level of economic and social development 
of a society reflects the social values and culture of that society, identifying 
entitlements based on what is commonly achieved in that particular society is 
unsettling.  It makes profound sense that, because individuals living in rich 
countries continually push at the upper boundaries of longevity, individuals in 
such societies should be able to make claims for the social basis of the most 
commonly achieved life plans, or even states of well-being.  Their likely fair 
share can be expected to include the upper bounds of human longevity 
because the most common values are at the upper end of the spectrum.  
There is no need to make any kind of argument in these societies that 
individuals have claims to achieve the upper bounds of human longevity 
because their most common life expectancy values are already there.  And 
the notion of equality of opportunity meshes well with the statistically most 
commonly achieved values.  The most common and most ideal 
achievements are merged.  What sense would there be of ensuring the 
equality of opportunity to achieve a life span that is currently impossible, or a 
lifespan that is so low that it is virtually guaranteed for every individual 
without any social inputs.   
406. However, were it the case that economic development resulted in 
dramatic decreases in human longevity for the entire population, then it 
would almost be guaranteed that the arguments for the equality of 
opportunity to achieve the most common values and to achieve the upper 
bound values would become distinctly separate.  That is, if poverty were to 
protect and improve human longevity, it would likely be that individuals in rich 
countries would want to switch from having the equality of opportunity to 
achieve the most common values of longevity to equality of opportunity to 
achieve the global, upper bound values.  They would mobilize social 
institutions to realize that principle.  The argument for the equality of 
opportunity to achieve a fair share of the normal range of life prospects 
obfuscates the underlying value given to living a life span as long as 
possible.  Examining life expectancy shows that the equality of opportunity to 
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achieve a normal range of life plans contains an implicit underlying value of 
achieving a share of the normal range at the maximum end of what is 
humanly possible.  There is something of value in being able to live as long 
as possible for every human being.  This means that making life prospects 
relative to each society denies what is shared across the human species.  It 
should be the case that every human being would also give value to being 
maximally unimpaired throughout a life span that reaches for the upper 
bounds.  Nevertheless, social-contractarians or ‘nationalists’ argue that it is 
what is most common or normal within a society that should be the standard 
to which entitlements are linked. 
407. Daniels takes such a position in both his initial and newly revised 
argument.  He provides the example that a person with dyslexia would not 
have any social justice claims for assistance from even domestic institutions 
in a society which is largely illiterate.  If the most common range of life plans 
does not entail literacy, then dyslexia does not constrain achieving a fair 
share of that range.  Daniels gives no value to the possibility that literacy is a 
good thing for a human being, irrespective of the literacy of the surrounding 
population.  Nor does Daniels acknowledge that literacy is an inherently and 
instrumentally valuable functioning for a human being in the contemporary 
world.  As societies are becoming more integrated, it seems reasonable to 
think that being literate will be instrumentally valuable in the future. Of 
course, given this argument about dyslexia, Daniels also has to contend that 
individuals will only have entitlements to the most common range of life 
expectancy values as well.  It is quite ironic that domestically Daniels 
attempts to guarantee as expansive a range of life prospects as possible for 
individuals—given their corrected talents and motivations—by not 
guaranteeing their chosen share of the normal range of life plans only but 
also their fair share of the full range.  Yet, internationally, he is willing to 
accept that the normal range of life plans in certain societies will be quite 
narrow, not because the individual chose them, or because of their talents 
and skills, but because of what is most common.  In countries that 
experience acute and endemic mortality and impairments due to a variety of 
causes such as hunger or infectious disease epidemics, assessing the justice 
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claims of an individual according to the standard of the surrounding 
population appears morally suspect.   
408. As an alternative to a largely or completely nationalist approach to 
social and global justice, the CA advocates two methods of reasoning to 
counteract the consequences of looking only within societies.  One method of 
reasoning is to try to take the view of an ‘impartial spectator’ when evaluating 
the social arrangements of a society.  While impartiality runs through the 
work of many philosophers, Sen advocates for Adam Smith’s conception of 
impartiality as it seems to allow judgements of disinterested individuals from 
other societies into social decision making in the domestic context. (Sen, 
2005)  The second approach is to recognize a set of minimum social 
entitlements for every human being wherever they are living.  On the one 
hand, the impartial observer would be able to look at a situation like that of 
Daniels’s dyslexic individual in an illiterate society and be able to reason that 
just because everybody else is illiterate or indeed, dying at a young age, 
does not mean these facts determine the moral claims to a good life for this 
individual.  In so far as an entire society can share a common sympathy or 
indeed a common hatred as the case may be, it does not mean that whatever 
is shared is necessarily morally legitimate.  On the other hand, relegating 
individuals born in certain societies to a short and painful life because that is 
what others in that society experience is avoidable by protecting a minimum 
set of capabilities and functionings for every human being. 
409. What Sen, Nussbaum, and other CA advocates argue is that within a 
particular society realizing social justice entails ensuring that individuals have 
equitable capabilities, particularly with respect to some basic capabilities.  
Across societies, where they are unable to ensure basic capabilities, the 
duties to assist in realizing such capabilities belong to a range of actors.  The 
justification for the duties of each person to ensure the basic capabilities of 
others, according to Nussbaum’s capability theory, lies in the recognition of 
equal dignity and the good of shared sociability.  The identification of 
entitlements and duties of individuals by the CA irrespective of where they 
are in the global society places it on the cosmopolitan side of the global 
justice debates.  However, capabilities advocates, though identifying fairly 
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stringent duties to assist individuals across borders, do not minimize the 
importance of sovereignty or national borders.  The obligations to support the 
entitlements to basic capabilities of every human being should not be seen 
as being immediately overwhelming, to the point of undermining the identify 
or sovereignty of a nation.  Indeed, Nussbaum argues that sovereignty must 
be respected from the perspective of the CA because it is an expression of 
individual freedom and self-determination in creating a state.  As Nussbaum 
identifies, individuals may reasonably delegate their obligations to institutions 
for a range of good reasons including those of collective action problems, to 
fairly divide the duties, limited capacity, and to limit the responsibilities from 
erasing an individual’s personal life. (Nussbaum, 2006: p 308)    
410. This cosmopolitan approach to global justice has a number of 
implications to the CH argument.  Foremost, all members of the human 
species are the primary agents of social justice irrespective of where they are 
in the world, and irrespective of their physical and mental state.  A conception 
of global justice is built up from the individual and continually refers back to 
the capabilities of individuals.  This is in contrast to the social contract and 
resourcist traditions.  Rawls those who follow him such as Daniels, work on 
the starting assumptions that the individual moral agents of a social contract 
must have certain features.  Rawls relies on Hume’s analysis of the 
necessary ‘circumstances of justice’ for individuals to leave the state of 
nature to form a social contract for cooperation.  Hume argued that 
individuals should be roughly equal in power and capacity and be living in 
conditions of moderate scarcity.  Otherwise individuals could simply dominate 
one another for their own benefit and resources could be either too abundant 
to necessitate cooperation or too scarce to allow cooperation.  In addition to 
these circumstances of justice, Rawls also assumes that the moral agents of 
his theory possess a sense of justice and capacity to reason—to form and 
pursue their own conception of the good.  Beyond these two minimal 
characteristics, Nussbaum argues that Rawls also built in impartiality or 
objectivity into his moral agents through the use of the ‘veil of ignorance’.  
Their ignorance of their prospective social position would mean that they 
would be impartial about the situation of every individual in the society. 
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411. Thus, Rawls’s assumptions that his moral agents are reasonable and 
rational, roughly equal, and living in conditions of moderate scarcity have 
profound implications for the issue of health justice within and across 
societies.  It has already been argued, though Rawls may have seen these 
assumptions to be necessary in order to pursue his theory, result in excluding 
concerns of certain individuals in the determination of basic principles of 
justice as well as treating them as second-class citizens.  Their concerns, it is 
said, will be addressed later and derivatively after the basic structures are 
laid out in light of the features of other individuals.  Rawls recognizes that in 
constructing his social contract device, he has had to exclude certain 
individuals such as future generations, individuals that lack rationality due to 
severe impairments, foreigners, and so forth.  Indeed, Daniels’s effort to 
extend Rawlsian justice to health issues is presented as ‘relaxing’ the 
assumption that all the contracting agents are normally functioning over the 
entire life course.  Daniels considers health justice to be concerned about 
what happens to individuals when their health functioning goes below normal 
over the life course.  Daniels has had to accept, perhaps seen no problem 
until recently, that his theory of health viewed the health concerns of 
individuals with severe impairments as being outside justice; akin to health 
concerns of individuals outside of national borders or those living in extreme 
scarcity.  In those situations, it is argued that beneficence and compassion 
apply, but not a framework of justice. 
412. While Rawls and Daniels may see great benefit in pursuing a 
theoretical structure with such assumptions, there are a number of 
consequences that undermine the coherence of their subsequent analysis as 
well as the integrity of the whole project.  Nussbaum makes a very powerful 
and clear argument that Rawls’s theory, despite being the best exemplar of 
the social contract tradition, still does not treat all human beings with equal 
dignity and respect.  By excluding individuals with impaired mental and 
physical abilities from being primary moral agents and consequently, not 
treating them as equal citizens, such theorizing violates the equal dignity of 
all human beings, and instrumentally undermines a more just society.   
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413. Rawls excludes health issues, and thereby, individuals with severe 
physical and mental impairments from the Original Position, because they 
would violate his conditions that make social contract possible.  Following 
Hume’s reasoning that for individuals to leave the state of nature in order to 
form a mutually beneficial cooperative venture individuals would have to be 
roughly equal in powers and there must be an environment of moderate 
scarcity.  Rawls adds some further stringent conditions in order for his social 
contract device to function.  He stipulates that individuals need to be free, 
independent, and rational.  Thus, individuals cannot be dependent on others 
or be concerned with the welfare of others.  Individuals must also have the 
capacities to rationally conceive their life plans and pursue such plans.  
Individuals with severe physical and mental impairments would violate these 
conditions.  But most importantly, these conditions or stipulations are meant 
to outline that individuals form a cooperative venture in which every individual 
has something productive to contribute to the venture, and that it is mutually 
advantageous to everyone.  If an individual is not sufficiently or wholly 
capable of contributing to the cooperative venture then they pose a 
theoretical problem.  Why would the others who are only self-interested 
agree to include a ‘dead-weight’ in their venture?  Rawls reasons that they 
would not, just as did Locke and others.  Thus, Rawls leaves out individuals 
who are not within the ‘normal’ range of physical and mental functioning.  
What this essentially means is that those individuals, in so far as they are 
capable of participating in political discussions and making choices are not 
included in the choosing of basic political principles.  Moreover, they are not 
allowed to inform the kinds of primary goods that individuals would want.  
This is so because the individual interests represented by the parties can be 
only that of independent individuals.  And they are working under the 
assumption that individuals will be fully functioning normally throughout their 
life course.  Even though they are supposed to be reasonable, they would not 
be able to identify as primary goods such things as the social bases for 
health, care, and other things and conditions that impaired individuals would 
find valuable in light of their extra needs and constraints on conversion skills. 
 211 
 
414. While the work of Daniels with regard to health issues and Rawls’s 
theory is noteworthy, it is important to get a true picture of what he has and 
has not done.  That is, Daniels has not addressed the concerns of individuals 
who are severely physically or mentally impaired.  Instead, he has taken the 
perspective of the contractors and relaxed the assumption about their health 
over the life course.  So the concerns of individuals left out of the formation of 
basic principles and identification of primary goods are not addressed by 
satisfying the health concerns of a different group of individuals who 
periodically or permanently get impaired over the life course.  Admittedly the 
concerns of the two groups overlap.  For example, an individual whose legs 
are paralyzed from birth and someone whose leg breaks whilst skiing would 
share a similar interest in having entrance ramps and mechanized doors to 
buildings.  But what Daniels tried in the beginning was simply to argue that 
individuals who see the possibility of impairments in their lives would want 
healthcare put on the primary goods list.  And surely, individuals who are 
severely impaired, if they were involved in the social contract rule making 
would also want healthcare on the list of primary goods.  But, it is likely that 
they would want other things as well.   
415. As Nussbaum argues, the social basis of care would be prominent on 
the list.  Individuals would find it valuable for society to ensure that there are 
individuals to provide care for them when they needed it, and that the carers 
are sufficiently supported in their roles.  But as important as care is, severely 
impaired individuals would want to ensure that the social basis of health 
functionings were on the list, not just healthcare.  The severely impaired and 
their carers understand first hand, more than the ‘normally functioning’, that 
protecting and maintaining physical and mental functioning is not just a 
question of access to healthcare but an active management of a process 
involving the social environment, individual choices, genetic endowment, and 
sheer luck.   
416. In the revised argument, Daniels argues that individuals who foresee 
the possibility of impairments in their lives would ensure that the ‘social 
determinants of health’ would be distributed fairly, which in essence, 
encompasses the entire social basis of health.  But Daniels does not directly 
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put these social bases on the list.  Instead, he argues that the contractors 
would build healthcare institutions as basic social institutions which help 
realize the primary good of equality of opportunity.  And interestingly, the 
non-healthcare, social determinants of health are ‘serendipitously’ already 
distributed fairly by the two principles of justice.   But we should not lose sight 
of the fact that the severely impaired are still not treated equally as citizens 
under Daniels’s scheme.  And, though more of their health concerns may be 
addressed through this broader distribution of the social determinants, there 
is no guarantee that all of their concerns are addressed or in the priority with 
which they would have organized them if they were involved from the 
beginning.   
417. In an ironic result, though Daniels advocates for the importance of 
justice in health, he excludes the people who in fact need such health justice 
the most.  The severely impaired individuals within his developed democratic 
society are likely to need more social assistance in regard to their health 
issues, as are the majority of the world’s population living in deprivation 
which produces preventable morbidity and mortality.  Daniels argues, as 
other individuals do when confronted with the shortcomings of a theory of 
justice, that the fact that Rawls’s theory cannot address the interests of these 
individuals means their interests are not a matter of justice.  The scope of 
justice simply does not extend to cover their interests.  Instead, he argues 
that the interests of the severely impaired are a matter for the beneficence 
and compassion of society, while the health concerns and wider needs of 
individuals in poor countries is a challenge for future generations of 
philosophers to figure out how to address. 
418. There is a tension in Daniels’ theory with respect to how he links a 
supposedly factual scientific concept of species-normal functionings and the 
limited duties in regard to the health capability of those outside the national 
borders.  The full knowledge of excluding other members of the human 
species from the theorizing must surely have implications.  David Miller has a 
similar issue in his defence of the nation state. (Miller, 2002; Miller, 2005)  He 
argues that members of a society can indeed be partial to compatriots 
because they share common sympathies.  But Miller also argues that 
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individuals in this society also have a moral duty to ensure that any other 
human being in the world has their basic human rights.  Moreover, he argues 
that where the state or social institutions cannot ensure the basic human 
rights of individuals within their borders, they are not legitimate governments.  
That is, individuals whose basic human rights are not met are living in a state 
of nature.  But it is unclear Miller reconciles that on he one hand, there are a 
huge number of individuals living in metaphorical state of nature, and on the 
other hand,  the subset of humans beings he belongs to decided to construct 
their own separate cooperative agreement.  In both Daniels and Miller, one 
can see difficulties that arise in the social contract tradition when theorizing 
about global justice tries to span both ideal theory and the realism of 
international relations. 
419. Section II : Two problems 
420. There are at least two areas that need greater exploration in the area 
of health and global/social justice.  The first area concerns the reality that 
determinants of the health of individuals and populations are trans-national.  
New and resurgent infectious diseases beginning with the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic in the 1980s followed by SARS, avian flu, foot and mouth disease, 
multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis and others have brought to the forefront how 
the increasing interconnectedness of societies also makes them more 
vulnerable to biological threats to life.  For a multitude of man-made reasons, 
the rate at which new and resurgent infectious diseases affecting human 
populations has been steadily increasing over the past three decades.  
Indeed, such vulnerability to biological threats through interconnectedness 
was thoroughly apparent in the spread of the bubonic plague that started in 
China before entering Europe in the 14th century.   
421. Though the history of infectious diseases and human populations 
show the consequences of both ever-growing settled populations and 
interactions between such settled communities, it would be hard to ignore the 
fact that the determinants of health across trans-national borders are not just 
infectious biological organisms.  Social and material factors also move across 
borders.  The social and economic relationships between societies have 
previously had both negative and positive impact on the health of individuals 
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and populations.  Sometimes the critics of contemporary globalization or 
colonialism underplay the benefits to health of interconnectedness.  Indeed, 
negative examples are aplenty.  For example, the European settlers in the 
American colonies in some cases unknowingly, and in some cases 
purposefully altered the social and material conditions which resulted in the 
extinction of various native populations.  That is, aside from killing them 
simply using guns, their continual annexation of land and denial of access to 
traditional ways of sustenance resulted in dramatic increases in mortality and 
impairments.  At the same time, the wealth from trade as well as knowledge 
from other societies has improved the health and life expectancy of many 
European countries.  Also, increasing forms and speed of communication 
has allowed citizens of developing countries to accrue health benefits just 
from information such as that on nutrition, sanitation, or biological threats.  
The health benefits and burdens resulting from the longstanding relationships 
between human communities are undeniable even if there is disagreement 
over which has been greater for a given society.  
422. The historical evidence of the positive and negative effects of trans-
national interactions on the health of individuals and populations militates 
against the idea that there is no global society or that human societies are 
mutually independent entities.  Though there may well be significant 
disagreements on when the processes of interconnectedness between 
societies really became established in which parts of the world, there can be 
little doubt that contemporary societies are and will become even more inter-
related.  If nothing else, the rapid spread across national borders of infectious 
diseases through human interaction evidences the shared vulnerabilities 
arising from being human beings, and the necessity to coordinate a response 
across the human community to mitigate the vulnerability.   
423. Alternatively, global society can be made up from the shared 
vulnerability of human beings to biological threats that arise from interactions, 
and the necessity to coordinate an appropriate response.  From there, it 
becomes easier to see that it is not only infectious biological agents but 
social and material determinants that also require regulating.  As a result of 
the ever more increasing interdependence of human societies across the 
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world, addressing the shared vulnerabilities resulting from the common 
features of human beings can be the source of cooperation across societies 
in contrast to establishing mutual deterrence principles against aggression 
from other societies.  The mutual recognition of the vulnerabilities to 
premature death and impairments as a result of human interactions within 
and across societies forms the basis of recognizing a global society of 
individual human beings, rather than one of national states.       
424. The processes of trans-national interactions which transform material 
and social conditions of societies that then influence the mortality and 
impairment burden of individuals and populations are easily recognizable in 
many contemporary societies.  There are many who argue that increased 
economic development through greater participation in the global economy 
will directly result in the improved longevity and quality of life of populations.  
Such a causal relationship may sometimes be true depending on the choice 
of economic policies, as evidenced by the varied experiences of China, India, 
Japan and other South-East Asian countries.  The opposite can also be the 
case as evidenced by the rise in preventable mortality and impairments in 
Russia after economic liberalization programs.  In light of both the 
vulnerabilities engendered by societal interconnectedness as well as the 
possible benefits, there are many ethical issues that arise in regard to the 
terms of trans-societal social cooperation.  In regard to health, there is a 
pressing concern to identify the terms of trans-national interactions in order to 
mitigate the biological as well as the social determinants which undermine 
the CH of individuals and populations of all societies.  If the equality of 
opportunity to achieve a fair share of life plans is a basic entitlement in a 
particular society, then ensuring such an entitlement would require engaging 
with the broad spectrum of agents which influence determinants originating 
from outside the national borders. 
425. The second area of concern is the question of what claims can 
individuals make to agents outside of their national borders when the basic 
social institutions within are either purposefully constraining their CH, lack the 
resources or knowledge to provide the social basis of the capability, or 
indeed, the basic social institutions are only partially existent if at all.  In times 
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of acute crisis that may overwhelm the capacity of a society’s institutions to 
adequately respond, agents outside the national borders may be motivated 
by beneficence to provide assistance in the form of material goods and other 
technological resources.  But what about the constraints on the health 
capability of individuals and populations during non-emergencies?  Can 
claims to support health capability still only appeal to beneficence?     
426. It may seem at first that in countries with the highest magnitude of 
mortality and impairments that what is needed to improve the health 
capability of individuals is material resources.  Improved nutrition, adequate 
sanitation, better housing conditions, vaccinations, education and so forth 
would dramatically relieve the constraints on the capability of individuals to 
be healthy.  But a more thorough examination of even the most basic causal 
pathways to health in the poorest of countries would show that the causal 
pathway includes both material goods and social conditions.  Even what 
seems to be a purely resource issue such as the improving rates of infant 
mortality through the provision of vaccinations requires addressing the social 
conditions in which mothers are situated.  The availability of the vaccine in a 
particular locale has to be matched with the social conditions which allow 
mothers to be aware of its availability and efficacy as well as the freedom to 
move to physically access the resource for their infant.  Indeed, resources 
such as vaccinations suggest that improving the CH of individuals could 
improve significantly simply with the provision of material goods at a certain 
point in time. The ‘silver bullet’ approach which is focused on providing goods 
to alleviate immediate threats to life or provide life long immunity can have 
significant impact but only with respect to those specific threats.  Ensuring 
that an individual has the capability to live a normal length of life and avoid 
impairments requires a supportive social and material environment over the 
life course.  In light of this, what moral claims can an individual make to 
agents outside of their national borders when their health capability is being 
maliciously constrained by domestic agents, or their society’s institutions are 
simply incapable of adequately mitigating the various constraints that are 
caused by genetic endowment, material and social conditions, and luck? 
427. Section III:  What ‘we’ owe the global poor 
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428. It should be clear that the present discussion has framed the issue of 
health and global justice from the perspective of individuals no matter where 
they are situated in the world.  Global justice debates often tend to be 
concerned with the right foreign policy of wealthy countries rather than about 
identifying an ethical global structure for all human beings.  It is unfortunate 
that current global justice debates generally and in specific relation to health 
concerns have largely been framed as attempting to determine ‘what do we 
owe to those distant needy’.  The assumptions underlying such a starting 
position are numerous and blinker the discussion from many important 
considerations.  Such a framework which conflates global justice as being 
largely about distributive justice and furthermore, as being about transferring 
goods from (we) richer to poorer countries is simply too rudimentary.  This is 
not to say that identifying ethical principles for foreign policy is not important; 
it is crucially important.  Yet, these discussions on the right foreign policy of 
rich countries towards the ‘global needy’ seem to be of the same tenor as the 
discussions on (domestic) social justice when it was centrally focused on 
whether morality required the transfer of material resources from the wealthy 
to the poor.  The various arguments for the global transfer of resources also 
seem to be uninformed by the longstanding debates over at least that past 
three decades in development ethics.  Recent philosophical arguments for a 
global dividend, health tax, or entitlements to basic needs under the heading 
of global justice rarely reflect or integrate the arguments already put forward 
and analysed in the development economics and development ethics 
literature.   
429. In addition, the ‘what do we owe them’ perspective does a great 
disservice both to the individuals in the ‘them’ category and to basic liberal 
principles.  It would hardly seem acceptable in discussions of a liberal 
conception of domestic justice if the distribution of benefits and burdens were 
largely discussed in relation to groups or classes of people.  The criteria of 
justice are assessed in relation to the individual as the primary moral agent.  
Liberal ethical reasoning takes the perspective of the individual, and seeks to 
identify individual benefits and burdens and secondarily, overall social 
considerations.  Global justice debates so far take the perspective of rich 
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individuals or societies and seek to identify the moral obligations they have, if 
any, to improve the conditions of a group of poor individuals within other 
countries, or the global poor en masse.  In contrast, the concern for the worst 
off in (domestic) social justice theories is discussed in terms of individuals, 
not as a class.  
430. There is a loss when reasoning loses sight of the liberal principle of 
each person as an end.  Even if the threat from utilitarian aggregation has 
been put aside post-Rawls, the global justice debates currently use 
aggregate analysis that looks far too similar to utilitarian analysis.  The most 
prominent example can be seen in Charles Jones’s argument for achieving 
global justice which entails protecting certain basic human rights. (Jones, 
1999)  He argues that if there are any basic human rights, then there are 
basic rights to food, clothing, education, and so forth.  But his argument for 
ensuring such rights is that it will improve overall, global welfare.  Despite the 
use of the rhetoric of basic human rights, it is rule-utilitarianism par 
excellence.  
431.  A contrasting and rare example of global and aggregate analysis 
that is cognizant of each person as an end is the tenor of Paul Farmer’s 
analysis of global justice.  It is pervasively informed by the memories of first-
hand experience providing medical assistance and personally engaging with 
distinct individuals in Haiti, other developing countries as well as in poor 
sections of the United States.  The arguments for addressing the global 
structural violence inflicted on the ‘global poor’ are grounded in the 
knowledge of explicit causal pathways to individual well-being in particular 
poor countries that can legitimately be extrapolated to the situations of other 
groups of individuals in other societies.  Individual human beings are the 
primary agents of justice and must be treated as distinct individuals with their 
own ends.   
432. Philosophers who start with peoples and nations as primary agents 
of global justice or who carelessly slip into group analysis when evaluating 
global inequalities compromise the basic starting principle of the distinctness 
of human beings.  Nussbaum, for example, criticizes Rawls for his 
willingness or toleration of the violence against women by allowing for 
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‘decent peoples’ to be parts of his global social contract rather than only 
liberal societies that treat every human being with equal respect. The 
emphasis on the necessity to be ‘realistic’ in the interactions with other 
societies and to be tolerant of the violation of individual dignity or similarly, be 
satisfied with improving aggregate indicators of well-being in other societies 
undermines the integrity of the arguments used to justify domestic theories of 
justice.  
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433. This dissertation presented an argument for a moral entitlement to a 
capability to be healthy in three parts.  In Part One, Chapter 1 presented an 
argument for a fully evaluative conception of health as a capability to achieve 
a cluster of basic capabilities and functionings that are commensurate with 
equal human dignity.  Chapter 2 presented a unified theory of causation and 
distribution of health that integrated the class biomedical model of disease 
with the entitlement analysis of malnutrition.  This integration produced a 
model of causation and distribution of the CH which encompassed the causal 
components of biological features, conversion skills, exposures to material 
goods, and social conditions. 
434.  Part Two presented the normative argument for the CH.  Chapter 3 
briefly summarized the CA and Chapter 4 presented the normative argument 
for the CH.  Part Three focused on defending capabilities against alternative 
theories.  Chapter 6 reviewed how health claims were addressed by welfarist 
and resourcist approaches.  Chapter 6 reviewed the comments of Pogge and 
Daniels’s recently revised Rawlsian approach to health and social justice.  
Chapters 7 and 8 briefly considered the notion of group capabilities in light of 
the ‘population health’ concept in public health and the implications for global 
justice theory that result from using a concept of health as a species-wide 
capability. 
435. Some areas for future research 
436. The introduction discussed the space and time constraints on the 
present dissertation, and the need to put various aspects of the argument 
aside.  While those areas need to be pursued further in future research and 
integrated into the present argument, there are several points that CA 
advocates might now consider in light of the CH argument. 
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437. Both Nussbaum and Sen give a significant role to public deliberation.  
Such recourse to public deliberation is not a way to resolve difficult dilemmas 
by deferring it to a public vote.  Public reasoning is seen as central to the 
process of justice.  Indeed, Nussbaum clearly sees herself as a participant in 
public deliberation, and advocates for a list of central human capabilities.  
She is confident that participating in deliberations across different societies is 
possible, and that her list of central human capabilities can achieve 
overlapping consensus across societies.  For Sen, public deliberation is also 
important through and through.  Public deliberation is seen as the appropriate 
method or vehicle to identify what capabilities to consider as being basic 
entitlements; what the thresholds should be; and how to evaluate 
consequences and distribution patterns.  However, aside from simply 
referring to public deliberation, there is no clear sense in the CA of what the 
structure or methodology of public reasoning would look like.  Without a 
clearer sense of public deliberation, the CA runs the risk of becoming another 
resource theory that thinks of individuals as recipients of capabilities rather 
than as active agents.  This dissertation has highlighted the importance of 
autonomy and agency in the CH.  To be able to life a normal life length of life 
span and protect and promote their basic capabilities and functionings 
individuals must be knowledgeable about and engaged with the varied 
causes and consequence of their CH over the life course.  The CA 
conception of public deliberation, particularly as it relates to the basic 
capabilities in the CH, needs to be examined further.  Such consideration 
must be connected to a greater appreciation of the self-realization of 
capabilities. 
438. This dissertation has briefly discussed the health aspects of groups, 
making it plausible to think of group capabilities.  Evaluating the dynamics of 
health at the individual and population level show that population health is not 
simply a summation of individual health, nor is group health divisible into 
individual level health.  The differences between causes of incidence rates of 
impairments and the causes of individual cases of impairments show that 
distinct dynamics occur at various levels from the individual, neighbourhood, 
city, nation, and beyond.  While it is clear that the CA is centrally focused on 
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individuals having sufficient or equitable basic capabilities, there needs to be 
further exploration of group capabilities.  It simply cannot be something that is 
thought to be nonsensical, or dismissed as being too close to the utilitarian 
pursuit of aggregate welfare. 
439. The CH argument expands the scope of the social bases of health to 
include a broad range of causal factors.  Yet, expanding the scope to 
encompass the diverse range of causal components of the CH raises the 
question of coordination.  Whether for CH, or any other capability, ensuring 
the social bases of a capability entails coordinating social support across a 
variety of institutions.  This raises the question of how one organizes in 
theory and in practice the protection and promotion of basic capabilities such 
as the CH.  If capabilities are multi-dimensional, then is it too simplistic to 
continue to imagine that one institution of social sector will focus on each 
capability.  It is clearly not the case the CH will be protected, promoted, and 
restored only through the actions of healthcare institutions.  If it is coherent to 
think of protecting, promoting and restoring capabilities as requiring the 
actions of diverse social institutions and other agents with an even more 
diverse range of responsibilities in relation to the causes, consequences, and 
distribution patterns of the CH, then it is hard to imagine that healthcare 
institutions will still be the central place for ensuring the CH.  And if the 
causal model of the CH can be applied to any capability, then the question of 
coordination becomes central to the implementation of any capability.  CA 
advocates need to consider more closely how basic social institutions could 
coordinate social responses in relation to the support of human capabilities. 
440. It has been argued here that a person’s ability to live for a normal 
length of life span cannot be neatly separated from physical and 
psychological functioning.  Death is the ultimate constraint on the somatic 
and psychological capabilities and functionings of an individual.  It follows 
from this that a ‘right to life’ cannot be separate from a ‘right to health’.  The 
CH is conceived as a meta-capability with death as the ultimate constraint.  
Such an argument for the CH should motivate advocates of the CA to 
examine the coherence of concepts such as health, life span, disease, 
illness, and other related concepts.  Indeed, the CA advocates should 
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consider jettisoning the idea of disease altogether and focus more on the 
capability to be healthy and impairment concepts. 
441. The CA must examine more closely the determinants of mortality and 
impairments, and not just rely on their prevalence statistics.  Indeed, extant 
statistics on mortality and impairments evidence a meaningful picture of the 
gross inequalities in the quality of life of individuals within and across most 
countries.  Nevertheless, relying on prevalence statistics can be vulnerable to 
criticisms of using incoherent underlying conceptions of health, and theories 
of health causation and distribution.  It is necessary to go beyond the 
prevalence statistics in order to thoroughly identify the full scope of claims 
that may arise from the causal components of personal features, conversion 
skills, exposures to material goods, and social conditions.  The entitlement 
theory has provided a useful framework to examine the causation and 
distribution of a specific health functioning, and its applicability to other health 
issues is worth exploring further independently or through the CH causal 
model presented here. 
442. The CA must quickly begin to integrate research on social 
determinants of impairments and mortality.  The research findings are too 
robust to ignore, and also support many of the central ideas in the CA.  
Advocates of the CA could significantly contribute to social determinants 
research by helping to develop a unified theory of health causation and 
distribution that coherently integrates the breadth of causal components.  
Furthermore, CA advocates contribute by fleshing out the ideas of agency, 
opportunity, and dignity used in the research.        
443. While this dissertation has wholly side-stepped these issues, the CA 
needs to provide more reasoning on the role of personal responsibility and 
luck in relation to capabilities.  Of particular interest to the present argument 
for the CH is how to relate the notion of luck to the diverse causal 
components.  Choices, responsibility and luck work through these four 
components, but it is unclear how to integrate them into such a model. 
444. CA advocates need to be able to show how to allocate social 
resources across the capabilities for a given individual and groups of 
individuals.  The discussion on group capabilities highlighted the inter-related 
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ideas of aggregating features across individuals and addressing a feature of 
the group.  Aiming for efficiency in supporting individual capabilities may 
require using aggregate analysis.  But it is unclear whether such aggregation 
is also implicitly recognizing a feature of the group independently of the 
specific individuals that belong to it at a given time.  The commitment to 
normative individualism in the CA is too important to not have clear reasoning 
in this area. 
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